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Abstract
The thesis investigates the role of public actors in private rule-making processes
at the example of the European Commission’s interventions in private industry
standardization in the mobile telecoms, high-definition television, digital broad-
casting and intermodal transport industries. It demonstrates that, far from having
replaced public rule-making or representing a form of ‘better’ regulation, the
private development of technical standards is constrained by the same collective
action and decision-making problems that constrain conventional policy-making
processes. Without the facilitating interventions of public actors, private standard
setters often struggle to overcome these constraints. The ability of public actors
to facilitate the private development of technical standards, however, depends
on a number of conditions. First they need to rely on entrepreneurial rather
than conventional policy instruments based on hierarchical authority and the
power of hard law. Hierarchical interventions—in addition to the well-known
information problems—only tend to have the unintended effect of exposing tech-
nical standardization processes to political contestation, exacerbating the inherent
decision-making problems. Entrepreneurial interventions, by contrast, may fa-
cilitate the private development of technical standards without exposing the
standardization process to political contestation. While such interventions may
raise serious legitimacy concerns, they also depend on a number of conditions,
such as early intervention, the presence of industry crisis, and the availabil-
ity of positive feedback mechanisms that drive compliance with the developed
standards. With its focus on technical standardization, this thesis seeks to con-
tribute to wider debates on self– and co–regulation and the transforming role of
government in the governance of advanced market economies more broadly.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Private Industry Standardization as Better Regu-
lation?
Technical standards are everywhere—even where one would least expect to find
them. Take football, for instance: From shin guards, to goal posts and even the
surface of the pitch almost every aspect of the game is governed by technical
standards.1 Football, however, is for from an exception. Technical standards
penetrate into almost every aspect of our daily lives and the international economy
alike.2 According to the oecd (1999a), more than 80% of world trade is already
directly affected by technical standards.
Although technical standards are usually unnoticed unless they are missing—
as anyone that will be able to confirm who, while traveling, has been confronted
with an incompatible electricity socket—they can fulfill a variety of important
economic functions. At the one end of the spectrum, reference and quality
standards signal consumers that a specific product or service is “fit for purpose”
(iso, 2005, p. 10), complying with a set of health, safety, or environmental
quality levels etc. Thereby technical standards significantly increase the efficiency
of economic transactions by resolving information asymmetries regarding the
quality of products between buyers and sellers (Akerlof, 1970). On the other hand,
compatibility and interface standards govern the technological and transactional
interconnectivity between different goods and services (David & Greenstein, 1990;
David & Steinmueller, 1994, p. 218). For reasons discussed further below, this
thesis focuses on the latter and defines technical standards as codifications of
1European Norm (en) 13061, en 748, and en 12232, en 12233 & en 14954 respectively, see cen
(2008, p. 22).
2This thesis itself provides plenty more examples. It was written on a qwerty keyboard, for
instance, the de facto keyboard standard; printed with a printer conforming with the European de
jure health and safety standards en60950 and en60825-1 that are presumed to conform with the
essential requirements of the 73/23/eec Low Voltage Directive; however, not always complying
with ilo’s c171 Night Work Convention.
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technology, intended for voluntary but wide-scale and repeated use.3
Technical standards are generally developed in private, industry-driven
standards-writing organizations, which stand outside of—and tend to be com-
pletely independent from—conventional policy-making processes. Therefore,
their wide prevalence and the central role they tend to play in the governance
of economic transactions could be interpreted as evidence for the superior gov-
ernance capacity of private rule-makers. In an area where public governance is
increasingly constrained by the accelerating pace of technical change and eco-
nomic internationalization, public actors find themselves increasingly unable to
provide the governance—i.e. coordination and public goods—that they used to
be able to provide. First, the accelerating pace of technical change is considered
to have created a growing information gap between private and public actors
(Knill, 2001, p. 237). Public actors are considered increasingly unable to acquire
the information and expertise that is necessary to govern complex markets such
as information and communication technologies (ict) and international finance.4
Because of economic internationalization, secondly, governments find themselves
increasingly faced with trans-national challenges, such as global warming, finan-
cial crisis or international migration, that exceed the reach of their jurisdiction
and instruments of governmental intervention.
Private standard-setters, by contrast, are unconstrained by jurisdictional
boundaries and information problems. They are generally expected to be able
provide the rules and coordination that public actors increasingly fail to provide.
And for they have a market incentive to update their information and to monitor
market trends and technological developments continuously (Abbott & Snidal,
2001, p. 365; David, 1985, 1990), governance through private industry standard-
ization rather than public law or regulation is considered to be based on superior
information and it is expected to allow for more flexible and timely governance
than could be provided by public rule-makers (Abbott & Snidal, 2001, p. 345).
This interpretation is also shared by public policy-makers themselves—especially,
though not exclusively, by the European Commission.5.
Technical standardization is also presented as a magic formula to cure a wide
range of policy problems. Technical standardization, for instance, is presented as
a way to promote growth, innovation and competitiveness:
A strong role for Europe in international standardization means European
leadership in new markets and gaining first-mover advantages in global
markets.
3This is loosely based on the definition provided by de Vries (1999).
4Eberlein and Grande (2005, p. 54), Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002, p. 241), Breyer (1982, pp. 109-
119), and Ogus (1994, p. 107)
5European Commission [ec], 2004a, p. 2; 2004b, 2008a; European Council, 2002
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(ec, 2008b)
This perception has been reinforced—and appears to have been intended to
be reinforced—by a range of studies commissioned by national governments
and standards-writing organizations, which all emphasize the strong positive
impact of technical standardization on economic performance. It is suggested
that technical standardization contributes to about 1% to 2.6% of growth domestic
product (gdp) growth and that their contribution to labor productivity growth is
larger than that of patents.6
Governance through standards is even seen as an opportunity to circumvent
the decision-making problems that often tend to gridlock conventional public
policy-making processes. Günter Verheugen, the previous vice-president of the
Commission, for instance, suggested that:
This [private standardization] is an excellent example of better regulation
[. . . ] We thus avoid that legislation becomes overloaded with excessive
technical details, we guarantee flexibility because European Standards can
be easily adapted and reviewed [. . . ].
(cen, 2005)
In the European Union (eu) quasi-regulatory tasks are therefore often delegated
to private standard-setters. The removal of technical barriers to trade by leg-
islative processes, as set out in the 1969 General Programme on the Removal of
Technical Obstacles to Trade, had turned out to be too cumbersome and time-
consuming (Egan, 2001, pp. 78-81). The legislative process was often held up
by the politicization of minor technical issues of legislation. Therefore, the New
Approach to technical harmonization and standardization was introduced in 1985
(European Council, 1985b). It was meant to circumvent the ‘joint-decision trap’
of the European policy-making process (Scharpf, 1988) by privatizing market
regulation. The New Approach delegates the task to remove the ‘technical’ to mar-
ket integration to the European standards-writing organizations, which included
cen (European Committee for Standardization), cenelec (European Committee
for Electrotechnical Standardization) and etsi (European Telecommunications
Standards Institute).
The widespread assumption that the broad prevalence of private standards—
as well as the wide range of governance functions that these appear to—fulfill,
provided evidence for the higher governance capacity of private standard-setters,
however, is directly at odds with two facts: First, the private development of
technical standards should be expected to be constrained by significant collective
6Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1994), Blind (2004), Department of Trade and Industry (2005)
and DIN (2000), Department of Trade and Industry (2005)
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action and decision-making problems. Secondly, private industry standardization
tends to perform best where the presence of the state looms large over private
standardization. The following two Sections (1.1.1 & 1.1.2) elaborate these puzzles
in greater detail and suggest that their combination could be interpreted to mean
that private standardization may not be as private as it may seem and that
public actors may have a considerable role to play in the private development
of technical standards, despite the various constraints of public actors discussed
in Section 1.2. Therefore, the central research question that this thesis’ seeks
to investigate, and which is elaborated below, is: In what circumstances, if any,
are public actors able—and willing—to intervene and foster the private development of
technical standards?
1.1.1 How do Private Standard-Setters Resolve their Collective
Action and Decision-Making Problems?
As is often the case in the private development and implementation of self-
regulatory measures in general (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011, p. 55; Börzel, 2007,
p. 47), the development of technical standards tends to be rather costly. In addition
to the participation fees of the standardization organizations, the cost of standard-
ization includes research costs, the seconding of company representatives (Berger
& Clement, 1990) and the direct opportunity cost of delayed marketing (Blind,
2004, p. 191). The problem with the high development costs is that companies are
not necessarily able to recoup these costs. Once published technical standards are
effectively in the public domain and their benefits cannot easily be withheld from
parties that have not contributed to their development (see Foray, 1994; Weiss &
Toyofuku, 1996). Therefore, technical standards are widely regarded as public
or collective goods.7 Standards tend to be non-rivalrous. Their value does not
depreciate with any additional user. Standards are also non-excludable. Once
published, they are effectively in the public domain and their benefits cannot be
withheld costlessly from non-contributors, which encourages free-riding. Hence,
standard-setters generally have no way of recouping the cost of standardization,
which are considered to be quite substantial because it requires the secondment
of technical experts, engineers as well as business executives to standard-setting
committees. While the entire industry would profit from their development,
individual companies are “fence-sitters, happy to jump on the bandwagon if it
gets rolling but insufficiently keen to set it rolling themselves” (Farrell & Saloner,
1985b, p. 78).
7Berg (1989a, 1989b); Cohendet and Steinmueller (2000); David and Greenstein (1990); Foray
(1994); Kindelberger (1983)
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Just like conventional public policy-making, private standardization, too, tends
to be constrained by significant decision-making problems.8 These appear to have
two sources. First, companies’ preferences as to which technology is eventually
selected as the de jure industry standard tend to diverge. Each firm seeks to
establish its own, proprietary technologies as the industry wide standard. This
would increase its income from royalty payments and shifts the cost of adapting
to the new standard onto the rest of the industry. Moreover, companies may
already have an ‘installed base’ of consumers that they do not want to drive away
by adopting standards that are incompatible with the goods and services that
they are already providing to their consumers. Therefore, companies’ ability and
willingness to make compromises concerning the selection of a single technology
as the common industry-wide ‘standard’ is limited (Schmidt & Werle, 1993;
Sirbu & Zwimpfer, 1985). Particularly where companies have already made
non-negligible pre-investments in the development of diverging technological
solutions to a standards problems or the development of an installed base of
consumers, there is little scope for a mutually acceptable agreement (Choi, 1996;
David & Greenstein, 1990, p. 105).
Secondly, decision-making problems also tend to result from the fact that
companies’ competitive struggles in the market place often tend to spill over into
the standardization process (Weiss, 1993). Technical standards can have a great
impact on companies’ market position:
As more and more products work in conjunction to form systems, [. . . ]
standards play a bigger and bigger role in the economy. And, as computer
and communications systems encompass for a larger portion of economic
activity, compatibility standards become an ever-more important aspect of
competitive strategy.
(Shapiro, 2000, pp. 18-19)
Or, as The Economist put it, “[n]ew standards can be the source of enormous wealth,
or the death of corporate empires” (The Economist, 1993). They define the terms
of market competition. Therefore, decisions on standards are often blurred with
corporate strategy. Companies increasingly use standards to control the structure
of an industry and their position in it (Mansell & Hawkins, 1992, p. 50) or for
managing technological interdependences between industries (Reddy, 1990, p. 54).
Standard-setters will do anything to “prevent their competitors from gaining
an advantage at their expense” (Weiss, 1993, p. 122). These decision-making
problems are exacerbated by the fact that in most standards-writing organizations
the adoption of technical standards traditionally requires the consensus of all
participants. This opens the door to a range of bargaining strategies, such as ‘hold-
8Choi (1996); Genschel (1997); Goerke and Holler (1995); Hawkins (1995)
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out’ in the form of.9 ‘patent blockade’ or ‘ambush’,10 or two-level games (Farrell
& Saloner, 1988, p. 238). Therefore, companies preferences can be expected to
diverge regardless of their pre-investments into alternative technological solutions
and the join-decision trap that is considered to constrain public decision-making
(Scharpf, 2006), can also be expected to undermine private decision-making.
1.1.2 The Elephant in the Room: How to explain the Strong
Presence of Public Actors in Private Standardization?
The second puzzle results from the fact that private industry standardization
tends to perform particularly well where it takes place in the shadow of inter-
ventionist public actors. In Europe, where both national governments as well as
supranational public actors like the European Commission are often actively in-
volved in the private development of technical standards, standardization appears
to perform much better than both American and international standardization
where the influence of public actors on technical standardization is limited.
In United States (us) American standardization public actors generally stay
out of private standardization processes. In the us, standardization is left entirely
to the market (see Tate, 2001). This stands in stark contrast to the organization
of European standardization, which is characterized by its tight coupling of
private industry standardization with public policy (Zuckerman, 1999). National
standard-setting bodies have traditionally been publicly funded—according to
Mattli and Büthe (2007), public subsidies account for about 20% of the income
of national standards-writing organizations. Often they are also delegated quasi
legislative powers. At the European level this is exemplified by the above-
mentioned New Approach. In the us, by contrast, the constitution rules out any
delegation of public authority. Direct ex ante intervention to coordinate the many
private standardization efforts, to give a single standards-developing organization
the status of the official national standards body, or to provide financial subsidies
to facilitate collective action, is considered unacceptable (Office of Technology
Assessment, 1992). The federal government only intervenes sporadically and ex
post to undermine anti-competitive behavior.11
Secondly, European standardization also seems to perform much better than
9Genschel (1997), Goerke and Holler (1995, pp. 797-798), David and Schurmer (1996)
10Farrell, Hayes, Shapiro, and Sullivan (2007); Hemphill (2005); Soininen (2007b)
11Because of the better performance of European standardization American industry represen-
tatives have called for more government involvement, suggesting greater government–industry
coordination (Garcia, 1992, p. 534; Garcia, 1993; Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). To date,
however, all attempts by us governments to centralize standardization under their control have
failed (see Tate, 2001).
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international standardization. As shown in Figure 1.1, since the 1990s the three
official European standards-writing organizations cen, cenelec, and etsi
have published more standards per year than the international or even the
most active national standards-writing organizations, the German din (German
Standardization Institute). This is odd for if one considers that—by the simple
fact that there neither is an international government nor a national governmental
actor whose control reaches far enough into the international realm—international
standardization can be considered to be the most independent from public
interference and thus the most private. Therefore, private standardization should
be expected to perform best at the international level. However, 1.1 demonstrates
that this is clearly not the case.
Figure 1.1: Annual standards output at national (Germany), international and
European level (1986-2008)
Source: perinorm , iso , iec , cen , cenelec , etsi catalogues, see Mattli and
Büthe (2007).
The performance of European standardization is also puzzling considering
the fact that it coincides with the integration of the single European market. The
above-mentioned decision-making problems should have been exacerbated by
the integration project. The systematic reduction of public tariff barriers should
have prompted national industry to build on private non-tariff barriers, such
as technical standards, to protect their markets. Especially, the companies that
were bound to be hurt by the opening of their markets to European competition
should have been expected to veto the adoption of European standards and build
on national standards instead.
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Both the fact that private standards are so wide-spread despite the presence
of non-negligible collective action and decision-making problems as well as the
fact that private standardization tends to perform best where there is a strong
presence of the state are rather puzzling, if looked at in isolation from each
other. In combination, however, they appear to suggest that private industry
standardization may not be that private after all. Because of its exceptional
ability to raise mandatory contributions and to hierarchically enforce compliance,
public actors have traditionally played a central role in the mitigation of collective
action problems and the provision of public goods, such as education, security
and defense. Therefore, public actors might also play a similar role in technical
standardization. The better performance of European standardization compared
with American standardization might be explained by the active role played by
public actors in Europe. And the fact that European level standardization exceeds
national and international standardization might be explained by the exceptional
role played by the European Commission at the European level.
Clearly, however, the facts presented above should not be misunderstood
as conclusive evidence for the dependence of private standard-setters on po-
tentially facilitating interventions of public actors. As discussed below, there
are significant informational, legal and political constraints that should be ex-
pected to constrain public actor interventions. Yet the combination of these
two—individually puzzling—facts presented above, provide a first hunch and
justify the investigation of the role of public actors in private standard-setting
processes. As mentioned above, this thesis therefore seeks an answer to the
following research question: In what circumstances, if any, are public actors able—and
willing—to intervene and foster the private development of technical standards?
This remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Sections 1.2 reviews the
literature on public interventions in private rule-making process in general, and
technical standardization in specific, for potential constraints of such interventions.
Based on this assessment, Section 1.3 investigates whether and, if so, to what
extent public actors may overcome these constraints. Section 1.4 elaborates the
methodology upon which the empirical investigations of the empirical Chapters,
which follow this introduction, are based.
1.2 The Constraints of Public Intervention
The literature, however, seems to have little confidence in the ability of public
actors to influence—not to mention to facilitate—the private development of
technical standards at all. First, they are constrained by significant informa-
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tion problems (Section 1.2.1). Secondly, public actor interventions in private
standardization are constrained by considerable political constraints 1.2.2.
1.2.1 Information Problems
As suggested above, public actors are considered increasingly unable to keep
pace with the accelerating speed of technological change. They generally lack the
technical expertise and market information that is necessary to keep pace with—
not to mention influencing the direction of—these developments. Therefore, the
standardization literature often describes public actors as ‘blind giants’ (David,
1990). Given their size and ability to adopt and enforce legally binding decisions,
public actors are potentially powerful but for their lack of information they are
unable to use this power in a purposeful way. Their interventions are therefore
bound to have a counterproductive effect—if they have an effect at all. And even
where public entrepreneurs had this information and expertise, it is argued, they
would only have a ‘narrow time window’ to intervene before markets were locked
in and before their technical knowledge became obsolete (Auriol & Benaim, 2000;
David, 1990). Therefore, public interventions either tend to lead to the selection
of inferior technologies or fail to have an influence on the market processes that
drive the selection of standards at all.
1.2.2 Political Constraints
At the same time, there also are significant political constraints, which even
overshadow the above-mentioned informational constraints. Both public and
private actors can be expected to resist public interventions.
Resistance by Private Actors
This thesis distinguishes between standard-setters, which are directly involved in
the standardization, process and standard-takers, which do not participate in the
standardization process but are directly affected by it. They eventually have to
adopt and adapt to the resulting standards. Albeit for different reasons, both can
be expected to resist public interventions.
According to Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 55), “[f]irms—as a rule—shun
public intervention into their economic activities.” Also private standard-setters
can be expected to resist public interferences with their activities. According
to Schepel (2004) and Frankel and Hojbjerg (2007) European standardization
has developed into an autonomous system of government that enjoys consider-
able independence from public policy-makers. The European standards-writing
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organizations—cen, cenelec and etsi—are formally independent from pub-
lic actors at national and European level. eu competition law, Schepel (2004,
p. 317) points out, provides very little leverage to influence the behavior of private
standard-setters.12 Private standard-setters should be expected to protect their
independence. While Spruyt (2001) has shown that the struggle between public
and private actors over who gets to set standards is quite an old struggle, which
goes back to Roman times. Egan (1998) has described this struggle in the case
of European standardization. European standard-setters have resisted against
public interventions.
Only where public interventions provide them with an opportunity to strengthen
their standards or to weaken rival groups of standard-setters, can private standard-
setters be expected to accept—or even actively seek—public actor interventions
(see Austin & Milner, 2001). Moreover, they may seek the collaboration with
public actors to gain privileged access to the policy-making process (see Coen,
2009). In all other circumstances, however, private standard-setters are likely to
resist public interventions.
At the same time, standard-takers can be expected to fight against public
interventions where this forces them to adopt and adapt to standards that do
not reflect their technical and strategic preferences. These opposing companies
would do anything they can, Weiss and Sirbu (1990, p. 122) have shown, “to
prevent their competitors from gaining an advantage at their expense.” They can
either be expected to lobby the intervening public actors and other public actors
such as parliaments and the courts to prevent such interventions. Or they can be
expected to become directly involved in the standardization process to make sure
that the resulting standard eventually conforms with their preferences or to veto
the adoption of the given standards all together. Even companies that might have
previously chose to free ride or to remain rationally ignorant in order to avoid the
high costs, which are involved in the participation in technical standardization
processes, may start to fight against public interventions.
Resistance by Public Actors
Furthermore, public actors themselves may resist interventions in private stan-
dardization processes, even if this would allow them to facilitate the development
12On the one hand, the European standardization organizations cannot be held accountable
under Article 86(3) ec because they do not qualify as public undertakings under Article 86(2)
ec for they are registered as private non-profit organizations under Belgian and, in the case
of etsi, French law. On the other hand, private industry standardization almost automatically
meets the exemptions under Article 81(3) ec. Moreover, Article 81 ec seems impractical as an
instrument to influence the behavior of private standard-setters as it only, if at all, seems provide
the Commission with an opportunity to prevent but not to demand the development of certain
standards.
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of technical standards and thus increase economic efficiency. Practitioners as well
as scholarly writers often provide functionalist explanations—and justifications—
for the intervention in private standardization processes. Repussard (1995, p. 62),
the former director of cen, for instance, argues that, “[c]oncerns for efficiency of
a country’s economy leads governments to take a general interest in standardiza-
tion.”13 Similarly Egan (1998) explains the reliance of public actors on private
standard-setters as a way to “improve the efficiency of public policy-making”
(Egan, 1998, p. 487). Functionalist explanations of public interventions, however,
do not go very far in explaining the genuine motivations of public actors to
intervene. Börzel and Risse (2010, p. 117) point out that the inclusion of private
actors in public policy-making processes generally entails a loss of autonomy for
public actors. Why should public actors voluntarily give up authority?
Public actors cannot necessarily be expected to be exclusively problem– or
efficiency–oriented.14 As argued by Schneider, Dang-Nguyen, and Werle (1994)
public actors, such as the European Commission, should rather be understood as
institutionally self-interested ‘corporate actors’ whose primary goal is to expand
the scope of their competences. As argued by Cram (1994, p. 199), however,
this does not necessarily mean that the European Commission was opposed to
solving problems. Its quest to expand the scope of its competences, however, has
a decisive influence on public actors’ decision to intervene. To use the conceptual
framework of Kingdon’s (1995) agenda-setting theory discussed in Section 1.3.2
below, public actors can be expected to focus their limited capacities on the
solving of those policy problems from the infinite number of policy problems that
will allow it to pursue its own political interests as well. Therefore, public actors
cannot necessarily be expected to intervene in private standardization processes
for it might weaken their own autonomy.
Where public actors have already lost some of their autonomy and where
they expect to regain it by cooperating with private standard-setters, however,
they can be expected to intervene. In the case of European standardization, two
situations are conceivable in which this may be the case—one is structural and
the other is institutional.
First, public actors may decide to rely on private standard-setters where
they find themselves increasingly constrained by structural changes such as the
accelerating pace of technical change and economic internationalization, due
to which they find themselves increasingly unable to provide the public goods
and the social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules
13Also see the statement by Ex-Commission vice-president Verheugen cited above.
14Mayntz (2004, p. 71) has called the assumption that public actors were genuinely problem-
oriented the ‘functionalist fallacy’—translation by Börzel and Risse (2010, p. 117)—of governance
research.
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that they used to be able to provide. Since governments are still commonly
expected to provide the same functions of governance that they used to be able to
provide, however, governments are considered to have responded to this crisis of
government by transforming rather than accepting a diminution of their role.15
The second situation in which public actors’ may actively seek the involve-
ment of private actors, such as private standard-setters, is that the public actors’
institutional authority is constrained already and that the collaboration with
private actors might help them to regain some of this authority. In the eu, for
instance, the European Commission is an actor whose legal competences limited
and its action are jealously controlled by the Member States’ governments and
the European Parliament (ep). Therefore, the European Commission may have
more to gain than to lose by including private standard-setters. The collaboration
with private standard-setters may allow it to form potent political alliances with
private companies against its institutional rivals, the ep and the Council. Such
alliances are at the core of neo-functionalist theories of European integration.
They may allow the Commission to exert pressure on Member States to achieve
certain policy objectives—be they functionally problem-oriented or institutionally
self-interested—and to advance the integration process while expanding the
Commission’s policy competences, as, for instance, through functional spillovers
etc. (see Schmitter, 1969, p. 162).
This explanation is supported by the recent literature, which suggests that in
addition to direct political lobbying of national governments, the collaboration
with private industry may provide public actors like the Commission with
the information and technical expertise that they require to strengthen their
position vis-à-vis both rival political institutions and opponents within their
own organization (see Rhodes & Visser, 2011, p. 112). According to research by
Coen and Richardson (2009), information—rather than campaign contributions, as
appears to be the case in the us—therefore constitutes the main currency of power
in European public policy-making. Its collaboration with—and inclusion of—of
private standard-setters may provide the Commission with such information and
an opportunity to win an advantage over its institutional rivals, the ep and the
Council. This point will be returned to below.
Finally, public interventions to facilitate the private development of techni-
cal standards can also be expected to be resisted by public actors not directly
involved in the public intervention. In pluralistic political systems, such as the
eu, public interventions generally require the consent—or, at least, fall under
the scrutiny—of third public actors. And where one public actors, such as the
15Braithwaite (2000), Braithwaite (2005), Eberlein and Grande (2005, p. 151), Knill and Lehmkuhl
(2002, p. 42)
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European Commission, intervenes in order to strengthen its position vis-à-vis its
institutional rivals.
As suggested by Héritier and Rhodes (2011a, pp. 163, 173) and Greven (2005,
p. 265) the inclusion of private actors in public decision-making processes tends
to strengthen the role of executive actors, such as the European Commission, at
the expense of legislative actors. The ep and Council have more to lose than to
gain from the delegation of quasi-regulatory tasks to private standard-setters.
They should be expected to prefer policy-making through conventional legislative
processes rather than governance through private standard-setting. Therefore,
the ep and the Council should be expected to seek to prevent attempts by the
European Commission to make policy with and through private standardization.
1.3 Opportunities: Can Public Actors Overcome their
Constraints?
This thesis suggest that whether and to what extent public actors are able to
overcome the above-mentioned constraints depends on the policy instruments
public actors choose to intervene in private standards-writing processes. This
thesis distinguishes between two basic types of policy instruments. On the one
hand there are conventional policy instruments that are based on:
• ‘Hard law,’ which according to Goldstein et al. (2000) is characterized by its
high degree of obligation, precision and/or delegation;
• Institutionalized hierarchies of domination and subordination that constrain
the autonomy of subordinate (private) actors (Börzel & Risse, 2010). The
use of the term ‘hierarchy’ is based on Oliver Williamson’s (1996) markets
and hierarchy as alternative forms of economic organization;
• Command-and-control regulation (Baldwin, 1997, p. 65); or
• Incentive-based instruments that create pressures on industry to behave
in socially desirable ways through the provision of positive and negative
sanctions (Ogus, 1994, ch. 11; Breyer, 1982).
Their performance of these instruments to in the context of private standardization
is analyzed in Section 1.3.1.
On the other hand, there are those policy instruments, which rely on:
• ‘Soft’ law, which according to Abbott and Snidal (2001) begins where legal
arrangements are weakened along one or more dimensions of obligation,
precision, and delegation;
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• Non-hierarchical coordination based on voluntary commitment and com-
pliance, such as benchmarking and peer review as in the Open Method of
Coordination; and
• entrepreneurial instruments which seek to induce rather than to coerce actor
participation, agreement and compliance (Rhodes & Visser, 2011, p. 133).
Whether and, if so, to what extent these new, non-hierarchical instruments
circumvent the problems of conventional policy interventions is discussed in
Subsection 1.3.2.
Both types of policy instruments, however, can be seen as part of a continuum
of which conventional interventions based institutional hierarchies and on the
power of hard law, on the one side, and non-hierarchical, entrepreneurial instru-
ments, on the other, constitute the two extreme points. The above-mentioned
New Approach would figure in the middle somewhere in between the two ex-
tremes. The following two Sections analyze the capacity of these two types
of policy instruments to meet the governance challenges posed by technical
standardization.
1.3.1 Hierarchical Intervention
Hierarchical,16 command-and-control based instruments may be used to prompt
industry to develop and comply with a given standard by means of positive or
negative sanctions. These instruments, however, have undergone considerable
criticism. Neoliberal critics have argued that such instruments were overly
prescriptive and that such ‘one-size-fits-all’ regulation was too inflexible. Calls
were made for the use of ‘less-restrictive’ or ‘incentive-based’ instruments. This
line of reasoning can also be found in the standardization literature, which
emphasizes the significant information problems faced by hierarchical policy
interventions in private standard-setting processes. For they are more precise
than entrepreneurial instruments, hierarchical policy instruments tend to require
public actors to select one technology from a range of alternative technologies
as the de jure standard. Public actors, however, are generally considered to lack
the technical expertise and market information that is necessary to influence
the outcome of private standardization processes, wherefore they are often
described as ‘blind giants’ (David, 1990). Even where public entrepreneurs had
this information and expertise, the economic standardization literature suggests,
they would only have a ‘narrow time window’ to intervene before markets were
16The term ‘hierarchical’ will be used to describe all policy instruments that are based on
institutional authority, hard law, coercion etc.
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locked in and before their technical knowledge became obsolete (Auriol & Benaim,
2000; David, 1990).
Despite this critique, however, hierarchical policy instruments continue to
play an important role in the academic literature as well as policy-making. Even
proponents of ‘softer,’ non-hierarchical modes of governance maintain that these
would only function and lead to desirable outcomes where they were backed
up by hierarchical policy instruments. This assumption can be found in several
literatures. In the regulation literature, for instance, Braithwaite (2002, p. 19)
argues that “persuasion will normally only be more effective than punishment
when the persuasion is backed up by punishment.” In the principal-agent
literature it is assumed that the stronger public principals’ hierarchical control
over their private agents, the less likely private industry is going to behave in an
undesirable way17. Even in the early entrepreneurship literature, which will be
discussed in the following Section, it is argued that the greater the initial grant of
authority to the policy entrepreneur the stronger its influence will be (Sandholtz,
1993, p. 251).
And the shadow-of-hierarchy literature, in turn, suggests that industry would
only engage in self– or co–regulation where it was faced with a credible threat
of hierarchical policy interventions, which Schmitter and Streeck (1985, p. 131)
describe as the ‘the Damocles sword of threatened direct state intervention’.18
Furthermore, it is maintained that the looming shadow of hierarchy was not only
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of non-hierarchical policy instruments but
also to ensure the democratic legitimacy of such new policy instruments that
include and leave more discretion to private actors and which tend to bypass
representative democratic policy-making processes (Börzel, 2007, p. 46; Héritier
& Lehmkuhl, 2011, p. 70). Bellamy et al. (2011, p. 162) argue that as democratic
legitimacy can only be provided through democratically elected governmental
actors, therefore their looming presence was crucial to ensure their legitimacy. If
something went wrong, they were there to defend the public interest with the
full legal force of hierarchical policy instruments.
Therefore, skeptics of the effectiveness of non-hierarchical policy instruments
suggest that if one scratched the surface of these new, non-hierarchical modes
of governance, one is likely to find old, hierarchical modes underneath (Rhodes
& Visser, 2011, p. 123). Where these underlying hierarchical instruments were
ineffective or weak, as in the case of the Open Method of Coordination, they were
17Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond (2001), McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast (1987), Pollack (1997), Rasmussen (2005), Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002)
18Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, pp. 35-40), Braithwaite (2002, p. 19), Bercusson (1993), Börzel
(2009), Héritier and Rhodes (2011b), Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2008), oecd (2003), oecd (1999b),
Mayntz and Scharpf (1995)
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likely to fail, it is argued.
The debate on the hierarchical policy interventions, however, has largely fo-
cused on the formal effectiveness of such interventions, neglecting—not only
the actual compliance with but also—the political implications of such interven-
tions. For their potential ineffectiveness alone, however, public actors should
not expected to refrain from using such hierarchical policy instruments. Just as
the functionalist explanations of the rise of private standard-setting in public
policy-making, the functionalist critique of hierarchical policy instruments, too,
neglects the politics involved.
Moreover, and despite the wide-spread assumption that private companies’
main objective was to thwart hierarchical interventions.19 Thus prefer co– or
self–regulation—as, for instance, through industry standardization—as a lesser
evil for it provides industry with a greater flexibility and influence over the
definition of regulatory measures (Boddewyn, 1992), some companies may have
a strong preference for command-and-control-based policy interventions.
Market insurgents, for instance, can be expected to have a strong interest in hi-
erarchical, command-and-control-based interventions to either provide them with
market access or to limit the dominant players ability to drive them out of the mar-
ket (Buchanan & Tullock, 1975, see).20 In the context of technical standardization,
market insurgents can be expected to demand open—i.e. non-proprietary—
standards that are made legally binding through secondary legislation in order
to ensure their access to the market.
Therefore, this thesis’ analysis of hierarchical policy interventions in pri-
vate standardization processes places particular emphasis on the political con-
sequences that such interventions may have. The first effect that the attempt
to use hierarchical interventions should be expected to have is—though poten-
tially unintended—that they draw further veto players and veto points into
the standardization process, thus it undermines the facilitating exclusiveness of
standard-setting communities. Instead of prompting industry to overcome its
collective action and bargaining problems, it should therefore be expected to
exacerbates decision-making problems rather than prompting industry to agree
on and to adopt the desired standards. There are two reasons for this.
First, such interventions raise the stake of the game and therefore increase
the number of potential veto players. Even companies that previously chose to
remain rationally ignorant may start to participate. The increased number and
heterogeneity of participants, however, increases bargaining costs and reduces the
19Bartolini (2011, p. 9), Héritier and Eckert (2008, p. 115), Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 55)
20The liberalization of national utilities—i.e. telecoms, gas, electricity etc.—appears to provided
many examples for this.
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scope for a mutually acceptable agreement on common standards. Moreover, the
raised stakes of the game make it more profitable for companies that have less to
lose from hierarchical intervention and less to gain from standardization to hold
out agreement against companies that have more to gain from self-regulation. The
increased number and heterogeneity of participants, however, reduces the scope
for a mutually acceptable agreement on common standards. Such hierarchical
policy interventions thus appear to represent what Truman (1951) describes as a
‘disturbance’ to the established order. According to Truman’s ‘disturbance theory,’
actors that are or expect to be adversely affected by such disturbances, start to
organize and mobilize themselves to counteract the disturbance.21
Hierarchical interventions thus undermine the main facilitating factor of
private standardization, namely its exclusivity. First, exclusivity resolves collective
action problems by allowing standard-setters to recoup the cost of developing a
common standard by shaping it in a way that is compatible with their technical
and strategic preferences potentially at the expense of non-participating rivals—
henceforth referred to as standard-takers.22 Secondly, the exclusivity facilitates
collective decision-making. Where the number and heterogeneity of rule-makers
is reduced, there is a larger scope for mutually acceptable agreements on common
self-regulatory measures. Moreover, collective decision-making in small and
homogeneous groups firms, which M. E. Porter (1979, p. 215) defines as ‘strategic
groups’, tends to be facilitated by the fact that firms are more likely to realize
their mutual dependence and replace strategic bargaining with more deliberative
forms of interaction, such as learning and collective problem-solving.
The exclusivity of private standardization processes generally results from
two factors. First, standard-setters may actively try to exclude rival companies,
as discussed below. Secondly the exclusivity of private standardization processes
often results from the fact that individual companies may deliberately choose
not to participate in the definition of self-regulatory measures, such as technical
standards. Some companies may not have the financial means and technical
expertise that is required to participate and to influence the standards-definition
process (Schepel & Falke, 2000). Other groups of actors and interests, such as
consumers (Foray, 1994; Link, 1983), may not be able to overcome their collective
action problems. Others may choose not to participate out of rational ignorance
(Quelin, Abdessemed, Bonardi, & Durand, 2001, p. 7). They may speculate that
the process will either not succeed or that the potential cost of eventually having
to adapt to the adopted standards will not exceed the cost of participating in the
21Such disturbance thus fulfill the same functions that industry crisis fulfill for public en-
trepreneurship discussed in Section 1.3.2 below.
22Austin and Milner (2001, p. 412), Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, and Bruderer (1995)
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process to shape the measures according to their own preferences. The possibil-
ity to free-ride on the standardization work of others is considered to provide
another reason why companies may deliberately choose not to participate in
the standardization process (Weiss & Toyofuku, 1996). Again this does is not
particularly uncommon in the world of self-regulation. As suggested by Bartolini
(2011), participation in governance arrangements is by definition voluntary. “Opt-
ing out is always possible, provided one is willing to bear the costs” (Bartolini,
2011). Where, as the result of hierarchical interventions, the rationally ignorant
free-riders realize the potential implications of such arrangements, however, they
should be expected to participate.
Secondly, hierarchical interventions tend to open up new avenues of appeal
to the opponents of the given standard at stake or standardization in general.
This results from the fact that in pluralist political systems, the use of hierarchical
instruments generally requires the consent of—or is at least subjected to the
scrutiny of—other public actors, such as parliaments and courts. These institu-
tions provide opponents of a specific standard or standardization in general with
effective veto points. Abbott and Snidal (2001, p. 349) suggest that companies
expecting a given standard to have an adverse effect on their business can be ex-
pected to appeal to governmental actors, possibly using normative arguments, to
prevent the adoption—or at least the hierarchical endorsement—of that standard.
These avenues of appeal can also be expected to open up where non-hierarchical
interventions are backed by a shadow of hierarchy. Particularly where public
institutions have retained a large degree of hierarchical authority or formal in-
struments of public control over the performance of private standard-setters,
appealing to different public actors to use these instruments to prevent the adop-
tion of a given technical standard or other self-regulatory measures. This is
directly opposed to the hypothesis by Héritier and Eckert (2008, p. 117) that the
more rigorous the instruments of control over the self-regulator’s performance,
the better the latter’s performance would be.
And the more credible the shadow of hierarchy and thus the greater companies
expectations that the threatened intervention will increase the chances that they
may eventually have to comply with the given self-regulatory measures, the more
companies will actively push into the definition process in order to make sure
that the resulting measures are in line with their preferences. As suggested by
the shadow-of-hierarchy literature itself, companies can therefore be expected to
overcome their collective action problems and start to participate.23
23Börzel (2007, p. 6), Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 55), Mayntz and Scharpf (1995, pp. 21-23)
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1.3.2 Entrepreneurial Intervention
This raises the question whether alternative policy instruments that do not rely
on the wielding of hard law and hierarchical authority may have any influence
on technical standardization processes without exposing private standardization
processes to political contestation. Instruments that do not rely on the power of
hard law or material sanctions are commonly described as soft, non-hierarchical
or entrepreneurial instruments,24 such as agenda-setting and consensus building
or conflict mediation. Agenda-setting is defined the discovery of unfulfilled needs
and the suggestion of innovative means to satisfy them (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996,
p. 422; Kingdon, 1984). It involves the mobilization and coordination of collective
action and the framing of issues in ways influences actors perception of problems
and potential solutions and thereby focuses them on specific goals.25 And
once an issue has been placed on the decision-makers’ agenda, entrepreneurial
policy interventions may facilitate the decision-making process by promoting
consensus-building and/or mediating potential decision-making conflicts. By
providing focal points around which actors preferences can converge (see Garrett
& Weingast, 1993), for instance, entrepreneurs may be able to promote consensus
building or to mediate decision-making conflicts. What both agenda-setting and
consensus-building or conflict mediating instruments have in common is that
they do not rely on the power of hard law or institutional authority, i.e. hierarchy.
Unlike these hierarchical instruments, the use of entrepreneurial policy in-
struments should not be expected to increase the number of veto players and
veto points. Only small and homogeneous groups of immediately concerned
companies of actors that share a common interest in standardization tend to re-
spond to agenda-setting. Furthermore, entrepreneurial policy instruments, unlike
conventional, hierarchical instruments, do not raise the stakes of the game for the
participants and non-participants—i.e. rule-makers and rule-takers. If they no-
tice entrepreneurial intervention at all, potentially affected but non-participating
companies are unlikely to expect these interventions to have a decisive impact on
the standardization process. Therefore, they can remain rationally ignorant and
continue to speculate that the standardization process might still fail or that the
eventual adaptation costs will not exceed the cost of participating and shaping
the content of the resulting standard.
Entrepreneurial interventions should not be expected to increase the number
of veto points either. Unlike hierarchical instruments, they do not require the
24This thesis will henceforth use the term ‘entrepreneurial’ to circumscribe all of this types of
instruments
25Haas (1992) suggests that if actors arrive at a common definition of the problem and its
underlying causes, they are more likely to solve it collaboratively.
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active participation, of other political institutions, which could scrutinize policy
entrepreneurs and hold them accountable for their actions. And for they are
generally too vague, inaccessible and opaque, entrepreneurial instruments tend
not to fall under the scrutiny of other political institutions such as parliaments
and the courts (Cini, 2001, p. 194). Therefore, potential veto players would
find it difficult to appeal to such veto points against the use of entrepreneurial
instruments. For better or worse, entrepreneurial policy instruments therefore
minimize the number of rule-makers and maximize the number of rule-takers.
The adoption of and compliance with the resulting standard tends to be self-
enforcing, where network and scale economies are present.
Moreover, public entrepreneurs may actively help private standardization
alliances to defend their insulation from broader participation. To resolve their
collective action and decision-making problems standard-setters may seek to
actively exclude of rival companies (Werle, 2001, see). The literature on pol-
icy monopolies (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), policy whirlpools (Griffith, 1939),
sub-systems (Cater, 1964), iron triangles (Freeman, 1955) and issue networks, to
unitary advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988) etc,26 which is one of the oldest litera-
tures in the discipline of political science, suggests that all these exclusive groups
of rule-makers have two things in common. First, a powerful supporting idea or
narrative that justifies this system of limited participation; and secondly, a defin-
able institutional structure that limits participation and interference by broader
political forces. Public entrepreneurs may be able to help private standard-setters
to achieve both.
Entrepreneurs may push the standardization process into standardization
venues whose voting or cost structure excludes or weakens potential veto players.
Moreover, public actors can be expected to be in a comparatively better position
to frame such a policy narrative defending the limited participation than private
companies, for they are generally recognized as more legitimate because of their
special ability to invoke democratic rhetoric and symbols (Baumgartner & Jones,
1993).27 Best ideas are such that can be linked to widely accepted core politi-
cal objectives that can be easily communicated such as technological progress,
productivity, growth, competitiveness, employment, security—i.e. ideas that are
hard to contest. Moreover, entrepreneurs may emphasize the ‘technical’ nature
of the standardization process and even the possibility of technological progress
that the process may provide to justify the limited stakeholder participation (see
Radaelli, 1999, p. 759; Mansell & Hawkins, 1992, p. 46).
26In the context of technical standardization, this thesis will speak of ‘standardization monopo-
lies.’
27This form of strategic framing distinguishes itself from the framing mentioned in the context
of coalition building in the sense that it is targeted as the coalition outsiders rather than insiders
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Technically complex issues such as nuclear power can be discussed either in
terms of their scientific and engineering details, or in terms of their social
impacts. When they are portrayed as technical problems rather than as social
questions, experts can dominate the decision-making process. When the
ethical, social, or political implications of such policies assume center stage,
a much broader range of participants can suddenly become involved (Baum-
gartner, 1989). Where a positive image dominates, specialists have strong
arguments for demanding that political leaders grant them the autonomy
and the resources necessary to get on with their work.
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, p. 1047)
Thereby public entrepreneurs can help shield the standardization monopoly
off from broader participation. This discourages the involvement of politi-
cal/legislative institutions and thus potential veto points. If everybody wins
and nobody loses from the standardization process, it may seem unnecessary to
legislative institutions to subject it to democratic scrutiny. Mansell and Hawkins
(1992) suggest that there is usually a conscious strategy involved in presenting
standardization as a technical process. Technical decisions “tend to acquire a
measure of detachment” from rival interests and political contestation (Mansell
& Hawkins, 1992, p. 46). While most standardization issues—no matter how
‘technical’ they may be—tend to have some normative and (re)distributive impli-
cations, they can be strategically framed otherwise. In contrast to normative and
redistributive issues, technical issues cannot make anyone worse off. This may
be used justify the limitation of broader stakeholder participation (see Radaelli,
1999, p. 759).
Thereby, entrepreneurs may insulate standardization from political contesta-
tion. As a result, individual standards-setters will be more willing to provide
the technical expertise and financial muscle that is necessary to develop the de-
sired standards. The limited number and heterogeneity of participants, will also
increase the chances that standard-setters will find a mutually acceptable agree-
ment on a single common standard.28 While such interventions may facilitate the
private development of technical standards, however, this raises serious concerns
about the democratic legitimacy of such interventions and private standardization
processes in general, as discussed in Section 1.3.2.
28Similarly, entrepreneurs may be able to exert pressure on private standard-setters by threaten-
ing to expose them to political contestation. Instead of depoliticizing the standardization process
and keeping its salience low, the Commission, for instance, may alert the European Parliament
and Council and actively push the process into the political debate. While the Commission may
use this threat—or ‘shadow of politicization’—to convince private standard-setters to develop the
standards it desires, however, the enactment of this threat is likely to backfire. The Commission
should be expected to lose control of the process and industry is unlikely to produce the desired
standard.
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Information Problems
A common critique of entrepreneurship theory is that it was based on the un-
realistic assumption that entrepreneurs hold an informational advantage over
the actors they seek to influence (see Moravcsik, 1999, p. 272). In the context of
technical standard-setting, this critique appears to pose a particularly serious
challenge. As mentioned above, the technical expertise and knowledge of the
relevant market information of private companies is considered to be vastly supe-
rior to that of public actors (David, 1985, 1990). While companies have a market
incentive to continuously monitor technological developments and market trends
(Abbott & Snidal, 2001, pp. 355–356), public actors rarely have the time, skills or
resources to keep pace with such developments.
Proponents of entrepreneurship theory, however, have suggested in response
to this criticism that the idea of informational asymmetry or advantage is to
be rejected. Kingdon (1995), for instance, bases his agenda-setting theory on
the “garbage-can model” of decision-making, as developed by Cohen, March
and Olsen (1972), in which actors’ preferences are loosely defined, information
is incomplete, and actor participation in decision-making venues varies over
time and across issue-area instead. Hence, both the entrepreneurs as well as the
actors whose agenda entrepreneurs seeks to influence are faced with imperfect
information and bounded rationality. Their attention to governance problems can
therefore be assumed to be scarce, while governance problems are in abundant
supply (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996, p. 422; Kingdon, 1984). In these circumstances,
policy entrepreneurs should be able to exert a significant influence over policy-
makers by simply mixing and matching governance problems, solutions and
actor-coalitions that emerge independently from each other (Zahariadis, 2007;
Kingdon, 1995). In the context of technical standardization specifically, public
entrepreneurs should be able to shape the private standardization processes by:
1. Identifying standardization deficits and opportunities;
2. Framing these in a way that suggests collaborative solutions;29 and
3. Prosing these solutions to groups of companies that have the financial
means and technical expertise necessary to seize these opportunities.
A direct implication of the mixing-and-matching framework is that the en-
trepreneurs do not necessarily need to come up with new ideas—i.e. standardiza-
tion opportunities—themselves. Ideas only need to be new in the given context.
Therefore, they may be able to import such ideas from different contexts. This
29Haas (1992) suggests that if actors arrive at a common definition of the problem and its
underlying causes, they are more likely to solve it collaboratively.
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constitutes a direct parallel to the business entrepreneur, upon which the concept
of the policy entrepreneur is based. According to Schumpeter (1939, p. 102),
the father of modern entrepreneurial thought, the function of an entrepreneur
is the combination of preexisting factors of production in a way that either lets
companies’ produce a new product or an existing product more efficiently. There-
fore, entrepreneurial interventions also should not be expected to suffer from the
same information problems as hierarchical interventions for they can rely on the
allegedly superior information and expertise of private standard-setters.
While the mixing-and-matching framework suggests that entrepreneurs do
not need to command over ‘perfect information,’ however, it also reveals the
weaknesses of entrepreneurial policy instruments. Entrepreneurial interventions
are unlikely to work where actors’ preferences are already clearly defined. In lack
of coercive powers, entrepreneurial policy instruments are unlikely to prompt
actors to do what they would not do otherwise. Entrepreneurial instruments
only work where actors are still in the process of defining or redefining their
preferences. Therefore, a number of conditions need to be met for entrepreneurial
interventions in private standard-setting processes to have an effect.
Necessary Conditions for Entrepreneurial Interventions
While entrepreneurial policy instruments do not tend to expose technical stan-
dardization processes to political contestation, they lack the power of hierarchy
or hard law. To have an effect, they therefore depend on a number of necessary
conditions.
Timing of entrepreneurial interventions The Commission’s ability to influence
behavior and shape outcome through entrepreneurial actions is recognize to be
the largest during the initial stages of the public policy-making process (Héritier,
1996, p. 150; Nugent, 1997; Sandholtz, 1992). This can also be expected to be
the case for private standardization processes. It is a direct implication of these
potential information problems and the assumption of imperfect information is
that entrepreneurship can only work where companies’ preference are still not
clearly defined.
This is likely to be the case during the early stages of life cycle of the technol-
ogy that is to be standardized. At this point, there may still be relative uncertainty
about the commercial implications of standardization and companies may not
have made any significant pre-investments in different development paths (see
Schmidt & Werle, 1998, p. 105). Therefore, the potential for decision-making
problems is rather low, while collective action problems, as argued above, can
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be expected to be relatively severe. However, entrepreneurial policy instru-
ments are more apt to mitigate collective action than decision-making problems.
‘Agenda-setting,’ as the name suggests, is directly targeted at the initiation of
decision-making processes by placing issues on decision-makers’ agenda rather
than influencing the outcome of the subsequent decision-making process itself.
Even the entrepreneurial provision of focal points to mitigate decision-making
problems only has an effect where the decision makers’ preferences are still rela-
tively loosely defined. Therefore, the scope for public entrepreneurship decreases
as the given technology matures.
Entrepreneurial instruments may mitigate modest conflicts of interest. At best,
entrepreneurship may still play a role where decision-making problem are as
pronounced as decision-making problems, i.e where decision-making-problems
and collective-action-problems lines intersect. Admittedly, however, this is a
rather optimistic guess. In reality the scope for entrepreneurship may be lower
than that. Once companies have started to deploy different technologies, however,
it can be expected that there is no scope for entrepreneurship.
After companies have already made significant pre-investments in the develop-
ment of diverging technological solutions and where the commercial implications
of a given technology have already become visible there is little scope for en-
trepreneurial interventions. Each firm will seek to promote their own proprietary
standard. They will not accept a competitors technology as the new standard if
this would have an adverse effect on their business. In this situation, there is little
that public entrepreneurs can do to persuade companies to potentially give up
their preferred technology and adopt another firm’s technology as the common
standard instead. Therefore, early intervention constitutes the second necessary
condition for public entrepreneurship in technical standardization to succeed.
While entrepreneurial interventions need to take place during the early stages
of the standardization process, they may also have a significant effect the later
stages of the process. Early entrepreneurial interventions may allow groups of
companies, such as the above-described standardization monopolies, to agree to
common standard much sooner than rival standard-setters. The mediating and
coordinating role of an entrepreneur may also prompt a more large-scale and
concerted implementation of the given standard. Therefore, the standard is much
more likely to achieve a critical mass of consumers with the help of network
effects and scale economies before other standards. Once this critical mass is
achieved, compliance with the standard enforces itself.
Industry Crisis According to the literature (Fligstein, 2001; Sandholtz, 1992),
another necessary condition for policy entrepreneurship is the presence of an
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acute sense of crisis.30 Given the existing institutional organization of the eu
and given Member States’ existing preferences, for instance, Fligstein (2001)
suggests it was not possible to explain the adoption of the single market program
and monetary union. Only the presence of acute political crisis—traditional
Keynsian and social democratic strategies were failing to produce economic
growth stagflation and furthermore the United Kingdom (uk) was threatening
to pull out of the eu—Fligstein argues could explain this radical policy change.
It allowed the European Commission to frame the notion of the single market
program as a project and to build a coalition to support this program. Similarly,
industry crisis can also be expected to constitute a necessary condition for public
entrepreneurship in private standardization.
The presence of industry crisis implies that the incumbent companies are
forced to reconsider the way they do business because their old strategies no
longer work. They are beginning to lose out or are no longer benefiting from
the existing institutional arrangements that govern the market (Fligstein, 2001,
pp. 264–264). In these circumstances, companies can be expected to be particularly
receptive to public entrepreneurship (Sandholtz, 1992).31 Companies preferences
are in fluid. While they are in the process of redefining their preferences, en-
trepreneurs can step in and re-frame companies’ conceptions of their interests
and create new coalitions, institutions and arrangements that previously may
have seemed impossible (Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth, 1992).
Positive Feedback Mechanisms As entrepreneurs cannot rely on hierarchical
instruments to enforce compliance with the given standards, they depend on some
form of positive feedback mechanisms to compliance self-enforced. Network
effects constitute one example of such positive feedback mechanisms. These
demand side economies of scale are considered to be present where “the utility
that a user derives from the consumption of the good increases with the number
of other agents consuming the good” (Katz & Shapiro, 1985a). Telephone networks
provide a particularly instructive example for this. The larger the number of
users that have subscribed to the network, the larger the number of users that
they can call. Once a critical mass has been achieved, network effects lead actors
that have been excluded from the definition of the standard as well as actors that
might have even preferred an alternative technology as the basis of the standard
to comply with it. No individual producer or user would have an incentive to
30Analytically, a ‘crises’ is different from the above-mentioned ‘problems.’ They demarcate
distinct events and turning-points rather than persistent difficulties.
31Fligstein and Sandholtz focus on the influence of crisis and the potential for entrepreneurship
in an intergovernmental context. What applies to public actors, however, also seems to apply to
private companies.
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switch to another standard, even if it was technically or economically superior.
As there is no guarantee that others will switch as well, switching is a very risky
strategy for individual actors (Farrell & Saloner, 1985a). Therefore, compliance
tends to be self-enforced in the presence of network effects. Network effects
are not uncommon in the world of technical standardization, especially in the
growing ict sector, where different systems need to interoperate.
The presence of such positive feedback mechanisms may appear like a rather
tough condition. At a closer look, however, it becomes clear that such positive
feedback mechanisms are quite common, not only in the world of technical
standardization but also in politics, business and society in general. According
to Baumgartner and Jones (2002, p. 21), positive feedback mechanisms operate
wherever actors’ decisions are directly affected by the decisions previously taken
by other actors around them. This often appears to be the case. Another example
for positive feedback mechanisms are economies of scale, which often accompany
and reinforce network effects. The more products a firm company, the higher its
returns to scale, the lower it can decrease sales prices, the higher demand for its
products and so forth. There is hardly any market, which does not exhibit such
increasing returns to scale. Similarly, learning effects may provide first movers
with an irrevocable advantage over their competitors (see Milner & Yoffie, 1989).
Legitimacy Problems
While entrepreneurial interventions may facilitate the private development of
technical standards, without exposing technical standardization processes to
political contestation, the fact that this is achieved by reinforcing the exclusiveness
of private standardization processes raises serious concerns about the democratic
legitimacy of such interventions. These concerns are increased by the quasi-
legislative status of many standards as well as the intrusive impact that technical
standards tend to have on our lives. This raises the question whether such
exclusive circles of private actors can be trusted with the development of technical
standards or whether technical standardization processes should not be made
more open and transport. Already Adam Smith suspected that:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in
some contrivance to raise prices.
(Smith, 1776, Book One, Chapter X, part II)
Any attempt to increase the inclusiveness and accessibility, however, is likely
to increase the above-mentioned collective action and decision-making problems
(also see Werle & Iversin, 2006, pp. 31-32), creating a trade-off between effective-
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ness (output legitimacy) and democratic accountability and transparency of of
private standard-setting processes (input legitimacy). As suggested by Kerwer,
this dilemma between output and input legitimacy, is not specific to technical
standardization.
Global governance institutions have come under increasing pressure to
become more democratic because global regulation has become wider in
scope and more intrusive. However, if they abolish the club model a larger
and more heterogeneous membership is likely to lead to decision-making
deadlocks. Thus, increasing input legitimacy is likely to reduce output
legitimacy—and vice versa. A good case in point are the difficulties of the
WTO, which now sports over 150 member states and has great difficulties in
concluding the present Doha round.
(Kerwer, 2010, p. 4)
Also many other new modes of governance appear to be faced with this dilemma.
While several contributors to the governance literature acknowledge the crucial
role of exclusivity (Eberlein & Grande, 2005, p. 164; also see Héritier & Lehmkuhl,
2011, p. 68),32 only few authors have put their finger on the fact that the enhanced
problem-solving capacity and effectiveness of these new modes of governance has
come at the price of transparency, accountability and thus democratic legitimacy.33
With the example of technical standardization, this thesis seeks to contribute to
the debate about the democratic legitimacy of what Kerwer calls the ‘club model’
of governance.This thesis investigates whether and to what extent this legitimacy
dilemma is or could be overcome.
1.4 Methodology
The thesis’ research question—In what circumstances, if any, are public actors able—
and willing—to intervene and foster the private development of technical standards?—
lends itself to a qualitative research approach. It is concerned with the conditions
under which public interventions have a given effect, rather than the probability
that public actors are willing and able to promote the private development techni-
cal standards.34 Qualitative methods—especially process-tracing—are generally
considered to be particularly well suited for the study complex social processes,
such as technical standardization, which take place over long periods of time and
which tends to be influenced by a large number of factors. Quantitative methods,
32Eberlein and Grande (2005, p. 164), for instance, suggest that “access to informal decision-
making bodies is necessarily selective and not subject to any classical democratic control.”
33see Bellamy, Castiglione, Follesdal, and Weale (2011), Greven (2005, p. 264)
34This thesis’s primary objective is thus one of theory building rather then testing. It is meant
to develop and refine the hypotheses formulated above, to investigate potential interactions, to
check for spuriousness and to identify potential alternative hypotheses.
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by contrast, tend to bias theory away from processes and toward structures, which
may be important but rarely explain the variation that takes place within them
(Odell, 2001; George & Bennett, 2005).35
A further reason for the choice of this process oriented analysis is that it al-
lows to take account of the common methodological critique of studies on policy
entrepreneurship. With regards to the entrepreneurial influence of the European
Commission on intergovernmental bargaining, for instance, Schmidt (1996; 2000,
p. 40) points out that the entrepreneur’s action may only appear to influence the
behavior of Member States’ governments, while the observed behavior rather
resulted from the fact that it was in the actors’ interest to behave the way they did
and that they would have therefore acted in the exact same way in the absence of
entrepreneurial leadership.36 This critique identifies the crucial methodological
problem of measuring the distinct influence of policy entrepreneurship. This
could also be a problem in the case of public entrepreneurship in private stan-
dardization. Process tracing, however, makes it possible to analyze whether or not
entrepreneurship has played a distinct role. By tracing the behavior and interests
of private standard-setters over time and especially by comparing their behavior
and interests before and after entrepreneurial interventions makes it possible to
analyze whether and if so to what extent they responded to the entrepreneurial
interventions or whether other causal mechanisms drive their behavior.
This thesis is therefore based on four qualitative, in-depth case studies, which
were selected based on the presence of some Commission activity in private
standardization. These case studies include European standardization in mobile
telecoms, high-definition television (hdtv), intermodal transport and digital
video broadcasting standardization (see Table 1.1).37
35Because of the fact that every case study consists of more than just one empirical observation,
as is often assumed by quantitatively inclined researchers such as King, Keohane, and Verba
(1994), qualitative research allows for the simultaneous investigation of multiple hypothesis with a
limited number of cases. As pointed out by George and Bennett (2005), there tend to be a countless
number of potential observations the hypothesized causal path between the independent and
dependent variables. Each observation on that path provides a test of that hypothesis. Therefore,
the small-n research provides a much larger ‘degrees of freedom’ than it is commonly criticized
(King et al., 1994). The higher the degrees of freedom, which are determined by subtracting the
number of cases with the number of independent variables, the lower levels of explained variance
are necessary to conclude with some confidence that the studied relationship is unlikely to have
been brought about by chance.
36Often, as in Moravcsik (1999), this critique is based on a misunderstanding. To some extent
entrepreneurs change agents’ behavior by chancing the way they define their interests. To argue
that the observed change in behavior should not be attributed to entrepreneurial interventions
because it was in the agents interest to change their behavior would thus miss the point of the
entrepreneurship hypothesis.
37As mentioned above, this thesis is exclusively concerned with technical interoperability
standards. Reference and quality standards are therefore excluded from the case selection.
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Table 1.1: Case Selection
Independent Mobile HDTV Intermodal Digital
variable Telecoms Transport Broadcast.
Hierarchical intervention X1 X X2
Entrepreneurial intervention X X1
Non-intervention X2
Early intervention X X
Industry crisis X X X X
Network effects X X X X
1 This case study is subdivided into two phases. During the first phase entrepreneurial
policy instruments were used and during the second phase hierarchical instruments were
used.
2 This case study, too, is subdivided into two phases. While there was no public
intervention in the first phase, there was a hierarchical intervention—in the form of a
shadow of hierarchy—in the second phase.
Mobile Telecoms The Commission relied exclusively on entrepreneurial policy
instruments. It sought to act as an agenda-setter and tried to mediate decision-
making conflicts and to coordinate the introduction of common standards. What
makes this a rather interesting case is that the Commission’s entrepreneurial
intervention took place in rather unfavorable circumstances. Because of the
complexity of the technology in question, the strong resistance from national
policy makers and national monopoly operators, and the requirement to bring
together a heterogeneous set of actors, mobile telecoms standardization can, a
priori, be considered to represent a least likely case. If the Commission managed to
play an entrepreneurial role nonetheless, however, it may be concluded that policy
entrepreneurship should also have an effect in less unfavorable circumstances.
Moreover, this case study allows for a cross-case comparison with the case of
hdtv standardization, as elaborated below, and it provides an opportunity for
within-case comparison. The analysis covers two decades and two generations of
technology. This allows for an investigation of the Commission’s entrepreneurial
interventions in markedly different economic and political circumstances.
High-Definition Television This case is divided into two phases. In the first
phase of the standardization process, the Commission relied on entrepreneurial
policy instruments. When it came to the deployment of its preferred standard,
however, it took recourse to hierarchical policy instruments. First, the within-
case comparison between these two different interventions at the two different
stages of the standardization process offers an opportunity to investigate the
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Table 1.2: Comparative Framework
Mobile Intermodal HDTV
Telecoms Transport
Mobile Telecoms - - Most similar1
HDTV Most similar1 Most different1 -
Digital Broadcast. Most similar2 Most different3 Most similar2
1 Only with regards to the second phase of this case study.
2 Only with regards to the first phase where private standardization took place in
the absence of public interventions.
3 Concerning the second phase where private hierarchical policy instruments
were used.
relative causal strength of hierarchical and entrepreneurial policy instruments
in rather similar circumstances. This may provide an answer to the questions
whether hierarchical interventions do lead to political contestation despite the
initial use of entrepreneurial policy instruments or whether the causal effect
of entrepreneurial policy instruments is stronger and standardization succeeds
despite the hierarchical intervention.
Secondly, the fact that the Commission’s interventions in the second phase of
the hdtv standardization process and the first phase of the mobile telecoms case
took place in rather similar circumstances, also provides an excellent opportunity
for cross-case comparison. If the outcomes of the two cases diverged, more causal
significance might be attributed to the different ways the Commission intervened
in the two cases. As the circumstances in which the Commission intervened in the
two cases cannot be expected to be completely identical, however, the cross-case
comparison is complemented with within-case comparison, i.e. process tracing.
By tracing the causal process from the independent variables of interest to the
dependent variable, George and Bennett (2005, p. 241) suggest, it may be possible
to control for potentially interfering variables that differ across the two cases.
Therefore, Collier (1993) argues that “within-case comparisons are critical to the
viability of small-n analysis.”
Digital Video Broadcasting In contrast to the other three cases the Commission
did not seek to intervene in the standardization process. Only upon the pressure
of the ep, the Commission eventually accepted the formulation of a threat to
intervene if industry did not develop and adopt the desired standards. This
case study thus, too, is organized in two phases. The first phase provides an
opportunity to investigate the conditions under which and the extent to which
private standard-setters are able to produce technical standards in the absence
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of direct public intervention. This may thus also provide an indication in which
circumstances and to what extent public actors may be able to facilitate the private
development of technical standards. If it turned out that private standard-setters
were very well able to develop the desired standards by themselves, facilitating
public interventions would be superfluous.
A priori, the conditions surrounding the standardization processes can be
considered to have been rather favorable. The gains from standardization were
comparatively large and broadly spread and the responsible standards-writing
organization is widely considered to be one of the most progressive of its kind. If
it turned out that private standard-setters were not able to develop the desired
standards even under these favorable conditions, the private development of
technical standards can also be expected to fail in less favorable circumstances.
Secondly, the digital video broadcasting case study investigates the operation
and effect of the shadow of hierarchy in circumstances that were markedly
different to the intermodal transport case. In contrast to the low-tech intermodal
transport case, for instance, this case provides an opportunity to analyze whether
and to what extent the high-tech nature of digital television standardization
allowed standard-setters to shield their exclusiveness behind technical arguments
and thereby undermined political contestation.
Intermodal Transport In contrast to the previous three case studies, which all
deal with technical standardization in high-tech industries, this case study is
concerned with low-tech standardization, namely the standardization of freight
containers. This provides an opportunity to investigate the extent to which the
technical complexity—or rather the lack thereof—influences the standard-setters
ability to shield their interests behind technical arguments and to prevent political
contestation.
The Commission’s intervention in this case was based on the New Approach,
which it backed up with the threat—i.e. shadow of hierarchy—to enact positive
and negative sanctions if industry did not develop and adopt the standards
desired by the Commission. According to the theoretical predictions formulated
above, the Commission’s intervention should have led to the political contestation
and failure of the standardization process. This case study investigates to what
extent this was the case.
Table 1.2 summarizes this thesis’ comparative framework.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapters 2–5 present
the findings of the four case studies and are followed by a concluding Chapter 6
which summarizes the main results and elaborates the broader contributions of
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this study. Given the technical nature of the topic the Appendix also includes a
detailed glossary, elaborating the main concepts and terms.
Chapter 2
Mobile Telecoms
The case of European mobile telecoms standardization offers an excellent op-
portunity to investigate the impact and effectiveness of entrepreneurial policy
interventions on private standardization processes. The European Commission re-
lied exclusively on entrepreneurial policy instruments. Therefore, this case study
provides an opportunity to study the role public entrepreneurship in isolation
from other, harder policy interventions. The case study of hdtv standardization
(see Chapter 3) will compare—and investigate potential interactions between—
entrepreneurial and hierarchical policy interventions in the same case study. This
case study, however, will focus exclusively on policy entrepreneurship.
Moreover, this case allows for an analysis of entrepreneurial interventions and
their effects over a period of more than two decades. This long time frame is
crucial for the operationalization of the process tracing methodology, mentioned
in the introductory Chapter (1).
This Chapter is divided into two main parts, each analyzing the Commission’s
entrepreneurial role during the standardization that took place during a different
generation of technology. Section 2.1 investigates the extent to which the Commis-
sion’s entrepreneurship influenced the development of second generation mobile
telecoms standardization. Section 2.2 analyzes the entrepreneurial impact on
third generation standardization respectively. Both Section are subdivided into
the two main stages and functions of public entrepreneurship. First, both sections
analyze whether and, if so, to what extent the European Commission was able
to set the agenda of private standard setters. Secondly, both sections investigate
the Commission’s entrepreneurial ability to mediate conflicts of interests and to
ensure industry commitment with the resulting standard.
During each generation of technology, the European Commission intervened
in markedly different circumstances. This allows for within-case comparisons,
which may provide opportunities to identify or to reject potential necessary
condition for public entrepreneurship.
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Moreover, mobile telecoms standardization constitutes a rather interesting
case because, a priori, public entrepreneurship should be considered to be rather
unlikely to succeed during either of the two technological generations, albeit for
slightly different reasons, discussed at the beginnings of Sections 2.1 and 2.2. This
may allow for the formulation of a number of contingent generalizations. If public
entrepreneurship had a facilitating effect on the private development of technical
standards, despite these unfavorable circumstances, public entrepreneurship may
be expected in more favorable circumstances.
2.1 GSM: An Unlikely Case
As suggested above, the circumstances in which the Commission intervened into
second-generation mobile telecoms standardization, can be considered rather
unfavorable.
1. Telecoms policy was—and to some extent still—is jealously guarded by
national governments and their ptts (Postal, Telegraph and Telephone
administrations), leaving little space for supranational interventions. When
the Commission first intervened in the late 1970s, it had almost no policy
competences in the field of telecoms. Even today many parts of the telecoms
sector remain rather resistant to European integration.
2. The potential standard-setters did not seem to have had any incentive to
collaborate on the development of common European standards. Telecoms
in Europe was compartmentalized into separate national markets, each
dominated by one monopoly operator and one or, at most, two equipment
manufacturers per market. To shelter their national markets from inter-
national competition, companies’ were accustomed to develop distinctly
different standards than their international neighbors. For that reason,
both fixed as well as first-generation mobile telecoms standards were both
developed at the national level and designed to be incompatible. By devel-
oping or adopting European standards, national companies only expected
to expose themselves to international competition.
3. The collaborative development of common European standards required
a heterogeneous set of actors and interests to collaborate. The interests
at stake did not only diverge across countries but also across industrial
sub-sectors. And the rapid technological change of the telecoms industry
increased the number and heterogeneity of directly concerned actors even
further. The gradual convergence of conventional telecoms and information
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technologies (it) led to the creation of new companies and the confrontation
of existing companies from different sectors.
This Chapter explores to what extent the Commission was able to assume the
role of the policy entrepreneur and influence European standardization processes
nonetheless.
The analysis of this Section is organized in two sub-sections. Each investigates
one of the key functions of the policy entrepreneur. Section 2.1.1 focuses on the
Commission’s agenda-setting role. Section 2.1.2 investigates to what extent the
Commission was able to mediate the decision-making conflicts that emerged
during the standardization process.
2.1.1 Agenda-Setting
As argued in the introductory Chapter (1) agenda-setting is the most important
function that a policy entrepreneur can provide. This section analyzes whether
and to what extent the European Commission was able to set the agenda of
private standard-setters by (1.) identifying a policy problem; (2.) matching this
problem with a potential policy solution; and (3.) identifying and mobilizing
an actor-coalition that would be willing and able to solve the policy problem as
suggested by the entrepreneur (see Zahariadis, 2007; Kingdon, 1995).
Identification of a standardization problem
The identification of the policy/standardization problem goes back to the late
1970s. The European Commission had grown increasingly worried about the
competitiveness of Europe’s it and telecoms industry. While the European it
industry already seemed to have been overtaken by their American competitors,
it was feared that the telecoms industry was going to follow next.
At the same time, it was expected that if the industry fell into crisis Member
States would rather respond by shielding national telecoms markets off from
international competition rather than opening them to European market integra-
tion. Therefore, the Commission sought to gain a role in industrial policy, which
had not been a Commission competences. As a first step, Etienne Davignon—
Commissioner for Directorate-General (dg) Internal Market (III)—set up the
Information Technologies Task Force (ittf), a group of technical experts with
industry experience, under his personal control (Peterson & Sharp, 1998, p. 169).
Davignon and his team were strongly influenced by the emerging New Trade
Theory, which was just being developed by (Krugman, 1979, 1980) during the
late 1970s, and which goes back to the work of Balassa (1967), Kravis (1971) and
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Grubel and Lloyd (1975). It had a significant influence on their perception the
problem of and solution to Europe’s competitiveness.
In contrast to neoclassical trade theory, New Trade Theory suggested that
international patterns of trade—and thus within that the competitive position
of individual countries—was mainly determined by increasing returns to scale,
rather than natural resource endowments. This was understood to implied an
active role for governmental actors. By helping domestic industries to exploit
sufficient economies of scale at home, they may be able to win increasing market
shares abroad (Krugman, 1986, p. 9). While New Trade Theory was later criticized
by Bhagwati (1994) and others for its negative impact on free trade, the Com-
mission enthusiastically embraced this new theory. It did not only provide the
Commission with the analytical tools to interpret the crisis of European industry.
The theory also represented a convenient justification for the expansion of its
competences into trade policy, which had traditionally been a prerogative of
national sovereignty.
Based on New Trade Theory, Davignon and his team concluded that the
root of the problem was to be found in the fact that the fragmented nature of
the European market could not provide enough scale to compete with the us
and Japan. At the beginning of the 1980s, the American and Japanese telecoms
markets represented 35% and 11% of the world market respectively. The largest
national markets in Europe, by contrast, occupied no more than six percent (ec,
1987a, p. 27).
Identification of a standardization solution
As a solution to European industry’s competitiveness problem, Davignon and the
ittf suggested a coordinated European response. For European technologies
to succeed at the international level, Davignon argued that, “home-markets of
sufficient size and, on the European conditions, these can only be provided by the
community as a whole” (EC, 1982) because, “[t]aken as a whole, the Community’s
telecommunications market corresponds to more than 20%” of the global market
(ec, 1987a, p. 27). For market integration, which would have triggered a process
of industry consolidation and increased companies’ returns to scale, it was still
too early in the telecoms sector. Member States would not have accepted this. It
was going to take another decade until market integration in telecoms eventually
made it onto the agenda of Europe’s decision-makers. Therefore, the Commission
argued for more intensive inter-company collaboration on issues such as research
and development (r&d) and technical standardization to achieve the required
scale economies instead.
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The basic rationale behind this strategy was that companies would be able to
share development costs and deploy the technology at a much larger scale if com-
panies coordinated the development and deployment of new technologies instead
of introducing competing technologies in each national market as they were used
to. A means to achieve such a coordination was technical standardization—or
more precisely ex ante standardization, the standardization of technologies before
they are deployed in the market. The success of Scandinavian First Generation, i.e.
analogue, mobile telephony standardization served Davignon and his team as a
real-world example for the potential of such a strategy. Despite the comparatively
weak state of the Scandinavian telecoms industry and the small size of their home
markets, the Scandinavian standard had achieved considerable success through-
out the world (Lehenkari & Miettinen, 2002, p. 110). The Scandinavian standard
won 1.3 million consumers in Europe and Japan, which was considerably more
than the American, French, Italian and British ones and only a little less than the
German standard had won.
The Commission thus had successfully performed the first two of the agenda-
setter’s three functions. It identified (1.) a policy problem and (2.) a potential
policy solution (see Zahariadis, 2007; Kingdon, 1995). In order to induce policy
change, however, it (3.) had to identify and mobilize an actor-coalition that would
be willing and able to solve the policy problem as suggested by the entrepreneur.
Mobilization of a standardization coalition
At the end of the 1970s, however, there was relatively little pan-European coop-
eration in the telecoms industry, which the Commission might have been able
to build on. Telecoms policy was still firmly in the hands of Member States’
governments and their ptts, which only coordinated their standardization ac-
tivities through cept (European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications
Administrations), where it was absolutely necessary, as, for instance, in the case
of radio spectrum.
At the European Council meeting in Dublin during November 1979, Davignon
and the ittf first approached Member States. They urged Members States
to coordinate their efforts in data processing, telecommunications, and micro-
electronics to catch up to the us and Japan (Business Week, 1979). While Member
States’ generally welcomed the report, they refused to take concrete actions. At
this point the Commission realized that it would have to pursue another strategy
to achieve the mobilization of collective action.
Next it approached national ptts and was slightly more successful than it
was with Member States’ governments. It managed to convince them to share
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the radio spectrum, which the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference
had set aside for use in land mobile communications, for the development
of a joint mobile telecoms standard through cept (Haug, 2002b, p. 12). In
1982, the Groupe Spécial Mobile—henceforth referred to as the ‘gsm-Group’
after which the resulting standard was going to be called—was set up within
cept to start developing technical specifications for a pan-European mobile
telecoms system (gsm World, 2009). For that purpose the Commission signed
a memorandum of understanding (mou) with cept, whereby cept would
write common standards and specifications for equipment according to priorities
established by the commission. In lack of serious commitments by the national
ptts, however, progress was slow. As monopoly providers of telecoms services,
the ptts had little incentive to advance mobile telephony. And the equipment
industry, to which mobile telephony meant a new market opportunity, did not
participate in cept.
Frustrated by the Council’s and cept’s lack of enthusiasm, Davignon and his
team finally turned to industry directly. “Only by going behind the backs of the
governments, so to speak, and convincing the chief executives”, Davignon later
stated in an interview with the The Washington Post, “were we able to push this
through” (Drozdiak, 1984). During 1979 and 1981, the Commission repeatedly
gathered the chief executives of the twelve largest European it and telecoms
companies for roundtable discussions to deliberate a joint strategy on mobile
telecoms (Sandholtz, 1992, p. 226). “We shopped around for successful firms who
realized they had to share the benefits of basic research if they did not want to lose
more markets to the Americans and Japanese,” Davignon explained (Drozdiak,
1984). Through a number of technical and economic studies,1 Davignon and
his task force had gained enough information to be taken seriously by industry
(Sandholtz, 1992, p. 242). Then he told companies that they could no longer
content themselves with the easy profits that they were making in their protected
home markets and encouraged them to use the size of the European market as
a springboard to expand their market shares abroad (Peterson & Sharp, 1998,
p. 85).
Industry turned out to be quite receptive to the Commission’s reasoning.
Adopting the Commission’s argumentation “Survival [for Europeans industry]
means one thing: getting together and cooperating” (Business Week, 1979), a
senior analyst from Arthur D. Little Inc. stated. And according to Britain’s icl,
“Davignon’s proposals address key issues that we consider are vital to resolve
for the future of the indigenous computer and telecommunications industries
1The studies were conducted by from Arthur D. Little, Macintosh International, Mckinsey, and
the Yankee group
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Table 2.1: Participants of the ‘Big
Twelve’ Round Table (1981)
Company Country
1 AEG West Germany
2 Bull France
3 CGE-Alcatel France
4 GEC United Kingdom
5 ICL United Kingdom
6 Nixdorf West Germany
7 Olivetti Italy
8 Philips The Netherlands
9 Plessey United Kingdom
10 Siemens West Germany
11 STET Italy
12 Thomson France
Source: Peterson and Sharp (1998)
in the ec” (Business Week, 1979). A group of twelve companies (henceforth
referred to as the ‘Big Twelve’), which first met in this constellation for round
table discussions in 1981, turned out to be most receptive to the Commission’s
arguments and eventually formed the standardization alliance that was going to
provide the technical expertise and financial muscle required for the development
and deployment of the European mobile telecoms standard (see Table 2.1).2
The Commission’s efforts to mobilize industry, however, have benefited from
an event which amplified the industry’s perception of crisis. The American
telecoms monopoly at&t was soon going to allowed it to move into the foreign
markets (Sandholtz, 1992, pp. 163-166). This led to a heightened sense of crisis
which made industry more receptive to the European Commission’s suggestion to
respond in a coordinated fashion. The hypothesis that industry crisis constitutes
a necessary condition for public entrepreneurship is thus confirmed (see Chapter
1).
With the formation of this alliance the Commission also managed to perform
the last function of agenda-setting. It successfully mixed and matched a policy
problem, solution and actor-coalition. During that process it demonstrated a
considerable degree of persistence, which, according to Kingdon (1984, pp. 189-
190), constitutes one of the key qualities of a policy entrepreneur. It did not cease
2There were different Round Tables which met in different constellations. Therefore, infor-
mation on the membership of these Round Tables often tends to differ (Sandholtz, 1992; Cowels,
1997; Peterson & Sharp, 1998, see).
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to approach new groups of actors until it had finally found one that was willing
to support its plans. Before it could convince industry to collaborate on common
standards, both the Council and cept had turned out to be unwilling to follow
the Commission’s plans.
This episode also illustrates how policy entrepreneurs may overcome their
alleged information deficits. Clearly, the Commission did not have an absolute
informational advantage over companies and clearly it did not have the technical
expertise of companies’ r&d departments. As a public actor, however, the
Commission turned out to be in a much better position to export new policy
ideas from different contexts and time periods—i.e. New Trade Theory and
the history of Scandinavian analogue mobile telephony standardization. In the
shadow of the ptts control of the telecoms industry, however, companies did
not seem to be able to conceive of the possibility of cross-national inter-company
collaboration. And even if an individual firm would have come up with this
idea and proposed it to its competitors, other companies —not to mention local
competition authorities—are very likely to have viewed this proposal with the
suspicion that this firm would want to free ride on its standardization work or
steal industry secrets. As a public rather than a private competitor, however, the
Commission could make a much more credible case for intensive inter-company
collaboration.
With the agenda-setting process completed, the technical standard still needed
to be developed. Again, the Commission turned out to play an active role during
this stage.
Together with the Commission’s ittf, the Big Twelve identified the lack of
cooperation between the member state’s individual r&d programs as one of the
main reasons why the European Union was falling behind the us and Japan. In
the 1980s, r&d was highly fragmented across Europe. In the us and Japan, by
contrast, r&d was concentrated within a limited number of research institutes or
companies, such as ibm and Sony, which each spent more than $ 2 billion on r&d
annually, a ittf representative argued (Wielaard, 1984). Therefore, the ittf and
the Big Twelve co-drafted a program for pre-competitive and pre-normative r&d
collaboration in it,3 which was called esprit (European Strategic Programme
for Research and Development in Information Technologies) (Cowels, 1997, p. 18).
Both the focus on it rather than telecoms as well as the focus on r&d rather than
industrial policy were political choices. In contrast to the telecoms, it was still
relatively unregulated and largely escaped from the direct control of the national
3‘Pre-competitive’ collaboration takes place before the competitive market introduction of a
product. ‘Pre-normative’ r&d collaboration signifies a collaboration that takes place before and in
preparation of technical standardization.
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ptts, which had the tendency to jealously guard their authority (Peterson &
Sharp, 1998, p. 76). And the focus on r&d was meant as a fig leaf to conceal
the Commission’s industrial policy ambitions, for which it did not have a legal
mandate.
However, the Big Twelve did not provide the technical expertise and financial
muscle necessary to execute the Commission’s standardization strategy. Industry
also provided political power. The Big Twelve immediately began to lobby their
respective national governments to support the collaborative r&d program. In a
document prepared for the Stuttgart European Council, they argued that:
[. . . ] we are concerned that our international competitors are developing a
lead over Europe in certain new technologies: this lead may be irreversible
unless political leaders act now. Should they fail to do so, this could endanger
Europe’s future living standards and position in the world, and might lead
to a dangerous disequilibrium in world trade.
(European Round Table, 1983, p. 2)
Soon the Twelve’s lobbying efforts started to pay off. On November 4th 1983,
the Council adopted a resolution that endorsed the Commission’s policies and
adopted the esprit program.4 The first phase of esprit provided e 1.5 billion
of Community funding, which was going to be matched by industry. The Big
Twelve received 50% of the total esprit budget and were involved in 70% of
projects. Although esprit’s actual contribution to innovation and industry
competitiveness is rather hard to assess, it became an instant success in the sense
that it brought the industry’s leaders as well as engineers to the same table. The
fact that these experts met continuously and over a long period of time created
a community that will be identified as one of the driving forces behind the
standardization process (see Section 2.1.2). esprit was initially planned as ten
year program. Already after three years, however, esprit’s first phase’s funding
ran out and industry asked the Commission to continue with the second phase
ahead of schedule.
According to the research director of Plessey, John Bass, “it [esprit] was
certainly the trigger of the funding that helped to get us involved” (Dickson,
1984). At first glance this statement, might be understood to mean that it was the
large amount of subsidies provided through esprit instead of the Commission’s
agenda-setting efforts that caused the mobilization of collective action. The
precise sequence of events, however, suggests that this cannot have been the case.
First, the Commission mobilized companies, then the latter, together with the
Commission, lobbied national governments to adopt esprit. Therefore, it can
4In 1985 and 1986, the Council furthermore adopted a decision and regulation in support of
the collaborative community action in telecoms (European Council, 1986, 1985a).
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be inferred that esprit thus would not have existed had it not been for the
Commission’s entrepreneurial intervention.
The focus on pre-normative r&d—i.e. the development of new technology
standards rather than the standardization of existing technologies—also increased
the leverage of the European Commission as a public entrepreneur in two ways.
First, and as discussed in the introduction (see Chapter 1), the effectiveness of
entrepreneurial policy instruments is rather limited. For they rely on the power
of persuasion rather than coercion, entrepreneurial policy instruments can only
have an effect where actors preferences are still in flux. During the r&d stage of
the technological life cycle of mobile telecoms this clearly was the case. At this
point there still was relative uncertainty about the commercial implications of
standardization and companies had not yet made any significant pre-investments
in different development paths. In these circumstances, the public entrepreneur
can be expected to find it much easier to convince companies to develop common
standards than at a later point during the technological life cycle where companies
have acquired clearly defined technological preferences and may no longer be
able to agree to a single technology as the basis of a single common standard.
The Commission was well aware of this fact, as a Communication from as early
as 1982 suggests (ec, 1982, p. 13).
Secondly, the focus on pre-normative and pre-competitive r&d allowed the
Commission to maximize its influence on private companies with a minimal
amount of subsidies. When compared with private r&d budgets or the volume
of subsidies available from national governments, however, the volume of the
European r&d programs have been rather small. However, the European pro-
grams were targeted at long-term r&d, for which European it and telecoms
equipment manufacturers generally only spent around ten percent of their r&d
budgets (Sandholtz, 1992).5 During the 1980s, esprit and race (Research and
technology development in Advanced Communications in Europe) amounted to
60% of the private sector’s budget’ for this type of r&d (Sandholtz, 1992). This
explains industry’s strong responsiveness to these programs.
Strengthened by the success with the esprit program in the it sector, Davi-
gnon and his team felt that they had build up enough political capital to extent
their actions into the relatively more politicized field of telecoms equipment.
For that purpose, however, it had to persuade the conservative ptts to admit
international collaboration in the field of telecoms equipment, which had tradi-
tionally been kept quite secretive for military reasons. To warm the ptts to the
5Even today, Siemens Nokia Networks’ head of research alliances, Mohr (2006) argues, compa-
nies’ r&d horizons are usually still not much longer than six or seven years.
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Table 2.2: EU-funded R&D programs with relevance for mobile telecoms stan-
dardization (in Ecu/EUR)
Years Project name FPa Budget
1984-1988 ESPRIT I 1 1.5 billion
1988-1992 ESPRIT II 2 3.1 billion
1990-1994 ESPRIT III 3
1985-1987 RACE definition phase
1990-1994 RACE I 3 550 million
1992-1994 RACE II 3 484 million
1994-1998 ACTS 4 682 million
1998-2002 ACTS II 5
2002-2006 IST: ’Mobile and Wireless Systems Beyond
Third Generation’
6 252 million
2007-2013 European Technology platform: eMobility 7 250 million
a Framework Programme
idea of r&d collaboration, the Commission organized a ‘Planning Exercise in
Telecommunications,’ which brought experts from ptts together with experts
from industry twice a week during 1984. According to Sandholtz (1992, p. 240)
this was “the hook that eventually brought in the telecoms administrations.”
The ptts could not help but be attracted by the vision of an integrated digi-
tal telecoms network.6 The final report of the Planning Exercise suggested the
community-wide introduction of mobile telephony. The report became the basis
for the r&d program race (ec, 1984a).
The initial focus on research and technical progress rather than industrial
policy payed off. Had the Commission focued on the latter rather than the former,
the national ptts would have surely viewed the Commission’s actions with great
suspicion. They are likely to have tried to block these, had the Commission
openly admitted its industrial policy ambitions. The focus on r&d, however,
gave the ptts a—potentially false—sense of security that their authority would
not be undermined. Moreover, the r&d collaboration was also going to change
the participating companies’ mode of interaction. Instead of an adversarial rela-
tionship, the r&d focus led to an intensive inter-company collaboration, which
was market by mutual learning and deliberation rather than strategic bargaining.
Moreover, r&d fora and the technical committees of standards-writing orga-
nizations they tend to be more concerned with opportunities of technological
6This is a beautiful example of a case where the Weberian spirit of technical rationality and
progress triumphs over power (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
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progress, rather than the strategic interests of the individual companies that they
work for. Therefore, they are more likely to replace strategic bargaining with
more deliberative forms of interaction.
With the identification of a policy problem and potential solution, the mobi-
lization of the Big Twelve, the persuasion of Member States’ governments and
ptts to admit and fund cross-national r&d collaboration in first it and then
telecoms, the Commission played a crucial role during the first phase of the
standardization process. The Commission’s intervention had been instrumental.
But this was only the first step toward a common standard. There still were a
number of problems to be overcome before a common European standard could
be successfully deployed and the case of hdtv standardization will demonstrate
(see Chapter 3) some of these problems can have a fatal effect on technical
standardization processes.
The standard-setters had to agree to a single common standard, overcome
potential conflicts that were bound to result from their diverging strategic interests,
and commit to a concerted introduction of the standard. Whether and, if so,
to what extent the Commission was also able to influence this stage of the
standardization process is investigated in the following section.
2.1.2 Coordination the Standard’s Development and Deployment
During the development and deployment stage, standard-setters still had to
overcome two basic types of decision-making problems before the Global System
of Mobile Telecommunication (gsm) standard—called after the gsm-Group—
could be deployed. The first problem exclusively concerned the direct participants
of the standardization process. They had to select one technology as the basis of
their common standard from a range of possible technologies. This was going
to be a difficult choice because different companies had proprietary interests
in different technologies. The second problem concerned the standard-setters’
relationship with actors that did not directly participate in the standardization
process but which were going to be directly affected by it—i.e. the ‘standard-
takers.’ Standard-setters and standard-takers had to commit to a concerted
market introduction of the common standard. The European Commission again
sought to play an active role in the remedy of these problems. To what extent
it has actually contributed to the solution of these problems is discussed in the
following two sub-sections.
By the late 1980s, a consensus on the technological basis of the common Euro-
pean standard had emerged in the gsm group.7 This was a direct consequence of
7The chosen technological basis was tdma (Time Division Multiple Access).
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the Commission’s agenda-setting efforts that led companies to collaborate already
during the stage of pre-normative r&d. If companies had not already started to
collaborate at this stage, they are likely to have followed diverging path of tech-
nological development and it would have been very difficult to agree on a single
technology as the basis of a common standard. As a result of the pre-normative
r&d programs that had been initiated by the European Commission, however, all
companies followed a single development path, which left a much larger scope
for a mutually acceptable agreement on a single technology for a single common
standard, rather than several technologies and competing standards.
The following subsections investigate the Commission’s role in the mediation
of technological conflict and in ensuring commitment respectively.
Mediating Technological Conflict
All the pre-normative r&d collaboration, however, could not prevent that the
standard-setters had developed diverging interests in two variants of the agreed
technology. One was backed by France Telecom and Alcatel as well as the German
companies aeg and Siemens.8 Another was championed by Ericsson, Nokia and
Swedish Telecom (gsm Group, 1987a, p. 1; Ruottu, 1998, pp. 257–258; Telecom
Markets, 1987).9 This almost led to the failure of gsm because standardization
through cept required unanimity by all members.
The technical experts, mentioned above, which were meeting in the gsm
group and the pre-normative r&d projects (see Section 2.1.1), however, did not
want to be held up by the strategic games that their companies played a the
executive level. “The people on the working level were quite happy to go along
with the narrowband [i.e. the Scandinavian] proposal,” a gsm Group participant
argued (Haug, 2002a, p. 21). The technical experts that sat in the gsm group’s
meetings had known each other for years and appear to have replaced strategic
bargaining with a more deliberative mode of interaction.10 This is well illustrated
by the following statement of the chair of the gsm group:
gsm [Group] spent long nights discussing this. I recall one night when
we went on until 2.30 in the morning and since we were almost dying for
something to eat, somebody had the brilliant idea of raiding the refrigerators
in the kitchen, adjoining the meeting hall . . . Sardines or no sardines, we had
arrived at an impasse.
(Haug, 2002a, p. 21)
Regardless of their employers strategic interest, the technical experts decided to
8Wideband-tdma.
9Narrowband-tdma.
10Interview a2 with a representative of a large European equipment manufacturer (2009)
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adopt the technology preferred by Scandinavian industry as a ‘working assump-
tion’ and to discontinue the development of the Franco-German technology (gsm
Group, 1987a, pp. 1–2; Haug, 2002a, pp. 20–21). The Franco-German variant was
not developed further. Thereby, the technical experts and engineers in the gsm
work group put considerable pressure on the strategic decision-makers at the
executive level of their respective companies because the Franco-German variant
became less and less attractive as the development of the Scandinavian variant
of the selected technology progressed. An epistemic community formed at the
levels of companies’ technical experts and engineers. This was a direct result of
the Commission’s promotion of pre-normative r&d collaboration.
Had the Commission only invited companies to collaborate at the executive
level, strategic bargaining is likely to have prevailed as the main mode of interac-
tion. At the level of the technical experts, however, the common technological
challenges provided scope for mutual learning and deliberation. This was the
first factor contributing to the solution of this decision-making gridlock over GSM.
This underlines the importance that entrepreneurs convince standard-setters to
start to collaborate early and to push the standardization process into technical,
research oriented venues.
At the executive level, however, the gridlock prevailed. The leaders of France
Telecom, Alcatel, aeg and Siemens continued to hold out agreement. They
did not have a choice. The French and German government had provided
considerable funding for the development of their variant of the technology in
addition to the money provided the race program. Therefore, they insisted
that the technologies developed through these subsidies were included into the
standard. Eventually, however, the Commission helped to resolve the decision-
making deadlock in two ways.
First, the Commission persuaded Member States, ptts and companies to
transfer the gsm project from cept to the etsi, which had been set up to
centralize and strengthen European standardization in the field of ict. In
contrast to cept, etsi directly allowed industry to participate directly. They
were no longer represented by national delegations/ptts as it was the case in
cept. This meant a de-politicization of the standardization process. National
governments/ptts could not longer exert a direct influence. In contrast to cept,
etsi also introduced qualified majority voting for some—and simple majority
voting for most—decisions. Therefore, the Franco-German coalition was no longer
be able to hold out agreement.11
11Therefore, Pelkmans (2001), suggests that etsi’s institutional design could be seen as a direct
response to the deficiencies of cept when it came to finding agreement on a single common
standard.
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Second, the Commission proposed ‘basket standard’ that would incorporate
features of both variants, including the Franco-German one—if only to a sym-
bolical extent. The ‘basket standard’ allow the outvoted French and German
companies to keep their face and to rid themselves of their obligations to their
respective governments (Bach, 2000). As a result, gsm’s technical specifications
ended up being far more complex than technically necessary. But this was the
price that had to be paid for the consensus on a single common standard (Ruottu,
1998, p. 270).
During the solution of the technological conflict over the two different variants
of the technological basis of gsm, the Commission demonstrated its negotiation
skills, which, according to Kingdon (1984, pp. 189-190), constitutes one of the
key qualities of a policy entrepreneur. It remains an open question, however,
whether the Commission would have been able to mediate these conflicts without
the consensus building process that had already been initiated through the pre-
normative r&d collaboration programs long before. The latter had not only
created a basic consensus on the technological basis of gsm. It had also created a
more constructive form of interaction among companies. They respected each
other’s strategic interests and largely refrained from opportunistic behavior.
Therefore, it can be assumed that the pre-normative r&d collaboration initiated
by the Commission had a larger effect on the overcoming of the above-described
decision-making gridlock than its immediate conflict mediation efforts. In this
respect, this thesis’ analysis differs from the work of Bach (2000) who argued that
the Commission’s provision of focal points alone was the crucial factor leading to
the solution of the decision-making conflict.
Ensuring Commitment
With the deadlock over the choice of the technological basis resolved, the gsm
system could be introduced. The introduction, however, required significant
investments in a concerted way from all industry participants in several countries.
Manufacturers had to produce the physical infrastructure. The ptts—most
of which were just in the process of reestablishing themselves as commercial
network operators—had to operate the network and start providing mobile
telecoms services.12 Moreover, it was estimated that at least three large markets—
i.e. Germany, France, Italy or the uk—had to start operations at the same
time to generate enough economies of scale and revenues to carry the required
12Also the chip-set manufacturers were crucial. They had to develop more advanced chips with
less electricity thirst to allow for the size of cellular mobile phones—which still used to be car
phones because their batteries were so large and heavy that they could only be transported in
cars—to be shrunk in size.
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investments (Temple, 2002, p. 40).
This created a commitment problem. If only one large country or one industry
participants decided not to introduce gsm, the investments of all of the others
would have been made in vain. On the one side, equipment manufacturers
were afraid to make the necessary investments because they were concerned
that some ptts would introduce new, more advanced analogue mobile telecoms
systems instead. Particularly the Scandinavian and British analogue standards
had advanced very quickly and were perceived as an immediate threat to the
introduction of gsm (Selian, 2001, p. 11).13 Moreover, the International Telecom-
munications Union (itu) had already envisioned the creation of third generation
technology (Selian, 2001, p. 43). Therefore, several operators considered to con-
tinue to use First Generation analogue technology until the third generation was
ready to be used. This might have put the whole system at jeopardy. Moreover,
manufacturers were concerned that the national operators, would favor national
over foreign suppliers in public procurement. ptts and the emerging private
network operators and service providers, on the other hand, were concerned
that manufacturers would take a long time to complete the development of gsm,
while their new analogue standards were already ready to be introduced. More-
over, they doubted that manufacturers would be able to start mass producing
transmission equipment in time.
The Commission, once again, played a crucial role in the solution of this prob-
lem. In September 1987, it negotiated a mou between equipment manufacturers
and operators that committed both to a firm introduction date, namely 1991 (gsm
Group, 1987b, p. 40). Moreover, ptts were committed to make public procure-
ment open to foreign manufacturers and to sign pan-European roaming contracts.
Manufacturers, in turn, committed themselves to finalize the development of
gsm by 1991 and to provide royalty free licenses for their gsm equipment.14
This provided each side with the certainty it need to make the necessary invest-
ments. By 1990, eight ptts and operators had provided procurement contracts
to individual manufacturers or consortiums of manufacturers based on the mou
(Temple, 2002, p. 40).
The Commission’s intervention was crucial for the success of gsm. The
coordination that it provided allowed for a concerted roll-out in Europe in 1992.
It quickly generated enough returns to scale to offer gsm handsets and services
13These standards were nmt900 and tacs.
14The intellectual property rights (ipr) clause was inserted into the mou due to pressure by the
French and German delegations (Temple, 2002, p. 45). Their governments had made significant
subsidies toward r&d, which they were going to make available for free. Therefore, they requested
that all other participants would provide royalty free licenses as well.
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Table 2.3: Signatories of the MoU (1990)
Country Operator Manufacturers
United Kingdom Racal Vodafone Orbitel and Ericsson
Callnet Motorola and Nokia
Germany Deutsche Bundes Post ECR900 (Alcatel, AEG and
Nokia), DMCS900 (Bosch, ANT
and PKI/Philips), Siemens
Mannesmann Mobilfunk Siemens and Ericsson
France France Télécom ERG 900, Matra, Ericsson and
Orbitel
Italy SIP Telettra and Alcatel
The Netherlands PTT Nederland ERC900
Belgium RTT DMCS 900, Siemens
Source: European Commission (1990, p. 9)
at a competitive price. Once a critical mass of consumers had adopted the
standard—i.e. purchased gsm compatible phones and signed gsm-based service
contracts—network effects led to an accelerating market penetration. From 1994
to 1995, the number of gsm subscribers jumped from one to ten million (see
Figure 2.1).
The scale provided by the European market reinforced these network effects at
the international level. Meanwhile, the Japanese standard was still under develop-
ment and in the American market several standards were still in competition with
each other. Driven by the network effects and reinforced by the returns to scale
provided by the European market, gsm quickly penetrated into the Japanese
and American markets. After operators in Australia in 1993, the first American
operator started to provided gsm services in 1995. In 1996, Chinese and Russian
operators followed. By 1997, 15 American operators were offering gsm services.
Eventually, gsm became the de facto international standard (gsm World, 2009).
Moreover, it is important to point out that none of the Commission’s inter-
ventions led to the political contestation of the standardization process. There
were two reasons for this. First, only a small and homogeneous groups of imme-
diately concerned companies of actors around mobile equipment manufacturers
responded to the Commission’s entrepreneurial interventions. Standard-takers
and potentially adversely affected companies, such as the analogue service
providers, did not feel threatened by these interventions—if they noticed them
at all—because they were neither very precise nor did they contain any concrete
obligations that might have affected their business. Therefore, not even Motorola,
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who was developing a different mobile telecoms standard in the us at the same
time as gsm was developed in Europe, seemed neither concerned about the
Commission’s interventions nor did it protest against them. Had the Commission
relied on more coercive, hard policy instruments instead, however, Motorola and
several other American companies are very likely to have chosen a similar strategy
as the hd -mac (High Definition Multiplexed Analogue Components) opponents
chose in the case of hdtv to undermine the Commission’s intervention.
Secondly, the Commission’s entrepreneurial interventions did increase the
number of veto points either. None of the instruments used by the Commission
directly required a formal vote by the ep or Council. Moreover, these instruments
escaped the informal scrutiny of the ep and Council for they were simply to vague,
inaccessible and opaque. While this may have been crucial for the successful
deployment of gsm, it clearly came at the price of broader, democratic input by
potentially concerned stakeholders, including consumers.
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100 operators have signed the MoU
1st Chinese and Russian operators
15 American operators sign the MoU
One new GSM customer every second
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
50
0
1992 '97 '02  '07
Source: GSM World, 2009
'93 '94 '95 '96 '98 '99 '00 '01  '03 '04 '05 '06  '08 '09
Mi
llio
n s
ub
scr
ibe
rs 1st American operators
65 % of world mobile subscribers 80 %
Figure 2.1: Market Penetration of GSM (in Mio. Subscribers, 1992-2009)
As in the case of the above-mentioned technological conflict, the previous
actions of the Commission played a considerable role. Had the Commission
not brought the standard-setters together at a relatively early stage, they would
have never won the crucial first-mover advantage. They may not have com-
pleted the technological development so quickly. Furthermore, it is unlikely that
the standard-setters would have agreed to a common technology as the single
common standard so quickly. Compared with the American standardization
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experience, the level of variety reduction achieved in Europe was crucial for
the success of gsm. Therefore, it can be concluded that the most crucial inter-
vention of the European Commission took place during the early phases of the
standardization process. This underlines the assumption that early intervention
constituted a necessary condition for entrepreneurial policy interventions to have
an effect.
This episode also demonstrates that policy entrepreneurs do not necessarily
need to stay neutral or act out of altruism to be influential. They may have a
stake in the issue themselves. While Commissioner Davignon and his team might
have well been genuinely concerned about the international competitiveness of
European industry, it seems clear that they also sought the close contact with
industry in order to win political support for its institutional struggle to expand
its legal competences. While it previously did not have any competences in
neither industrial nor telecoms policy, the commercial success of gsm suddenly
turned the Commission into an actor to be reckoned with in both policy areas.
This is also reflected in the changes introduced by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.
The ittf was turned into the new dg for Information Society. And industrial
policy was official made a new Commission competence, which was divided
between dg Information Society and dg Internal Market. Moreover, a clause
was included in the treaty, defining ‘interoperability’ as a public interest, which
provided the Commission with a legal basis to continue to intervene in technical
standardization processes (ec, 1992a).
Industry appreciated the efforts of the European Commission. Erik Dekker,
then chief executive officer (ceo) of Philips, stated that:
We have a very good and close relationship with the Commission. The
Commission appreciates this as it means its members can talk privately with
people who have to do things in practice. We also appreciate it because we
are able, in a positive way, to influence certain things
(Europe 2000, 1990).
The political collaboration between the Big Twelve and the Commission turned
out to be mutually beneficial. Weather and to what extent this collaboration has
been beneficial to the European consumers is discussed further below.
2.2 UMTS: Can the Commission do it Again?
By the mid 1990s, the telecoms industry had changed dramatically. On the equip-
ment manufacturing side of the market, the increasing technological complexity
had exacerbated r&d costs and lead to an increasing technological convergence
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between telecoms and it drawing in companies from both industries.15 More-
over, the European market for telecoms equipment had become almost fully
integrated. On the services side of the market, the gradual liberalization of the
sector had let to the entry of new companies challenging the incumbent operators.
In these changed circumstances public entrepreneurship was even more unlikely
to succeed than in the case of gsm. And several commentators argued that the
commercial success of gsm was exceptional and could not be repeated.
1. Bach (2000, p. 31), for instance, argued that the multiplication of actors and
interests resulting from the rapid technological change and economic inter-
nationalization would reduce the scope for mutually acceptable agreements
on common European standards. While the European telecoms industry
still used to be a club of protected national monopolies during the develop-
ment of gsm, Pelkmans (2001, pp. 434,437) suggested, the introduction of
competition in telecoms would render companies more concerned about
the strategic implications of standardization and thus reduce the scope for
intensive inter-company collaboration.
2. Until the late 1990s, industry did not have an immediate commercial interest
in third generation mobile telephony. Instead European manufacturers
sought to maximize their gains from gsm. This should have made it very
difficult for the Commission to mobilize collective action.
3. The gsm standardization process demonstrated the vulnerability of collab-
orative standardization processes to aggressive ipr hold-out strategies.16
After the deployment of gsm, Motorola initially refused to license its patents
on essential gsm technologies. Eventually Motorola gave in and provided
15The growing complexity of multifunctional telecommunications networks and terminals
required new, faster and more efficient network management tools, transmission and switching
devices and. These tasks were increasingly carried out by computers and microprocessors. The
gradual computerization of telecommunications equipment eventually led to the convergence of
two formerly separate industries: information technologies and telecommunications (Werle, 2001,
p. 392).
16Participants as well as non-participants can conceal the fact that they hold patents on
essential technologies during the cooperative development of technical standards and hold-out
the implementation of the standard after it has been published by refusing to license these patents
(Dunlavey & Schallop, 2007; Shapiro, 2000; Soininen, 2007a). Although such actions might be seen
as a potential abuse of a dominant position and although the Commission sought to present it
as such (ec, 1992b, p. 20), the application of Article 82 ec in the case of ict standardization is
considered to be rather difficult in (Staniszewski, 2007, p. 16). The first problem lies in the fact
that it is almost impossible to defining a relevant market in which the patent holder is alleged to
be dominant. Given the rapid diffusion of technological boundaries in ict, this is often impossible
because the patented technology is often used by standards to establish interoperability with other
technologies and markets. Therefore, dominance has to be defined by considering the availability
of alternative technologies, the cost and time effort required to develop such technology, and
barriers to entry. This also requires the consideration of technological change and progress, which
adds yet another complicating factor.
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the required licenses, albeit not without claiming horrendous royalty pay-
ments. The fallout from the ipr conflict with Motorola can hardly be
overestimated. Standard-setters started to look at each other with greater
suspicion. They always had to expect that they would not be able to recoup
their investments into the development of new technical systems through
standardization, if patent holders could refuse to license essential patents
and demand an unlimited level of royalty payments. This is considered to
have eroded the mutual trust among standard-setters and thereby reduced
the scope for cooperation within standardization organizations (van Eecke,
Fonseca, & Egyedi, 2007, p. 108).17 This also appears reflected in the prolif-
eration of private litigations (Staniszewski, 2007; Soininen, 2007a) as well as
the complaint by the ceo of net that “[A]ll big telecoms manufacturers
have teams of lawyers with the task of bringing in revenues from use of their
IPRs” (Purton, 1999). The basis for intensive inter-company collaboration
on common standards appears to have been destroyed.
4. Given the speed of technological change and given the presence of strong
network externalities, companies should have found unilateral, de facto stan-
dardization strategies more attractive. Patent hold-outs would have been
less of an issue and companies might have been able to move faster alone for
they would not be held up by decision-making problems. According to the
literature particularly large companies, which the European manufacturers
had certainly become at this point, should be expected to use their deep
pockets (see Farrell & Saloner, 1985b; Saloner, 1990) and existing installed
base of consumers (Weiss & Sirbu, 1990), to set standards unilaterally (see
Katz & Shapiro, 1985b, 1985a, 1986). 18
As European second-generation mobile telecoms standardization, third gener-
ation standardization, too, was a rather unlikely case for public entrepreneurship
to succeed.
This Section explores to what extent the Commission was able to maintain its
entrepreneurial influence, despite these unfavorable circumstances
17van Eecke et al. (2007, p. 108) claim that because the legal framework of standardization is
blurred and the legal framework recognizing IPRs is on the contrary very clear, IPRs-holders have
all the power while standard-setters have none.
18Once the market is locked in, the sponsor of the wining technology are in extremely profitable
position. First, they can set monopolistic prices and second they can deliberately set proprietary
standards that are incompatible with the products of their competitors.
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2.2.1 Agenda-Setting
As in the previous section, the investigation of the Commission’s entrepreneurial
influence begins with an analysis of the Commission’s ability to set the agenda of
private standard-setters and is subdivided into three parts, each dealing with one
of the key agenda-setting functions.
Identification of a standardization problem
The Commission saw itself confirmed by the success of gsm (ec, 1996, 1994a,
1997a), and continued to act as the main agenda-setter in mobile telecoms stan-
dardization. The new Commissioner, Martin Bangemann, and his team were
keen to maintain both the position of the European Commission in telecoms
and industrial policy as well as the competitive advantage that the success of
GSM had brought for the European mobile telecoms industry. The emergence of
third generation mobile telecoms technology on the horizon, in particular, was
perceived as a great challenge to the success of gsm and European dominance.
In 1989, the itu had asked its members to start with the development of third
generation standards that could be adopted as international standards.19 In
1992, the World Radio Conference already identified radio spectrum for such a
standard.
The current speed of technological developments, the high stakes in the
uptake of electronic commerce, and efforts of Europe’s competitors to try to
establish market dominance make a more coordinated and targeted approach
to standardization in electronic commerce a matter of urgency.
(ec, 1996, p. 7)
This was the main ‘policy problem’ that the Commission, as the agenda-setters,
had identified.
Identification of a standardization solution
After the successful introduction of gsm, the choice of the ‘policy solutions’
was relatively straight forward. It encouraged industry to continue to collabo-
rate in r&d and standardization to strengthen Europe’s competitive position
internationally (ec, 1996).
The potential commercial gains for a limited number of companies to un-
dertake standardization are often not large enough to be justifiable from
their own individual perspective, even if for the market as a whole such an
development would be beneficial.
(ec, 1996, p. 11)
19This is also referred to as the imt-2000 program.
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As during the development of gsm, the Commission argued that “a strong
home market would seem to provide the best conditions for European industry to
compete in other parts of the world” (ec, 1997b, p. 2) and defined standardization
as “a vital part of European industrial competitiveness policy” (ec, 1996, p. 2).
Reinforced by the success of gsm and the new competences it had gained through
the Treaty of Maastricht, the Commission had become more confident to admit
to its industrial policy ambitions. This stands in stark contrast of the case of gsm
standardization where it had to take a strategic detour through the it sector
before it could intervene in the telecoms sector.
The Commission’s industrial policy ambitions and its own institutional self-
interest appear to have had a strong influence on this choice for collaborative
standardization as the policy solution. This stands in stark contrast to the policy
choices that the Commission was going to make concerning the development
of digital video broadcasting standards (See Chapter 4) and the standardization
policy of the us. In both cases it was decided not to let the market select one tech-
nology as the de facto standard. Instead of ex ante interventions, standardization
policy was based on ex post corrections of market failures through competition
law to correct potential market-failures.
In mobile telecoms standardization—and especially in Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (umts) standardization—however, the Commis-
sion’s choice for collaborative, ex ante and government facilitated standardization
was strongly influenced by its institutional self-interest. The close collaboration
with industry was perceived as an opportunity to strengthen the Commission’s
role in the inter-institutional competition with the Parliament and Council and
expand its legal competences. As the case of gsm had demonstrated, the close
links it had forged with private companies had given it access to invaluable
information and political support, which it needed to strengthen its role institu-
tionally and to pursue a range of policy objectives, such as the liberalization and
integration of the telecoms market. This conforms with this thesis’ conception of
a purposefully opportunistic policy entrepreneur.
Mobilization of a standardization coalition
The main difficulty that posed itself to the Commission as an agenda-setter,
however, was the mobilization of an adequate ‘actor-coalition’—the third function
of the agenda-setting according to Kingdon (1995)—that was able and willing to
sponsor the standardization process. Operators had no interest in third generation
technology for they were still making large profits with gsm and were concerned
that third generation services would cannibalize these profits.
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Network operators invested heavily in gsm and were not very pleased to
see a new initiative starting and a new system coming across that would
basically compete with their investments or with their systems . . . They saw
it as a threat to what was being widely commercialized.
(Interview with Siemens employee, in Lembke, 2002b, p. 279)
Equipment manufacturers rather sought to increasing the capacity of and max-
imize their gains from gsm (Bekkers, 2001),20 instead of developing a third
generation standard. Moreover, the Round Table of the Big Twelve had become
less cohesive due to the crisis of Philips and the acquisition of icl by Japanese
competitors.
Commissioner Bangemann’s first attempt to mobilize industry was the cre-
ation of a new group in 1994, the High Level Group on the Information Society,
which gathered the leaders of the European telecommunications industry. Most
companies that were part of the Big Twelve (in italics in Table 4) also participated
in the new body (Peterson & Sharp, 1998). The ‘Bangemann Group’—as the High
Level Group later came to be called—was meant to prepare a proposal for a broad
policy framework for a European broadband communications market—including
both fixed as well as wireless high-bandwidth communication.21 In the group’s
final report to the European Council industry stated its intention to continue to
collaborate in standardization, following the example of gsm (Bangemann High-
level group on the information society, 1994, p. 18) and took up the Commission’s
argument that industry collaboration on common standards was necessary to
enhance Europe’s international competitiveness for “competition alone will not
provide such a [critical] mass, or it will provide it too slowly” and advocated
that “cooperation should be encouraged among competitors so as to create the
required size and momentum in particular market areas.” Technical standardiza-
tion was suggested as one of these areas (Bangemann High-level group on the
information society, 1994, p. 19).
[I]f Europe arrives late, our suppliers of technologies and services will lack
the commercial muscle to win a share of the enormous global opportunities
which lie ahead [. . . ] Joint commercial decisions must be taken [. . . ] without
delay to ensure rapid extension of European basic services beyond telephony.
This would improve their competitive position vis-à-vis non-European play-
ers in their own markets.
(Bangemann High-level group on the information society, 1994, 7, emphasis added)
20Standard-setters continued to advance gsm throughout the 1990s. Several advanced versions
of gsm were published, including gprs, edge and hsdpa.
21Etienne Davignon, who had become president of Societé Générale de Belgique and Head
of the European Round Table upon leaving the European Commission, chaired a subgroup
responsible for standardization and intellectual property rights. This ‘pantouflage’ is further
discussed below.
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However, no concrete actions followed upon these proclamations. Yet, it helped
build a consensus around the need for sustained industry collaboration.
Eventually, it was with the help of the industry’s technical experts that the
Commission finally convinced companies to use the opportunities that a collabo-
rative development of third generation mobile telecoms standards presented. The
technical experts, many of which had already participated in the development of
gsm, continued to meet in the gsm Group, which in its last meeting decided to
adopt umts as a new study area (gsm Group, 1991) and to rename itself to Spe-
cial Mobile Group (smg), as well as the collaborative r&d program race, which
was eventually succeeded by acts (Advanced Communications Technologies
and Services) in 1994. Since the ‘sardine moment’ during the decision-making
gridlock over the technological basis of gsm (see Section 2.1.2), the technical
experts and engineers involved in the actual development of the standard consti-
tuted a distinct force to be reckoned with. Also during the development of the
umts standard, this appears to have been the case. The experts’ fascination with
the opportunity to develop a new generation of telecoms standard was stronger
than their task to merely upgrade gsm, which they had been given by their
employers. They pressured their employers to move on to umts.
In 1995, the Commission invited the industry’s decision-makers and execu-
tives to a workshop, titled “Towards third generation Mobile Communication
Systems” (Fernandes, 2001, p. 147). Among the workshop’s presenters were many
members of the race research community. They demonstrated the feasibility of
third generation mobile telephony and suggested that umts was within reach.
Thereupon, the leaders of the companies that participate in the workshop decided
to set up the umts Task Force as an advisory group that was given the task to
propose a common strategy and develop a detailed plan for the development of
umts (da Silva, 2001, p. 125). The Task Force was made up of a group of technical
experts, which was handpicked and chaired by dg infosoc (See Table 2.4). It
was mandated to produce a detailed report within six month. And it met behind
closed doors, without leaking much information. The Commission participated
as an observer (Beijer, 2001, p. 159). By 1 March 1996, the final report was issued
(umts Task Force, 1996). Besides (1.) backward compatibility with gsm and (2.)
additional radio spectrum, the report demanded (3.) the adoption of a umts
regulatory framework by the end of 1997 to reduce the risks and uncertainties for
the telecoms industry and thereby stimulate the required investments and (4.)
proposed the creation of a umts Forum to develop this framework.
Following the Task Force’s recommendations, the ‘umts Forum’ was set up by
the Commission in December 1996, to elaborate the precise industry requirements
and to build broader industry support for the umts (ec, 1997b). The Forum
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Table 2.4: Members of the ‘UMTS Task Force’ (1996)
Actor Country
1 Ericsson Radio Systems Sweden
2 Nokia Finnland
3 Siemens Germany
4 Alcatel France
5 France Telecom France
6 British Telecom United Kingdom
7 Telia Italy
8 Orange France
9 T-Mobil Germany
10 KPN The Netherlands
11 GSM Association
12 European Radio communications Office
13 European Telecommunications Network Operators
14 DG InfoSoc
16 ETIS’s SMG
Source: (Lembke, 2002b)
brought together a broad group of regulators, operators, manufacturers and other
interested parties and standardization organizations such as etsi. It was financed
via its 70 members and had an annual budget of about e 500,000 (Niepold, 2001,
p. 133). In a 1997 stakeholder consultation organized by the Commission, the
Forum’s participants concluded that a joint European approach was “essential
to maximize the opportunities for European players within the global market
for third generation mobile it was felt that Europe had a narrow window of
opportunity in which to develop a clear and winning strategy” (in ec, 1997a).
The report of the Task Force and the creation of the umts Forum was the
turning point marking the beginning of the collaborative development of umts.
Meanwhile, Japan and China were making considerable progress toward a
third generation mobile telecoms standard. While Japanese standardization was
perceived as a threat, Chinese standardization was, for the enormous size of
the potential Chinese market, rather considered as an opportunity. At the same
time, the market penetration of gsm reached a new high (see Figure 2.1). gsm
turned out to be very profitable. Nokia, for instance, more than doubled its sales
from us$ 6.0 billion in 1994 to us$ 15.7 billion in 1998, thanks to GSM, which
accounted for 12% of Finnish gdp (itu, 1999, p. 9). By 1998, four of the top ten
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mobile equipment manufacturers were European, accounting for an estimated
50% of the world market (see Table 2.5). In this context, reminded companies
that:
The current speed of technological developments, the high stakes in the
uptake of electronic commerce, and efforts of Europe’s competitors to try to
establish market dominance make a more coordinated and targeted approach
to standardization in electronic commerce a matter of urgency.
(ec, 1996, p. 7)
Continued collaboration was perceived as a way to retain their international
market position in third generation mobile telecoms.
Once again, the Commission had succeeded to push European standardization
on the companies’ agenda, or as a participant of the umts forum argued, “[t]he
Commission was instrumental in setting things in motion and has been an
important partner who has contributed in a constructive way” (quoted in Lembke,
2002b, p. 277). As during the gsm standardization process, the Commission
defined the policy problem and solution and mobilized a potent actor-coalition.
Its agenda-setting was reinforced by the emerging senses of industry crisis,
emanating from the standardization activities of foreign competitors. As industry
crisis was also present in the case of gsm, a much stronger—though not definite—
basis exists to infer that industry crisis constitutes a necessary condition for public
agenda-setting in private standardization to succeed.
2.2.2 Coordinating the Standard’s Development and Deployment
Similar to gsm (see Section 2.1.2), the developers of the umts standard were
confronted with significant decision-making problems over the choice of the
technological basis and the commitment to a concerted introduction of umts.
Therefore, agenda-setting alone was not enough to ensure the success of technical
standardization. Standardization could only become a success if these problems
were overcome. This section analyzes whether and to what extent the Commission
was able to help circumvent the discussed decision-making problems.
Mediating Technological Conflict
During the development of umts, standard-setters once again clashed over the
choice between two competing technological alternatives. Despite the fact that
the r&d collaboration under race and acts program had led to a convergence
around the technology upon which umts was to be based,22 industry supported
22This technology was cdma (Code Division Multiple Access).
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Table 2.5: Top 10 mobile equipment manufacturers ranked by
mobile equipment sales (1998)
Manufacturer Revenue Change Foreign
# (headquarters) in bio US$ (1997-98) sales
1 Motorola (USA) 17.9 0% 59%
2 Nokia (Finnland) 14.7 59% 94%
3 Ericsson (Sweden) 14.5 5% 95%
4 Lucent (USA) 4.3 -6% 26%
5 Nortel (Canada) 3.7 8% 36%
6 NEC (Japan) 3.7 -3% 5%
7 Qualcomm (USA) 3.3 60% 34%
8 Matsushitat (Japan) 3.1 16% 51%
9 Siemens (Germany) 3.0 10% 69%
10 Alcatel (France) 2.7 30% 83%
Top 10 71.0 14% 54%
Source: ITU, 1999, p. 24
different variants of this technology,23 as in the case of gsm (see Section 2.1.2).
One variant was supported by Ericsson and another was championed by Nokia,
Alcatel, Siemens and Nortel (Jackson, 1999).
After two failed votes within etsi (smg, 1998a, 6ff.), Commissioner Bange-
mann summoned the ceos of the five equipment manufacturers to Brussels in
1998 and urged them to accept a compromise, again, involving both variants of
the basic technology in a ‘basket standard’ (smg, 1998b), as already discussed
in the context of gsm standardization (see Section 2.1.2). According to a partici-
pant of the smg and frames (Future Radio Wideband Multiple Access System)
project this allowed all participants to ‘keep their face.’24 Wideband-cdma was
chosen for wide-area applications and time division-cdma was chosen for low
mobility indoor applications. According to the source, the fact that industry had
‘learned to talk to each other’ during its r&d collaboration was crucial. In 1999,
etsi adopted this compromise by a wide majority (Hillebrand, 2002, p. 204).
As during the development of gsm (see Section 2.1.2), the Commission played
an important role during the solution of decision-making conflicts. This illustrates
the mediating role that public entrepreneurs may play in private standardization
processes. As argued above, however, it seems unlikely that the Commission
would have been able to mediate this conflict had not there already been a basic
23The different variants of cdma were wideband and time-division cdma.
24Interview a2 with a representative of a large European equipment manufacturer (2009)
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willingness to collaborate and to overcome this conflict. This basis was achieved
through the previous interventions of the Commission, bringing companies
together during a relatively early point during the technologies life cycle. This
suggests that early intervention constitutes a necessary condition for conflict
mediation to succeed.
Without the entrepreneurial facilitation, standard-setters are unlikely to have
overcome the technological conflict or it would have taken them much longer,
sacrificing the decisive first-mover advantage that umts was going to enjoy over
rival standards. This is not to say, of course, that the necessary mediation could
only be provided by the European Commission. Another public entrepreneur
might have been able to play a similar role.
Ensuring Commitment
To generate a sufficient level of scale on both the demand and supply side of
the market, it was necessary that umts was introduced in a coordinated way,
requiring commitments from a diverse range of actors, including equipment
manufacturers, operators and Member States’ governments and regulators. As
in the case of gsm standardization (see Section 2.1.2) the Commission sought to
assume its leadership role. Where it had negotiated a mou among companies in
the case of gsm, it decided to rely on more formal instruments this time around.
With the support of the umts Forum (Niepold, 2001, p. 135), the Commission
proposed the ‘umts Decision on the coordinated introduction of umts by 1
January 2002’ to the Council in 1998 (ec, 1998). The proposed Decision was to
oblige Member States to award at least one radio spectrum license for umts
services to national operators that asked for it. Although this Decision would
not make the adoption or compliance with the umts standard obligatory, it was
expected to provide the certainty that manufacturers and operators needed to
make sufficient investment into the launch of umts. Given the lack of obligation,
this intervention therefore is not classified as a hard intervention.
While European industry generally stood behind umts because unlike alter-
native third generation standards because it was backward compatible with gsm,
American industry which did not have a stake in umts opposed the Commis-
sion’s proposal for the umts Directive. The opposition was led by Qualcomm,
which supported the cdma2000 standard, a direct competitor of umts. They
were afraid that the umts Decision would exclude them from the large and
profitable European market.
Qualcomm even appealed to President Clinton’s administration for support.
In a letter to Commissioner Bangemann signed by us Secretary of State Madeleine
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Albright, Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Commerce Secretary Bill
Daley and Federal Communications Commission chairman William Kennard,
Washington complained that the umts Decision would give umts an unfair
advantage and a “head start” over alternative standards, such as the Qualcomm-
sponsored cdma2000 (Mobile Communications Report, 1999).25 “ec and member
state regulations must ensure non-discriminatory access to European markets and
not impose unnecessary barriers to trade,” the letter stated and threatened with
reprisals if the eu did not allow for competition between standards in Europe
(Clarke, 1999).26 And while Commissioner Bangemann, in a formal response,
argued that, “[t]]he umts decision does not limit other technologies in the
European market as member states are free to authorise them next to umts
if economic operators would propose this” (Utility Europe, 1999, p. 3), Federal
Communications Commission (fcc) Chairman Kennard pointed out that the
umts Decision nonetheless, “confers regulatory certainty and therefore a market
advantage upon only one type of technology” (Mobile Communications Report,
1999).
Additionally, Qualcomm also lobbied the ep and national governments. Soon
it had to find out, however, that their access to the to these institutions was limited.
The ep and Member States’ governments turned out to be unreceptive to their
arguments. This had two reasons. First, as an American firm without a seat in the
eu, Qualcomm had very little political leverage to influence national governments.
Secondly, the majority of decision-makers within the ep and the Council internal-
ized the industrial policy logic of the European Commission. American industry
was perceived as a threat to Europe’s ‘competitiveness.’ Moreover, Qualcomm’s
lobbying strategy in particular was perceived as too aggressive.
The main result was that it upset people like someone who is using a hammer.
The reaction was that it must be something wrong and that they tried to fool
us. umts was not regarded as a political problem [. . . ] It is political when
you have valid arguments on both sides and you have to take a decision.
(Interview with an unnamed MEP, quoted in Lembke, 2002a, p. 172)
The Commission emphasized the important of horizontal competition based
on a single common standard. Moreover, it skillfully invoked the notion that the
eu had to defend its competitiveness against the us. Bangemann argued, that,
25Secretary of Commerce, William Daley, argued that “I am concerned that the Common
Position [of ec] would give umts an unfair head start on other types of 3G systems if ec member
states go ahead without awaiting the results of itu deliberations” (Mobile Communications Report,
1999).
26An appeal to the wto (Worldwide Trade Organization), as threatened by the American
administration, however, was not expected to be very successful for the latter’s dispute settlement
procedure is unlikely to have come to a conclusion before the market had tipped toward one
standard or another. Therefore, the issue was dropped eventually.
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“umts will lead to strong competition on services and equipment to the benefits
not only of consumers but also of all market players in Europe, including non-
European manufacturers and operators in Europe” (ec, 1999a, emphasis added).
This narrative turned out to be very influential. With the help of this policy
narrative, the Commission successfully managed to protect the standardization
alliance from political contestation. This is in line with the hypothesis that public
entrepreneurs can have a significant influence on the depoliticization of technical
standardization processes.
Despite the fact that there were strong counter arguments—some of which
were used by the American opposition that had rallied around Qualcomm—the
ep and Council were highly receptive to the Commission’s narrative. American
industry often countered this narrative by emphasizing the benefits of vertical
competition between technologies, i.e. the marked-driven selection of de facto tech-
nical standards. Another potential counterargument, which was deemphasized
by the European Commission, was that the competition based on the common
European standard was going to be limited. The European market for mobile
telecoms equipment was soon to be dominated by three companies. Therefore, it
is hardly possible to speak of a competitive horizontal market. It is not this thesis’
intention however, to assess the relative strength of these narratives. Instead
these narratives are taken to be strategic tools used by each side in the political
debate.27 This thesis seeks to uncover the strategic interests underneath and the
way in which they influenced the decision-making process.
The Commission’s narrative had been highly successful. With the backing
of national equipment manufacturers, however, Bangemann quickly convinced
the telecoms ministers and the ep that an active industrial policy was necessary
to retain the competitive advantage that European industry had acquired as a
result of the international commercial success of gsm. Only nine month after
the Commission’s proposal the Council and ep adopted the Decision (Euro-
pean Council and the European Parliament, 1999). Therefore, the use of such a
non-entrepreneurial, ‘hard’ policy instrument did not lead to the failure of the
standardization process. In 2000, umts was formally adopted and deployed.
In 2000, the market deployment of umts began. Although the third gener-
ation telecoms market grew much slower than many had expected, the umts
standard allowed European industry to consolidate its dominant market position.
umts and gsm together capture 88% of the global mobile telecoms market
(etsi, 2008; gsm World, 2009). This has brought abundant revenues to European
27It is rather interested in the way in which the strength were emphasized and the weaknesses
concealed.
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manufacturers, such as Nokia and Ericsson, establishing them as international
market leaders. The industry’s international competitiveness, however, appears
to have come at the price of worrying degree of market concentration in Eu-
rope. The European mobile equipment market today is dominated by three
companies—Nokia-Siemens-Networks, Sony-Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent. This
puts the justification of collusion during the development of common standards
to create a platform for subsequent market competition somewhat into ques-
tion. The European Commission appears to have accepted this as a price for the
companies political support in the inter-institutional struggle with the Council.
2.3 Conclusion
This case study suggests that the European Commission’s entrepreneurial lead-
ership played a decisive role in the development and deployment of both the
gsm as well as the umts standards. In both cases—though in markedly different
circumstances—the Commission was able to set the agenda by identifying and
matching standardization problems, solutions and a potent actor-coalitions. It
mediated decision-making conflicts over the technological bases of the two stan-
dards, it mediated commitment problems by organizing the standards’ market
deployment. Moreover, the Commission shielded the standardization process off
from political contestation by actively depoliticizing the discourse surrounding
the process.
The Commission demonstrated all of three crucial qualities of a policy en-
trepreneur (Kingdon, 1984, pp. 189-190). First, it managed to be taken seriously
by the standard-setters; secondly, it demonstrated great negotiation skills; and
last, but most importantly, it demonstrated great persistence. Both in the case of
gsm and umts, it waited for several years until a window of opportunity finally
opened up.
In light of the fact that the Commission’s entrepreneurial interventions took
place in rather unfavorable circumstances, public entrepreneurship can also be
expected to play a similar role in more favorable circumstances.
While the Commission intervened during all stages of the standardization
process, the Commission’s agenda-setting at the very beginning has to be con-
sidered the most important. If companies would have eventually overcome their
collective action problems themselves, this is likely to have happened at a much
later point during the two technologies’ life cycles, as demonstrated in the case
studies of digital television and intermodal transport standardization (Chapters 4
& 5). The Commission’s agenda-setting role made sure that the standard-setters
started to collaborate at a relatively early point in time, namely during the r&d
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phase. This was crucial in that it (1.) provided European industry with a first
mover advantage internationally, (2.) it minimized the risk of potential bargaining
conflicts, and (3.) brought together the technical experts, which turned out to
create an epistemic community that became an important driving force behind
the collaborative development of common European standards. At a later point
during the standardization process, the Commission’s entrepreneurial interven-
tions during the standards development and deployment phase are unlikely to
have had the same effect. This case study thus confirms the hypothesis that
early intervention represents one of the conditions necessary for entrepreneurial
leadership to have an effect.
The presence of an acute industry crises is another necessary condition. In
both cases, it was not until industry crisis emerged that the Commission was able
to mobilize collective action.
Additionally, this case study demonstrates that public entrepreneurs do not
necessarily need to be neutral or honest brokers to be effective. While the
Commission may have been genuinely concerned about the lack of European
industry’s competitiveness, it is clear that it would not have intervened had it
not allowed the Commission to strengthen its position vis-à-vis its institutional
rivals. Through its close collaboration with the standardization coalition, the
Commission was able to expand its competences in telecoms and industrial policy.
Therefore, the Commission was also happy to accept increasingly worrying
degrees of market concentration in the European mobile equipment industry.
Finally, this case study provides important insights into the conditions for
political contestation to undermine technical standardization. The umts Decision
that obliged Member States to provide at least one umts license if industry
desired did not appear to have led to the political contestation and failure of
umts because the veto players mobilized by this ‘hard’ intervention did not have
access to the potential veto points. This underlines the assumption that hard
interventions and the resulting political contestation can only have a negative
effect on standardization process in pluralistic political systems that provide all
concerned stakeholders with access to the relevant decision-making processes.
Chapter 3
High-Definition Television
In the case of European hdtv standardization, too, the Commission sought
to play an active role. In contrast to the case of mobile telecoms, however, the
Commission did not exclusively rely on entrepreneurial policy instruments alone.
Only during the initial development stage of the standardization process, it
relied on entrepreneurial policy instruments. Eventually, however, it chose non-
entrepreneurial, hierarchical policy instruments to strengthen the deployment of
its preferred standards. Thereby, this case study provides a good opportunity for
both within-case and cross-case comparisons of the performance of hierarchical
and entrepreneurial policy instruments.
First, the comparison between the mobile telecoms and the hdtv case presents
an opportunity to investigate the impact of hierarchical and entrepreneurial inter-
ventions. Considering the fact that in both cases the Commission’s interventions
have taken place in rather similar circumstances, as discussed below, this case
study may allow for a number of contingent generalizations based on the ‘most
similar’ comparison with the mobile telecoms case.
Secondly, it presents an opportunity to compare the impact of hierarchical
and entrepreneurial policy instruments during the development and deployment
stages of the standardization process respectively. In the light of the mobile
telecoms case study’s conclusions, which suggest that entrepreneurial interven-
tions during the early development stage were crucial for the success of technical
standardization, this comparison is particularly interesting. It may allow for
an investigation of the question whether hierarchical interventions during the
deployment stage will still lead to the political contestation of the standardization
process, despite earlier, entrepreneurial interventions during the development
stage. Therefore, this case study may provide an opportunity to test the relative
strength of the impact of hierarchical and entrepreneurial policy interventions.
The Chapter is organized in two Sections. The first, Section 3.1, investigates
the effectiveness of the Commission’s agenda-setting efforts. And Section 3.2
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examines the effect of the Commission’s attempt to subsidize the deployment of
and mandate compliance with its preferred standard.
3.1 Agenda-Setting
Since the late 1970s, the Commission had tried to launch a European industrial
policy in the field of television content and equipment. In lack of any significant
policy competences in industrial policy, the Commission’s initial strategy was
rather similar to the case of mobile telecoms. Therefore, it build on entrepreneurial
policy instruments. First, it sought to set the agenda of private standard-setters,
so that they would develop the desired European standards. This Section is
structured around the three functions of the agenda-setter. It investigates to what
extent the Commission was able to mix and match a standardization problem,
solution and standardization-coalition.
3.1.1 Identification of a Standardization Problem
As in the case of the telecoms industry, the Commission was quite concerned
about the competitiveness of Europe’s audiovisual and consumer electronics
industry. The industry was in crisis. Throughout Europe, tv set manufacturers
were experiencing declining sales (Bray, 1996, p. 98). The market for tv sets was
saturated. Consumers only tended to replace their tv sets every twelve years
on average—not often enough for manufacturers to break even (de Bruin, 1997).
While the memory of the defeat to Japan’s consumer electronics industry in the
video cassette market in the late 1970s was still fresh,1 Commissioner Davignon
and his ittf feared that after Europe’s it industry, the audiovisual and consumer
electronics industry, too, would fall irrevocably behind its international competi-
tors. The lack of common standards was soon identified as a main problem.
Europe’s national manufacturers as well as broadcasters, which often enjoyed
monopolistic positions in their respective home markets, were accustomed to
use broadcasting standards as barriers to trade to shield their respective national
markets off from their international competitors and from each other. This way
Europe had already ended up with two incompatible color television standards:
pal (Phase Alternative by Line) and secam (Sequential Color with Memory).
According to the Commission,“[t]his discourages mass production, blunts the
competitive edge of European manufacturers and increases the price of television
for consumers” (ec, 1984b, p. 6).
1Interview c1 with a Commission representative (2010)
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3.1.2 Identification of a Standardization Solution
As a solution to this policy problem, Davignon and his ittf called for common
standards and increasing industrial cooperation (ec, 1983, p. 5). To retain their
competitiveness, European companies need to maximize their returns to scale,
which could only be achieved if companies opened their national markets and
agreed to common European standards, it was argued:
This should also be an industrial policy objective in order to increase the
competitiveness of European industry in the face of Japanese and us rivals
who enjoy large, unified domestic markets.
(ec, 1984b, p. 7)
At the dawn of the emergence of satellite television, the Commission attested
the industry a huge growth potential (ec, 1983, 1984b), however, “provided a
common policy is launched without delay” (ec, 1983, p. 5). “If it fails to keep up
with the demand, this gigantic new market [i.e. satellite broadcasting] will be
taken over by American and even Japanese competitors, thereby compounding
their economic and cultural penetration of Europe,” the Commission warned (ec,
1984b, p. 6). It presented the emergence of satellite television, as an opportunity to
adopt a single common standard for television broadcasting throughout Europe:
The Countries of Europe, despite having been unable to agree on common
technical standards for 625-line [standard definition] television, now have
a new opportunity to standardize their satellite services. This would help
to achieve rationalization on the internal market and to ensure an effective
European presence at world level in terms of industry, commerce and exports.
(ec, 1983, p. 12)
The Commission’s ittf suggested that a common market for standardized hdtv
equipment could be worth e 10 billion (ec, 1986, p. 6). The development of
European hdtv system, however, required huge investments. Therefore, the
Commission suggested a pooling of resources to minimize the r&d costs and to
use the scale of a common European market for television equipment (ec, 1987b,
p. 10) and argued that, “[s]tandards are the pre-requisite to economies of scale in
manufacture and consequent consumer confidence in the decision to purchase”
(ec, 1988a, p. 6).
In its quest for this policy solution, again, the Commission took its inspiration
from two main sources. First, with its emphasis on ‘scale economies’, as in the
case of mobile telecoms, the Commission appears to have been influenced by
the newly emerged New Trade Theory. Secondly, it took inspiration from the
rapid roll-out of satellite television in North America. “The current situation
on the United States and Canada, large countries without internal frontiers,
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shows how rapidly satellite and cable networks can expand in just a few years,”
the Commission suggested (ec, 1983, p. 15). Like the case of mobile telecoms
standardization, this demonstrates how public entrepreneurs may overcome their
alleged information problems by exporting existing ideas and experiences into a
new policy context.
3.1.3 Mobilization of a Standardization Coalition
Having matched policy problem and solution, however, the Commission strug-
gled to complete the agenda-setting process and to identify and mobilize an
adequate actor-coalition. That is not to say, however, that it was lacking support.
By linking its standardization policy to the cultural role of television, it soon
won the support of the European Parliament (see European Parliament [ep],
1984, pp. 7,20-21), which turned out to be rather receptive to the Commission’s
reasoning that Europe’s cultural heritage was at stake.
Television can make a major contribution to the promotion of a sense of
common historical, cultural, economic and political destiny amongst Com-
munity citizens (p. 6) . . . By linking together European culture and the new
technologies, which hold the key to future prosperity and employment, a
European television policy is now a major imperative.
(ec, 1984b, p. 10)
At the same time, the Commission won the support of the European Broadcasting
Union (ebu) and the European Association of Consumer Electronics Manufactur-
ers (eacem), who were just in the process of developing technical specifications
for satellite television system called mac (Multiplexed Analogue Components),
which was intended to be backward compatible with the existing pal and secam
systems (ec, 1984b, p. 6; ec, 1986, p. 10). The Commission supported these efforts
and called on industry and governments to migrate from the older incompatible
standards to mac. While the new system was generally welcomed, no concrete
actions were taken.
In 1986, however, the situation changed dramatically. At the 1986 meeting of
the ccir (Consultative Committee for International Radio)—the organization that
used to be responsible for international television standardization—in Dubrovnik,
Japan’s government proposed the adoption of its domestic hdtv technology
as the common international standard. It had just invested e 700 million in the
development of a domestic hdtv system and suggested that the system was
ready to be implemented on a global scale (Lycett, 1989). Throughout European
industry, this proposal was perceived as a great threat, as the following statement
by an executive of Thomson demonstrates:
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High-definition television was to be the [Japanese consumer-electronic com-
panies’] ultimate weapon—an instrument with which to squeeze their Eu-
ropean competitors out of their own domestic market and blitzkrieg the
wide-open American market. In short, move in for the kill [. . . ] This [the
Dubrovnik meeting] was to be the new Verdun.
(Interview with an unnamed Thomson executive in, The Economist, 1990)
It was commonly expected that the acceptance of the Japanese standard would
consolidate the dominant position of Japan’s consumer electronics industry
once and for all. Therefore, the European Commission finally had no trouble
convincing industry that this had to be prevented by all means.
The Commission helped organize the European industry’s opposition against
the Japanese standard. At the ccir meeting, companies were represented only
indirectly through their respective national governments. Upon the initiative of
Davignon and his ittf, companies started to lobby Member States’ governments
to oppose the Japanese standard. Then Davingon coordinated the positions of the
European delegations at Dubrovnik (ec, 1988a, p. 2). Moreover, it provided them
with a pretext to justify their position, suggesting that the Japanese standard was
not backward compatible with European tv systems.2 “The Japanese ‘revolution’
would have thrown some 600 million tv receivers throughout the world on the
scrapheap,” Peterson (1993, p. 511) cited a European diplomat at Dubrovnik
echoing the Commission’s narrative. To be compatible with the installed base of
existing tv sets in Europe with 625 lines any hdtv standard would have to have
exactly twice, i.e. 1250 lines, and not 1125 lines as the Japanese technology.3 In
reality, however, backward compatibility should not have been an insurmountable
obstacle to the development of a hdtv. After all, the replacement of existing tv
sets was the main reason why the European tv set manufacturers wanted to get
involved in technical standardization. Yet, they obviously preferred European
companies to replace their tv sets with European rather than Japanese hdtv
sets.
Together the European delegates pushed for a postponement of the decision
on hdtv standards until the next ccir meeting, which was scheduled to be
held four years later in 1990 in Düsseldorf. Under the pressure of its European
members’, the ccir eventually decided to defer the decision on hdtv for four
years to leave time for the identification of a new standard suitable to all parties.
This was to provide the Europeans for enough time to develop a backward
compatible alternative (Cawson, 1995).
The Commission’s coordinating role during the negotiations at Dubrovnik,
strengthened its credibility with the industry’s leaders. This is also illustrated by
2ec (1986), citetInterviewBrown2010TV
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a telegram from the Director of the French company sgci, from May 22 1986, to
the permanent representation of France to the eu, stating that
The President [i.e. Mitterrand] and the Commission ought to be congratu-
lated for the coordinating role it had played between the twelve European
governments present in Dubrovnik.
(quoted in Bray, 1996, 94, emphasis added)
This turn of events finally opened the window of opportunity that the Com-
mission needed to mobilize a broad actor-coalition of companies in support of its
standardization strategy. Against the threat posed by the Japanese standard and
the shared sense of crisis among Europe’s companies, Etienne Davignon and his
ittf had no difficulty in convincing national manufacturers that a coordinated
response was needed in order to fend off the Japanese standard. The Commission
convinced companies that blocking the Japanese standard alone was not enough.
They needed to come up with a European alternative to the Japanese standard
(ec, 1987b, p. 10). European industry was very receptive to these arguments.
According to Philippe Laven (1998), director of the ebu’s Technical Department,
it was felt “that they had to achieve agreement [on a common strategy] because
they realized that it was ‘now’ or ‘never’ ” (Laven, 1998).
As the case of mobile telecoms standardization, this, too, confirms that the
presence of industry crisis was necessary for public entrepreneurship to have
an effect. This episode shows that companies were unwilling to respond to
the Commission’s entrepreneurial efforts until they were confronted with a real
crisis situation that forced them to reconsider their existing strategies and to
look for new ones. Once the crisis had occurred, however, companies turned
out to be highly receptive to the entrepreneurship—i.e. the mobilization of
collective action and the solutions—offered by the Commission. The European
tv set manufacturers finally agreed to collaboratively develop a European hdtv
standard, based on the existing mac technology, named hd -mac.4 At last,
the Commission had succeeded to mobilize an actor-coalition that was willing
and able to develop the desired standards. The European tv set manufacturers
around Philips, Thomson, Grundig and Nokia were going to drive the r&d and
standardization process, providing the technical expertise, investments as well as
the political pressure that was necessary to develop the standard.
This episode also demonstrates the importance of persistence, without which
entrepreneurship is unlikely to succeed. It took the Commission several failed
attempts to mobilize a standardization coalition, until the competitive threat
posed by the Japanese hdtv standard proposal at the ccir had finally opened a
4It was meant to be backward compatible with the pal and secam standards.
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window of opportunity. Moreover, this case suggests that the Commission may
be in a better position to assume the role of an entrepreneur than most elected
officials in that it has the possibility to push a policy agenda over a much longer
period of time until a window of opportunity eventually opens up.
As both factors could also be observed during the case of mobile telecoms, a
much stronger basis exists for concluding that both constitute necessary condi-
tions for public entrepreneurship to have the desired effect.
Together with the standardization alliance that had formed around the con-
sumer electronics manufacturers, the Commission continued to build on a broad
political alliance in support of European hdtv standardization. With the support
of its private allies, the tv set manufacturers, Davignon and the ittf started to
lobby Member States’ governments. Industry lobbied governments at the national
level and provided the Commission with the technical information that it needed
to make its case at the European level. The Commission, in turn, provided the
political narratives linking hd -mac to broad policy objectives such as growth
and competitiveness. Three distinct, strategic narratives can be identified. First,
the Commission emphasized the strategic nature of hdtv for European compet-
itiveness, growth and job creation. With a projected volume of e 150 billion of
the future hdtv market, the Commission argued that, “[t]he scale and potential
impact of this new technology make it of strategic importance” (ec, 1988b).
Secondly, the Commission began to frame hd -mac as a cultural rather than
a purely industrial project. It was argued that television played a central role in
the functioning of modern democratic societies.5 “This new medium will offer
remarkable new opportunities for economic growth and employment but also
for the presentation of subjects related to the European Identity in an attractive
form,” it was argued (ec, 1988b, emphasis added).
Thirdly, the Commission also increasingly began to make use of the image
of American cultural imperialism (see Hutchison, 1993, p. 440). In 1989, Delors
argued that the eu could not afford “to leave the monopoly of audio-visual
techniques to the Japanese and that of programmes to the Americans” (Delors,
1989). While Europe produced as many movies as the us (ec, 1988c, p. 28), it
was pointed out that 40% of all movies broadcasted on European public service
television channels were American (ec, 1988c, p. 22). If no action was taken,
the Commission suggested, by 1995, the European audiovisual industry’s share
5The Commission’s argument appears to stand in sharp contrast to many, such as Putnam
(1995), for instance, who argue that “[t]elevision has made our communities (or, rather, what we
experience as our communities) wider and shallower. In the language of economics, electronic
technology enables individual tastes to be satisfied more fully, but at the cost of positive social
externalities associated with more primitive forms of entertainment” (Putnam, 1995, p. 65).
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of the market that has a total volume of 125,000 hours of drama productions,
will have dropped to 20,000 hours (15%) (ec, 1990).6 Therefore, Commission
President Jacques Delors told the ep in 1989 that as long as he was in charge
“[t]he Community refuses to leave the monopoly of audio-visual techniques to
the Japanese and that of programmes to the Americans” (Delors, 1989).
Strengthened by the political support of industry and armed with the above-
mentioned policy narratives, the Commission eventually turned to eureka
(European Research Co-ordinating Agency) for financial support. eureka was
an intergovernmental high-tech collaboration program, which had been launched
by the French President Mitterrand in response to the American Star Wars
initiative (Carton, 1987). After an extensive lobbying campaign launched by
Bosch, Philips, Thomson and Thorn-emi, Member States governments accepted
the hd -mac project as eureka project number 95, also referred to as e !95.
The European Council considered the situation in the audiovisual media.
It agreed that it is urgently important for the Community that European
production of audiovisual programs reflecting the richness and diversity of
European culture should attain a level more in line with the broadcasting
capacity in Europe. [. . . ] It felt that urgent consideration should be given to
the possibility of creating a eureka project in the audiovisual sphere.
(European Council, 1988, p. 3)
This official statement of the Council thus directly reflected the Commission’s
argumentation. The Council accepted the reasoning that actions needed to be
taken to strengthen Europe’s industrial competitiveness and to “to enhance and
promote European culture in its richness and diversity” (European Council, 1989,
p. 10). Davignon and his team, together with the alliance of equipment manufac-
turers, succeeded to install the argumentation that justified its standardization
work as the dominant policy paradigm. Wary not to openly challenge Mem-
ber States’ sovereignty, however, it continued to downplay its own role. Adam
Watson-Brown, then member of Davignon’s cabinet, for instance, suggested:
“Don’t imagine that the Commission defines the reasons why one or another
standard should be used. What we’ve done here is simply that we have organized
the European negotiations. We are trying, at the European Commission, to create
something ‘European’ ” (Interview with Adam Watson-Brown of the European
Commission, quoted in Bray, 1996, p. 97, author’s translation).
As a result of—and a reward for—their lobbying efforts, the e !95 project was
tailored around the interests of the standardization alliance that the Commission
had formed around the tv set manufacturers. The manufacturers were classified
6In 1999, the Commission calculated that the share of us import on the audio-visual markets
of the Member States was between 60 and 90 percent with a total value of Euro 7 billion, while
the share of European import on the us markets was only 1-2 percent (ec, 1999b).
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as ‘type a partners.’ Broadcasters, program-makers, sub-contractors and all
other industry participants were classified as ‘type b’ participants. They only
had limited influence and voting rights. This membership structure, allowed
the alliance of tv set manufacturers to dominate the standardization process
and to bias the developed standard toward its own technical preferences. This is
also reflected in the fact, for instance, that hd -mac was always intended as a
proprietary system, which meant that broadcasters and other users of the system
would have to pay royalties to the group of manufacturers. The proprietary
nature of hd -mac also meant that the largest returns were to be expected on the
equipment rather than the services side of the market.
As argued in the introductory Chapter 1, such exclusivity of the standardiza-
tion process, for better or worse, constitutes a necessary condition for private,
technical standardization to succeed. Assuming that companies interests are not
only moderately heterogeneous, but that consensual decision-making processes
also open the opportunity for hold-out strategies, it can be considered highly
unlikely that standard-setters would be able to agree to a single common stan-
dard if all concerned actors and interests are directly involved. In the case of
hd -mac standardization, however, participation was limited to the relatively
small and homogeneous group of equipment manufacturers. This meant that
they could expect to be able to recoup their investments into the development
of the European standard by making sure that it conformed with their technical
preferences and by claiming royalties from the standards adopters. Therefore, an
important necessary condition for private standardization to succeed had been
met.
Initially, however, Davignon and the ittf had strong reservations about eu -
reka. It was feared that the project, which was deliberately set up outside the
European Community structures and motivated by Member States’ reluctance to
give up national r&d prerogatives (Peterson, 1991, pp. 284-287), would reduce
national contributions to the European Framework Programmes, such as race.
Moreover, eureka escaped from the control of the Commission. According to its
founding document—the Hanover Declaration from 1985—it was officially gov-
erned by an intergovernmental Council of Ministers of the participating member
states (eureka, 1985). In practice, however, eureka was de-centrally organized
and funding decisions were strongly influenced by national politics. Most of
the—at that time—18 member states tended to have their own research priorities
and favored their national manufacturers. In the e !95 project, particularly French
and, to a lesser extent, German governments took a strong influence on the
research (Bray, 1996).
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When eureka turned out to be an excellent platform to raise contributions
from Member States without having to go through the cumbersome procedures
of the eu’s budgetary rounds, however, the reservations were quickly overcome.
According to eureka (2010) itself, it raised around e 720 million. According to
Cawson (1995) and Peterson and Sharp (1998), however, this figure is likely to
have been close to e 1 billion or more.
Up to this point, it can therefore be concluded that the European Commis-
sion’s entrepreneurial leadership had a decisive influence on the development
of the European hdtv system standard. Its identification and framing of the
standardization problem, solution and mobilization of a standardization-coalition
that had the financial means and expertise to develop a European standard was
crucial to make these developments possible. Moreover, the Commission build
broad political support for the European hdtv standardization project.
It might be argued that not the European Commission’s entrepreneurial inter-
vention and agenda-setting but rather the financial subsidies that companies were
awarded through the e !95 project, led to the mobilization of the standardization
alliance. The exact sequence of events, however, suggests that this has not been
the case. First, the Commission’s agenda-setting efforts led to a mobilization of
the standardization alliance. Then the alliance, together with the Commission,
lobbied Member States governments to provide the r&d subsidies. Without the
Commission’s agenda-setting, the alliance would have never formed, companies
would not have lobbied Member States, and the latter would not have set up e !95.
Therefore, the driving force, in this case, was the Commission’s entrepreneurship
and not the financial subsidies, Member States or companies.
3.1.4 Favorable Starting Conditions for the Deployment of HD-
MAC
Up to this point, the deployment of hd -mac, the European Commission’s
agenda-setting was just as successful as—if not more than—it had been in the
case of mobile telecoms standardization standardization. With the broad political
support that had been won by the Commission and the standardization alliance
as well as the eureka funding, European hdtv standardization appears to have
been in just as good—if not better—starting position than gsm (See Table 3.2).
As shown in Table 3.1, the hd -mac standard-setters had access to much more
r&d funding than the developers of gsm. With this funding, the manufacturers
participating in e !95 made fast progress toward the development of the hd -mac
system. In 1989, the alliance successfully demonstrated the system International
3. High-Definition Television 87
Table 3.1: R&D Funding for GSM and HD-
MAC (in Mio)
Name Time Budget
GSM RACE I 1988-1992 e 550
HD-MAC E!95 1988-1991 e 720
Broadcasting Convention in Brighton (ec, 1988a, pp. 2,12).7 Member States’
representatives are reported to have been highly enthusiastic about the results.8
Moreover, the broad political support by the Council and ep, which had
turned out to be very receptive to the Commission’s arguments that not only
Europe’s industrial competitiveness but also its cultural heritage was at stake,
should have undermined political contestation and protected the insulation of
the e !95 project from broader participation and scrutiny.
With the exclusivity of the e !95 standardization project, another important
necessary condition for European standardization to succeed was met. As in the
case of second generation mobile telephony, hdtv offered great benefits to all
market participants, also to operators, broadcasters and not just the equipment
manufacturers. To operators and broadcasters, the increased picture quality of
hdtv meant an opportunity to offer a new television sensation to customers—in
addition to just more channels—making use of the increased broadcasting capac-
ity of satellite television. For many operators, and especially pay tv providers,
hdtv might have meant an opportunity to differentiate themselves from conven-
tional free tv operators. For tv set manufacturers, hdtv meant an opportunity
to boost their declining sales. Moreover, the deployment of a European hdtv
standard also offered both manufacturers as well as operators and broadcasters
and opportunity to strengthen their position against their international competi-
tors. All in all, the entire industry could expect to benefit from the introduction
of hdtv. While different industry participants may have preferred different
technological standards and deployment dates and strategies, however, none
opposed the introduction of hdtv, in principal.
Not even the fact that digital broadcasting was already on the horizon, should
have prevented industry from adopting the half-digital hd -mac standard—the
transmission of audio signals was already digitalized—until digital television
technology was matured. With the benefit of hindsight it can be noted that it
was going to take another decade for digital television to be introduced and even
7The ccir timetable had required a successful demonstration of hdtv concepts before the May
1989.
8Interview c1 with a Commission representative (2010)
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today digital has not replaced analogue television completely. The comparison
to mobile telecoms also shows that the emergence of digital technology was not
a problem. In this case too, fully digitalized, third generation telephony was
already looming over the introduction of the introduction of gsm.
Furthermore, the deployment of hd -mac could be expected to benefit from
considerable network effects and scale economies. The intense collaboration of the
entire European tv equipment manufacturing industry within the e !95 project
should have offered considerable scale economies. Although hd -mac equipment
would initially have been rather expensive—as criticized by the opponents of hd -
mac (see Section 5.2.4)—these scale economies should have enabled producers
to sustainable provide hd -mac equipment at decreasing price levels opening it
to a mass market. And once a critical mass of hd -mac units would have been
sold it could be expected to create its own demand. Therefore, another important
necessary condition was present, which was defined in the introductory Chapter
(1) and confirmed by the mobile telecoms case study.
Moreover, the European Commission also intervened at a sufficiently early
point in time, namely even before the r&d stage of the standardization process.
Thereby, also the condition, which was identified as the most important necessary
condition in the case of gsm standardization, were met. The gsm case study
suggests that such an early intervention should be expected to have a strongly
facilitating impact on the deployment of the given standard. The starting condi-
tions for the deployment of hd -mac can thus be considered to have been very
favorable. Whether and to what extent the European Commission was able to
use these favorable starting conditions and turn the deployment of hd -mac into
a success equaling that of gsm, is investigated in the following Section.
3.2 Hierarchical Intervention and Political Contesta-
tion
In contrast to the mobile telecoms case, however, the Commission chose not limit
itself to entrepreneurial instruments to promote the deployment of hd -mac.
Instead of mediating potential conflicts, ensuring commitment and coordinating
the market introduction of the standard through entrepreneurial instruments,
as it had done in the mobile telecoms case, the Commission sought to force
the introduction and adoption of hd -mac by subsidizing the deployment and
adoption, and mandating compliance with the standard. This stands in stark
contrast to the mobile telecoms case, where the Commission exclusively relied
on entrepreneurial policy instruments (see Table 3.3). Given the broad political
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Table 3.2: Starting Conditions of GSM and HD-MAC at Time of Deployment
Starting condition HD-MAC GSM
Broad political support
by
MS, EP PTT, MS, EP
Exclusive
standardization-
coalition
around
Telecoms manufacturers TV set manufacturers
Favorable institutional
framework
ETSI E!95
Supporting policy
narrative
Competitiveness and
protection of Europe’s
cultural heritage
Competitiveness
Pre-normative R&D
subsidies
RACE E!95
Potential gains Large and broadly
spread
Large and broadly
spread
Next-generation
technology on the
horizon
Digital broadcasting Mobile multimedia
telecoms
Rival technologies
already installed
Analogue satellite
broadcasting
First-generation mobile
telecoms
Network and Scale
economies
X X
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support that it had achieved during the agenda-setting stage, the Commission
did not only expected the use of these more coercive instruments to guarantee
the success of hd -mac but also to be politically possible. Therefore, the Commis-
sion’s hierarchical intervention in the European hdtv standardization process
provides an opportunity to investigate the different impact of entrepreneurial
and hierarchical policy interventions.
Already in 1986, at the time of the ccir meeting in Dubrovnik, the Commis-
sion had proposed a Directive making the mac system the mandatory standard
for satellite television within Europe (ec, 1986). This was meant to make sure
that any satellite systems introduced before the development of hd -mac was
completed would be compatible with the latter. Against the alleged threat of
Japanese dominance in hdtv and with the support of national manufacturers,
the Commissioner Davignon had little difficulties persuading Member States to
adopt its proposal. Only six month after Dubrovnik, the Council adopted the
‘mac Directive’ (86/529/eec), which made mac mandatory, though only for a
period of four years and only for high powered television broadcasting satellites,
an exemption that the proponents of the competing pal system eventually used
to start broadcasting over low-powered telecommunication satellites.
Where in the case of gsm standardization the Commission negotiated a mou
among the different industry participants, which reciprocally committed them
to make the necessary investments into compatible equipment and services, the
Commission sought to force the deployment and adoption of hd -mac by means
of positive and negative sanctions based on two legal instruments.9 First, the
Commission proposed a new mac Directive, when the mac Directive expired at
the end of 1991, that was to oblige all broadcasters and satellite operators to use
hd -mac starting in 1992 and force all manufacturers to fit all new tv sets with
hd -mac decoders by 1993 (ec, 1991).
Second, it proposed a financial Action Plan that was meant to provide subsi-
dies toward the deployment of hd -mac. In 1992, the Commission proposed a
five-year Action Plan that was intended to provide between e 850 million and e 1
billion—approximately e 5 million per channel per year—to ease the adaption
costs created by hd -mac (ec, 1992c). In return for this support, industry was
asked to sign a mou committing all broadcasters to a voluntary cut-off date
for non-mac-based standards. These subsidies distinguished themselves from
the subsidies previously provided through eureka and the mobile telecoms
case, that they were not targeted at the technological development but rather the
market adoption of the standard.
Soon, however, the Commission’s twin strategy of subsidizing the deployment
9Interview c1 with a Commission representative (2010)
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Table 3.3: Interventions of the European Commission targeted at the Deployment
of GSM and HD-MAC
HD-MAC GSM
Proposed deployment subsidies Mediation of bargaining conflicts
Proposed mandation of compliance Ensuring of commitment
Selection and support of a single
technology
Coordination of market deployment
and mandating of compliance with hd -mac started to backfire. The more legal
weight—in the form of hierarchical law—the Commission threw behind hd -
mac, it seemed, the stronger the opposition against hd -mac grew. Instead of
supporting the standardization coalition it strengthened the opponents of hd -
mac. The legislative decision-making processes initiated by the Commission’s
attempt to use such positive and negative sanctions, however, simply multiplied
the number of involved veto players and veto points rather than prompting
industry to adopt the common standard.
3.2.1 Multiplication of Veto Players and Veto Points
The first effect of the Commission’s proposals to mandate and subsidize the
adoption of hd -mac was that it raised the stakes for all actors involved. Prior
to the Commission’s proposal, the chance that hd -mac would become the
dominant standard depended on how well it competed with alternative standards
in the market place. In principle, any system that would have achieved a critical
mass of adopters first could become the dominant, de facto standard. Therefore,
the proponents of alternative systems, namely pal plus, an evolution of pal,
and secam, focused all their energy on the development of the development
and deployment of these systems. mac was merely a market competitor. Before
the Commission proposed the Directive, the proponents of pal and secam had
no reason to get involved in the hd -mac standardization process.
The Commission’s hierarchical intervention, however, meant a non-market,
i.e. a political threat. If the Commission’s proposals were adopted, stakeholders
knew, hd -mac would become the de jure European standard. They would be
forced to comply with it, if they did not prevent its adoption. Therefore, many
stakeholders that were previously not directly concerned with the hd -mac
standardization process started to push into the policy process to make sure that
the process’ outcome would be compatible with their technological and strategic
interests. They started to fight this threat outside the market at the political level.
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They hence started to participate in the policy process in order to make sure that
they were not adversely affected by hd -mac. The Commission’s hierarchical
intervention thus had the effect of mobilizing the opposition against hd -mac.
Just as industry crisis was necessary for collective action in the case of mobile
telecoms standardization (Chapter 2), it appears that the hierarchical intervention
of the European Commission created the crisis that facilitated the mobilization of
collective action of the hd -mac opponents. Moreover, the fact that in pluralis-
tic political systems hierarchical interventions always implicate multiple public
actors, such as the ep and Council, provided the newly emerged veto players
with effective veto points. These veto points turned out to be a lot more accessi-
ble than the standardization committees. While the participation in the actual
standardization process would have required the new veto players to commit
significant amounts of time and resources, the cost of participating in the public
policy making process was much lower. To raise their voices in the political arena,
they did not have to draft a technical proposal and delegate technical experts to
the relevant standardization committees. And whereas technical standardization
committees generally require actors to formulate their interests in abstract techni-
cal terms (Schmidt & Werle, 1993, p. 15; Sirbu & Zwimpfer, 1985), they merely
had to point out the redistributive consequences of the standardization process
in order to demonstrate that it was not as technical as it may seem and to destroy
the policy consensus upon which the Commission’s proposal was based (see
Section 3.2.2). Moreover, the broadcasters influence in the e !95 standardization
project was limited. Therefore, they pushed onto the arena of European poli-
tics, appealing to the ep and European Council to influence the standardization
process.
The multiplication of veto players and veto points and interests started already
with the Commission’s proposal for the first mac Directive in 1986, which was
meant to mandate compliance with the mac standard for satellite television,
until the development of hd -mac was completed and ready for implementation.
Because the mandation of compliance with mac threatened to nullify many
broadcasters investments into pal and secam, they began to mobilize them-
selves against the proposal. As Luxembourg was just reinventing itself as the
seat of Europe’s satellite broadcasting industry, the mac opponents started to
lobby Luxembourg’s government to veto the mac Directive. Luxembourg held
out agreement in the Council until the French government and the Commission
proposed, as a compromise, to exempt low and medium powered communica-
tions satellites, which were not yet able to transmit television signals but which
the proponents of pal plus and secam intended to use for satellite broadcast-
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ing.10 Due to rapid advances in reception technology, the mac opponents were
soon able start broadcasting television signals in pal and secam soon after. In
1988, Rupert Murdoch’s Sky started broadcasting over a communications satellite
called astra, which was not covered by the mac directive.11 Later in 1989
four German channels also started to broadcast in pal over the astra satellite
(Peterson, 1993).
The Commission’s proposal for the second mac Directive—the hd -mac
Directive in 1991—and the proposal for the Action Plan further intensified the
opposition. The pal Plus and secam proponents were joined in their opposition
against hd -mac by many broadcasters which were not opposed to hdtv per se
but which were concerned about the tremendous costs that the adoption of—and
adaptation to—the standard would have involved. They had to replace all of their
production and broadcasting equipment with hd -mac equipment. Moreover,
they generally favored bandwidth efficiency—i.e. the ability to broadcast a large
number of channels over a limited radio spectrum—over picture quality. They
were also concerned that the demand for hdtv would not suffice to recoup the
required investments.12
3.2.2 Decunstruction of the Policy Consensus
To prevent the mandation of hd -mac they started an intensive lobbying cam-
paign, that was meant to undermine the legitimacy of the hd -mac alliance. The
hd -mac opponents’ arguments can be summarized in three strategic counter-
narratives. First, they sought to place the consumer at the center of the debate,
which stands in stark contrast to the Commission’s hd -mac strategy that focused
on industry competitiveness. “The interests of the industry are being given more
weight than those of television viewers,” a representative of Thames Television
said at a hearing of the ep (European Report, 1991b). And ses—Luxembourg’s
astra satellites operator—tabled a report that suggested that only 20% of Eu-
rope viewers would be able to enjoy the full benefits from the improvements
10Interview c1 with a Commission representative (2010). The information gathered during the
course of this project, contradict accounts by Cawson (1995); Dai (2008), which suggest that the
Directive’s exclusion of such satellites was coincidental and based on the common believe that it
was not possible to transmit television signals over such satellites.
11Satellite transmission was crucial for the viability of pay tv, whose major selling asset was
based on its comparatively large amount of offered channels.
12This concern seemed to be supported by the high price of hd-mac compatible tv sets. The first
hd-mac compatible tv sets offered by Thomson and Philips cost e 5,000 and e 4,350 respectively
(European Report, 1991c; Europolitique, 1991; d’Istria, 1991). In principle, these were not proper
hdtv sets yet because they still had only 625 lines. In 1990, the first hdtv-sets ever to go on sale,
by Sony, cost even more than e 20,000 (New Media Markets, 1990). However, this neglects the fact
that many technologies, such as Personal Computers or mobile phones, were very expensive at
first but that their price dropped vary rapidly.
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created by d2 -mac, whilst all viewers would be faced with higher costs (Nolan,
1991).
Try to imagine! On January 1st 1992, all channels would have lost 100%
of their audience. This could have only been emanated from the brain of
a Commissioner who is completely detached from the economic realities
of the European audiovisual industry. Secondly, on January 2nd, millions
of consumers would have gone out to buy new equipment and why? To
continue to see the exact same channels they still used to see on December
31st. Absolutely ridiculous!
(Interview with Yves Feltes from ses, in Bray, 1996, p. 297)
Therefore, they suggested that it should be left to consumers themselves to
decide whether or not to adopt the hd -mac standard. And the best way to
involve consumers more directly, it was argued, was to let the market and not
policy-makers decide.
This argumentation was neither better nor worse than the one advanced by
the hd -mac proponents. It simply emphasized a weakness in the argumentation
of the hd -mac alliance that the latter always sought to conceal. This counter
narrative was not without flaws either. It concealed the fact, for instance, that
market competition hardly leave consumers much choice either. In theory, only
the first adopter has a real choice where network effects and scale economies are
present. Subsequent adopters have little choice but to adopt the standard chosen
by previous adopters.
As mentioned above, however, this thesis is not directly concerned with the
actual validity of these arguments. It is rather concerned with the strategic
interests behind the use of these narratives and their impact on the debate
and standardization process instead. For instance, the hd -mac used the just-
mentioned narrative because they expected to stand a much better chance in the
market, where pal Plus had already achieved small a first-mover advantage,
rather than the political arena, where hd -mac initially enjoyed broad political
support within the Council and the ep, not to mention the Commission. The
impact of this strategic narrative on the standardization process is discussed
further below.
Secondly, the hd -mac opponents also sought to deconstruct the Commis-
sion’s narrative that hd -mac would strengthen the competitiveness of Europe’s
audiovisual industry against its American competitors. The hd -mac opponents
pointed out that instead of strengthening European content producers it would
push the European market wide open for the American producers because of
the 16:9 screen format, the preferred format of the Hollywood movie industry.
While European program makers—except for some cinema productions—hardly
produce films in this format, the American competition has always produced
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cinema as well as tv content in this format and therefore hold a dominant
position in the production of movies as well as tv series in 16:9 (see European
Report, 1991a). Again, this argumentation was not without weaknesses either. It
concealed the fact that the screen format of hd -mac would strengthen—and
was meant to strengthen—the exportability of European audiovisual content.
Finally, the mac alliance was also attacked on technological grounds, arguing
that analogue television systems, such as hd -mac, were soon going to be made
obsolete by the nascent digital technology. The German broadcaster sat Eins,
for instance, therefore called the passage via hd -mac to the digital future, “a
shortcut that is longer than the normal path” (European Report, 1991b). Unlike
high-definition, digital tv had long been on the minds of the broadcasting
industry. Whilst (analogue) hdtv was very demanding in terms of bandwidth
and would have either required broadcasters to obtain more radio frequency or
reduce the number of channels, digital tv is more economical and would have
allowed for more channels with a lower bandwidth. This argumentation was not
without weaknesses either. Commissioner Dodlinger argued:
The fact remains that a standard for digital transmission does not yet exist.
At best, it would be operational in the medium to long term and become a
market reality some time later. hd-mac is defined and its development is
well advanced. To abandon it now would mean yielding ground to other
existing hdtv systems
(Rapid Press Release, 1991).
This counter argument, however, already came too late.
The impact that the emergence of these strategic counter-narratives, accom-
panying the multiplication of veto-players, had on the standardization process
was that it destroyed the consensus around hd -mac. Despite the fact that none
of the arguments appear to have been much stronger—or weaker—than the
arguments of the hd -mac proponents, the debate that emerged as a result of the
multiplication of veto players suddenly forced the hd -mac opponents to justify
their choices. Table 3.4 juxtaposes the arguments of both sides.
However, they made the choice to publicly support the introduction of hd -
mac appear much less uncontroversial than it had initially seemed. Suddenly
this choice appeared to be a lot less technical and uncontroversial to policy-
makers and, unlike before, the Commission increasingly had to begin to justify
its hd -mac strategy. With the help of these counter-narratives the hd -mac
opponents had successfully pushed the standardization process from the arcane
and unfathomable world of engineering and r&d onto the center stage of eu
politics. A policy debate emerged that would not have been led otherwise. As
a result, hdtv standardization was no longer perceived as an opportunity to
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Table 3.4: HD-MAC Narratives and Counter-Narratives
Narrative Counter-Narrative
1 A government-led, concerted
introduction of HD-MAC would
minimize adaptation costs for all
stakeholders, including consumers.
A market-led introduction would
give more power to consumers.
2 HD-MAC will increase the
international competitiveness of
European industry. The 16:9 format
will strengthen the exportability of
European audiovisual content.
HD-MAC’s 16:9 format will weaken
European industry and push the
European market wide open to the
American competitors because they
have always produced content in
this format.
3 HD-MAC represents the state-of-the
art. It will revolutionize the
production, broadcasting and
consumption of audiovisual content.
HD-MAC is about to be outdated by
digital broadcasting technology.
realize technological progress and to strengthen Europe’s competitive position
against Japan and the us but as a (re)distributive struggle among European
companies.
As a result, the issue of hdtv was no longer perceived as an opportunity
to raise European competitiveness—positive sum game—and the redistributive
consequences of hd -mac—negative sum—dominated the debate.
From the standpoint of participatory democracy, the multiplication of veto
players and the emergence of political debate certainly is to be welcomed. For
better or worse, television does play an important part in the European citizens’
lives and technical standards have an direct impact on how television programs
are consumer. Therefore, more democratic input in the development of these
standards is clearly to be welcomed. To the Commission and the hd -mac
alliance the politicization of the standardization process, however, did pose a
problem for this threatened their dominance over this process.
The political debate that was launched by the hd -mac destroyed the policy
consensus upon which the Commission’s intervention was based. This was
critical as the legislative procedures established by the Single European Act,
the proposed Directive mandating hd -mac required a qualified-majority in
the Council and the assent of the ep. The adoption of the proposed Action
Plan providing deployment subsidies required unanimity in the Council. These
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procedures turned the ep and the Council into effective veto points for the hd -
mac opponents—i.e. the veto players. Both institutions turned out to be quite
receptive to the hd -mac opponents’ arguments.
Although the ep adopted the Commission’s proposal it did so not without
introducing a number of amendments that would water it down to an extent that
it no longer posed a threat to the opponents of hd -mac. The cut-off date was
moved back to 1996 and it only required that tv-sets with a 16:9 screen format
only would have to be fitted with a hd -mac decoder. All others merely have to
have a socket to make it possible to receive programs in the standard.
Eventually, the hd -mac opponents also managed to divide the Council over
the Commission’s proposal. As the result of an intensive lobbying campaign by
the pal Plus alliance, the Council found itself in a deadlock between the uk and
Luxembourg, on the one hand, and Germany, France, The Netherlands, which
were still supporting the hd -mac Directive, on the other. Luxembourg’s policy
was mainly determined by ses who owned the astra satellites and therefore
had a major stake in pal. Italy, Greece, and Spain opposed any reference to
financing until the next budgetary round. Ireland and Denmark wanted to reduce
it by half. Eventually, the strong pal lobby also convinced Germany to drop
its support for hd -mac. At the 1991 Council meeting in Brussels, Chancellor
Helmut Kohl brought his telecoms minister, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, an
hd -mac enthusiast, back into line. This left France and The Netherlands isolated.
Therefore, the German delegation started to demand a reorientation of the Action
Plan toward pal.
Initially, the uk was not directly concerned by the hdtv development but it
refused Community subsidies out of principle. Eventually, however, Murdoch’s
bSkyb (British Sky Broadcasting) convinced the uk government to oppose hd -
mac.13 The uk hence adopted the argumentation of the hd -mac opponents,
arguing that the introduction of mac would be to the detriment of the consumers.
If there’s a market for this, then industry will produce it. It’s as simple as
that. What we’re not prepared to do is pour in huge amounts of taxpayers’
money into a technology which may be outdated before it even arrives.
(uk Secretary of State for Telecommunications, Edward Leigh, on cnn Kelly, 1993).
At the November 19st 1991 Council meeting in Edinburgh, Edward Leigh, who
also chaired the meeting, therefore vetoed the Action Plan and even opposed to
convene a special telecoms Council meeting to resolve the issue. According to
Bray (1996, p. 262), this is supposed to have led to a furious confrontation with
Commissioner Filippo Maria Pandolfi.
13After all Murdoch is supposed to have been a personal friend of Prime Minister Thatcher
(Bray, 1996, p. 220).
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In December 1991, however, a compromise on the hd -mac Directive could be
reached. The Commission’s proposal was adopted albeit not without significantly
diluting the provisions of the Directive even further. It only required manufac-
turers to provide a socket for connection to mac circuitry instead of actually
building the mac system into all satellite receivers and television sets. Only new
satellite services which began transmissions after January 1st 1995 were required
to broadcast in mac as well as pal. And in 1993, the Council adopted the Action
Plan Decision providing financial subsidies at a reduced value of e 228 million
rather than e 800 million to the audio-visual content producers “irrespective of
the European television standard used” (European Council, 1993, Article 3(1)),14
which meant that also pal Plus compliant program makers were eligible (Chaize,
1993).
This was directly opposed to what the Commission had originally intended
in its proposal, illustrating by how much the Commission had lost control of the
policy process. From the agenda-setter and main driver behind European hdtv
standardization, the Commission’s role was diminished to that of one among
many actors.
This episode illustrates how little it takes to destroy the policy consensus
upon which the public support of the given private standardization processes
is based. The standards-opponents merely had to point out the normative
and redistributive consequences of the standard in order to destroy the policy
consensus and to achieve a blocking minority. It also demonstrates how difficult
it may be to force the adoption of a common standard through hierarchical policy
interventions. In pluralistic political systems, such interventions always require
some form a legislative act. Legislative processes was a lot more accessible
to concerned stakeholders, however, than technical standardization processes.
Because of the number and heterogeneity of actors and interest that participate
in legislative processes, it was almost impossible to achieve a mutual agreement
on a single common standard through legislative policy-making procedures. The
decision-making problems faced by these procedures may be overcome by means
of compromises between the different interests. Where variety reduction is the
purpose of technical standardization—as it almost always is the case—however,
such compromises do not appear to be good enough for there can be either one
technical standard or no standard. The coexistence of multiple incompatible
standards or a standard incorporating incompatible technologies, would defeat
the purpose of the standardization process.
14When Edward Leigh was replaced through Patrick MacLoughlin at the top of the Department
of Trade and Industry (dti), even the British government, which once was one of the fiercest
opponents of the Directive, lifted its veto (Bray, 1996, p. 262).
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Again the comparison to the case of mobile telecoms standardization is
illustrative. The entrepreneurial policy instruments employed by the European
Commission did not expose the standardization process to political contestation.
Only a small and homogeneous groups of immediately concerned companies of
actors around mobile equipment manufacturers responded to the Commission’s
entrepreneurial interventions. Furthermore, the Commission’s entrepreneurial
interventions did not increase the number of veto points either. None of the
instruments used by the Commission directly required a formal vote by the ep
or Council. Therefore, neither gsm nor umts standardization was exposed to
political contestation.
3.2.3 Policy Shift
Another factor undermining the standardization process, this case suggests, is that
where hierarchical interventions lead to the politicization of the standardization
process the initial standardization alliance of private companies as well as the
public entrepreneur lose control of—and thus interest in—the process. Without
the financial muscle and technical expertise of the standardization alliance and
the coordinating role of the public entrepreneur, technical standards hardly have
a chance of being successfully deployed in the market place.
Because of the dilution of the hd -mac Directive the initial standardization al-
liance around the manufacturers lost interest in the standard. Both Thomson and
Philips began to refocus their attention on the development of next-generation
television standards in the profitable us market instead. In 1992 Philips’ even
withdrew its support of eureka all together. That is even despite the fact that
the broadcasters and operators had finally agreed to a mou with the manufac-
turers, which would have guaranteed the latter a steady demand for hd -mac
equipment.
This meant that also the Commission lost an important political ally. There-
fore, the Commission, too, eventually turned its back on hd -mac. After the
political contestation of hd -mac a growing number of Commission members
started to distance themselves from dg Information Technology’s (XIII) hd -mac
policy. The lobbying activities of the hd -mac opponents and the division of
the European Council appear to have been the catalyst that provided the anti-
dirigiste Commission members with opportunity to raise their voice and criticize
the standardization policy publicly. dg Competition (X), especially, become one
of the most outspoken opponents. An unnamed dg Competition representative
stated that:
Together with dg I [external relations], we started to question the strategy of
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dg XIII, which only listened to the interests of the manufacturing interest,
without talking the interest of the broadcasters and content into account.[. . . ]
The advantage that we had compared to dg XIII, was that we were a small
dg, which could act more freely. In another dg that would not have been
possible because there are ’filters’ on decision and initiative. Especially, dg
XIII was blocked by its work habits, and its relations/engagements. Quickly
the debate became fairly virulent because we presented counter arguments
that could not easily be brushed aside.
(Interview with a member of dg X, quoted in Bray, 1996, p. 270)
However, the political contestation of hd -mac opened up new alliance
opportunities. When Martin Bangemann took over dg Information Technology
from Maria Pandolfi, he sought to build an alliance with the hd -mac opponents
and to win the support of the growing group of Commission employers that
opposed Pandolfi’s dirigiste policy, by distancing himself from the hd -mac
policy. Shortly after his inauguration in 1993, he told Le Monde that “[t]he project
of introducing d2 -mac or hd -mac by obligation is a mistake [. . . ] Almost
the whole world knows this [. . . ] I will therefore propose that we abandon it”
(de Gasquet, 1993; Le Monde, 1993, author translation). In front of the ep he later
said, seemingly proud of what he had done, that:
I confess my guilt, if you like, in having contributed to killing these hopes
[that hd-mac would succeed] off, for I saw when I took responsibility for
this report that we would not make progress with an analogue standard.
(Martin Bangemann at a hearing of the ep, 1994a, p. 15)
This move allowed Bangemann to demarcate himself from his predecessor Pan-
dolfi and to disassociate himself from the great industrial policy debacle that the
Commission’s hd -mac soon became to be viewed.
He enthusiastically embraced the argumentation advanced by mac opponents.
First, he adopted the argument that the future was digital. “Digital television
is going to be operational in three or four years, which is a lot sooner than we
had thought. Therefore, it does not seem to make a lot of sense to continue
this [analogue] hdtv program” (Europolitique, 1993, author translation). Unlike
high-definition, digital tv had long been on the minds of broadcasters for it
promised to allow them to broadcast an even larger number of channels via
satellite or other modes using the same amount of radio frequency. As argued
above, however, it cannot be concluded that European hdtv standardization
failed because it was eventually outdated by digital broadcasting technology.
Even today, two decades later, digital broadcasting has not completely replaced
analogue television. And also gsm was eventually outdated by umts but still
became a global success.
And instead of a dirigiste industrial policy, Bangemann adopted a policy
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Table 3.5: Intention and Effect of the Commission’s Intervention in HDTV Stan-
dardization
Intention Effect
Installation of the HD-MAC as the de
facto standard
Boost of digital television
Strengthening of the HD-MAC
alliance
Strengthened PAL Plus alliance
Strengthening of the political position
of Commission employees adhering to
the policy of dirigist industrial policy
A new group of Commission
employees supporting the policy of
laissez faire is strengthened
of laissez faire and reached out to the Japanese and American administrations
to collaborate on a common international standard (Chaize, 1993; de Gasquet,
1993). To the us Congress he said that European and American standardization
authorities should work together, “either mutually acknowledging what they
are doing, or better, the best way, to work together to make the standard an
international standard” (Federal News Service, 1991).
The fact that the Commission, the initial entrepreneur and main supporter of
the standardization process, eventually turned its back on the standardization
project marks a direct parallel to the case of intermodal transport standardization
(see Chapter 5). Here, too, the Commission eventually abandoned its initial
standardization policy after the political debate, which had erupted in response
to the Commission’s use of hierarchical policy instruments, strengthened the
initial policy’s proponents within the Commission. In this case too, they adopted
the opponents’ policy narrative.
3.3 Conclusion
As in the mobile telecoms case, the European Commission’s intervention had a
decisive influence on the outcome of the European hdtv standardization process.
In contrast to the mobile telecoms case, however, its intervention led to the
unintended failure rather than the success of the standardization process. Instead
of boosting the market deployment of the hd -mac standard, the Commission’s
attempt to mandate compliance and to subsidize the adoption had the unintended
effect of exposing the technical standardization process to political contestation
by multiplying the number of veto players and veto points. As a result, there was
little scope for a mutually acceptable agreement on a single common standard.
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At the same time, the standardization alliance as well as the public entrepreneur,
which initially constituted the main driving forces behind the standardization
process, lost control over—and, therefore, also interest in—the process.
Nonetheless, this case study underlines the effectiveness of entrepreneurial
leadership during the early phases of the standardization process, provided that
there is a sufficiently big crisis for the entrepreneurial agenda-setter to make
its voice heard. Through its entrepreneurial interventions during the standards
development stage, the Commission created ideal conditions for the standard’s
deployment. There was no reason to expect hdtv standardization to fail before
the Commission started to use hierarchical policy instruments.
The Commission’s subsequent use of conventional, hierarchical policy instru-
ments, however, nullified the effects of its entrepreneurial leadership and led
to the political contestation and failure of the standardization process. There-
fore, the impact of conventional policy instruments on private standardization
processes, however, appears to be stronger than the impact of entrepreneurial
ones. This should not be misunderstood to mean that entrepreneurial policy
interventions were ineffective. If the Commission would have limited itself to
policy entrepreneurship, the hdtv standardization might have became as big a
commercial success as gsm and umts. With the first-mover advantage it had
gained as a result of the Commission’s entrepreneurial leadership, hd -mac may
have well survived the competition with other systems—such as pal Plus—as
the de facto standard.
The Commission’s interventions in mobile telecoms and hdtv standardization
took place in rather similar circumstances.
• Standardization required the collaboration of a heterogeneous group of
actors, however, the benefits of standardization were large and broadly
spread;
• In both cases markets, were marked by a high degree of technological
change and economic internationalization, leading to a multiplication of
actors and interests.
• Threat of foreign competition and the opportunity to penetrate foreign
markets through standardization;
• Initially both enjoyed wide political support;
• Network effects and scale economies;
• etsi’s gsm Group and eureka’s e !95 Project provided a similar institu-
tional context;
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• eureka and race provided substantial pre-normative r&d subsidies in
both cases;
• With umts and digital broadcasting, next-generation technologies were
looming on the horizon in both cases;
• Both hd -mac and gsm had to compete against an existing installed base
of analogue equipment.
In the light of these similarities, more causal significance may be attributed to the
different type of policy interventions leading to the diverging outcomes.
Chapter 4
Digital Television
This case study of digital video broadcasting standardization investigates two
main issues. First, it analyzes the performance of private standardization pro-
cesses in the absence of public interventions. It studies the conditions under
which and the extent to which private standard-setters are able to produce stan-
dards in the absence of direct public intervention. After the hd -mac debacle,
the old dirigist policy was replaced with a policy of non-intervention, which
became the dominant policy paradigm in the field of television standardization.
In the case of digital video broadcasting standardization, which directly suc-
ceeded the failure of hd -mac, the European Commission thus limited itself to ex
post regulation through competition/anti-trust rules to correct potential market
failures.
This issue is crucial for it defines the functional scope for public interventions
and the extent to which public entrepreneurs may facilitate private standard-
ization processes. If it turned out that private standard-setters were very well
able to develop technical standards in the absence of public interventions and
despite the collective action and decision-making problems that are assumed
to be inherent to these processes, the entrepreneurship hypothesis developed
in the previous Chapters would be weakened considerably. It would suggest
that such interventions were superfluous and that the causal effect of public
entrepreneurship was spurious. If, by contrast, it turned out that the assumed
existence of the collective action and bargaining problems did in fact prevent
industry from setting common standards, the hypothesis would be strengthened.
Secondly, this case study investigates the impact of the shadow of hierarchy
on private standardization processes. In contrast to the intermodal transport case
(Chapter 5), the shadow of hierarchy was not accompanied by secondary legisla-
tion directly concerned with the standardization process. Instead it emerged out
of the dominant policy consensus that the industry knew best what standards to
develop and how to develop these and that the regulator should only intervene
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ex post, when industry turned out to have failed. The shadow of hierarchy was
meant as an extra incentive for private standard-setters to develop the desired
standards. Upon the pressure of the European Parliament, which turned out to
be the least comfortable with the policy of non-intervention, an explicit threat
to intervene if private standard-setters did not behave in a desirable way was
formulated.
The case of digital video broadcasting standardization is deliberately chosen
for the fact that a priori, it represented a rather favorable case for private standard-
setting to succeed. The benefits from digital television were not only expected to
be quite significant but also very broadly and evenly distributed. Broadcasters
saw digitalization as an opportunity to broadcast a higher number of channels at
a lower cost. To manufacturers it meant an opportunity to boost their stagnating
television set sales numbers. While Europeans were only replacing their television
sets every 10 to 12 years on average (de Bruin & Smits, 1999, p. 281), digitalization
would have encouraged consumers to replace their tv sets much earlier. At
the same time digital television was a very new technology, where none of
the industry participants had made any significant pre-investments in different
alternatives, which might have undermined consensus building. Therefore, the
private development of technical standardization should be expected to succeed.
Member States’ governments saw digitalization as a way to gain access to
the digital dividend by auctioning off the radio frequencies previously used for
analogue, terrestrial broadcasting. Therefore, digital television standardization
was seen as, “the opportunity of the decade,” as Wood (1994, p. 12) from the ebu
argued. Moreover, digitalization was expected to promote important public inter-
ests. The reduction in broadcasting costs was expected to increase competition
and to improve media pluralism and diversity, increasing the supply of niche
programming that would not be profitable in the analogue market and which
would targeted smaller and diverse audiences (Biggam, 2000). Interactive digital
television was regarded as an opportunity to close the digital gap by providing
information services for people without access to broadband Internet (ec, 2003a).
Therefore, the basic set-up is that of a critical case. If private industry standard-
ization turns out to be unable to develop technical standards in these favorable
circumstances and even the shadow of hierarchy did not prompt the development
of private standards, standardization and the shadow of hierarchy can also be
expected to fail under less favorable circumstances.
This Chapter is organized in four main parts. The first, Section 4.1.1 investi-
gates the emergence of Digital Video Broadcasting (dvb) Group. The remaining
three Sections, each deal with a different episode of digital television standard-
ization.
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4.1 Digital Transmission Standardization in the Ab-
sence of Public Interventions
4.1.1 Collective Action and Private entrepreneurship
This Section investigates whether and how private standard-setters are able to
overcome their collective action problems in the absence of facilitating public
interventions.
The development and standardization of digital television and broadcasting in
Europe can be traced back to the initiative of six engineers that started to gather
around Ulrich Reimers, the director of engineering of the German public service
broadcaster ndr. During the early 1990s, this group provided the entrepreneurial
leadership that was necessary to overcome the industry’s collective action prob-
lems and the inertia that had overtaken the industry after the hd -mac debacle
investigated in Chapter 3. The group’s leadership resembles the entrepreneurial
leadership provided by the European Commission in the case of European mobile
telecoms and the early stages of hdtv standardization. The group of engineers
mixed and matched a (1.) standardization problem, with a (2.) solution and (3.)
potent actor coalition.
The main standardization problem identified by the group was the interference
of policy-makers with technical standardization process. The group saw technical
standardization as a technical issue and believed that it should therefore be left to
technical experts rather than political actors. As a solution to the problems created
by the hd -mac debacle the group proposed digital television standardization.
The six engineers were united by their shared vision that the future of television
broadcasting was digital.1 “We started very clearly seeing that the future is digital
and feeling that something needed to be done,” one of the six stated (Homer,
1994). As in the examples of public entrepreneurship described in this thesis, the
mobilization of an adequate actor coalition, however, turned out to be the biggest
challenge to the six private entrepreneurs.
To materialize their vision of digitalized television and broadcasting they
soon realized that they would need to gain broad-based support and that they
could not rely on the community of engineers alone. They would not have been
able to develop and deploy digital television standards by themselves. Because
their employers were still officially committed to the development of hd -mac,
however, they had to be very careful. Their first meetings took place in secrecy.
1Interview c3 with a member of the dvb Group (2010), Interview c11 with a representative of
the broadcasting industry and now member of the (2010) and Interview c2 with a representative
of the broadcasting industry (2010)
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To make it look as unofficial as possible, the six met on weekends and during
their free time. The first meeting was even held on a castle on the Rhine, a
popular tourist destination.2. Gradually, they invited more and more actors, one
of which was Peter Kahl, a senior official at the German Federal Ministry of
Communications (dvb Project, 1999). He was recruited to legitimize and win
support for the movement on at the highest levels of politics and business.3
In 1992, the movement officially established itself as the European Launching
Group. In September 1993, the group drafted a mou that was signed by 87
public and private broadcasters and manufacturers founding the dvb Project,
as which it became known from then on (de Bruin & Smits, 1999, p. 14). It was
decided that the development and standardization of digital television should
involve a much wider set of actors than eureka and hd -mac (dvb Project,
1993, Article 2(1)). To include the entire value chain broadcasters and content
producers should be just as much part of the movement as tv-set manufacturers
(dvb Project, 1993, Article 6(1)). The six also decided that participation should
not be limited to European companies and actively sought the participation of
Japanese and Korean companies.4 In its first year, the dvb grew from 83 to 147
companies (de Bruin & Smits, 1999, p. 14). Today, it includes 250 companies (dvb
Project, 2010a). By the including of both manufacturers and broadcasters on equal
terms, the dvb Project clearly distinguished itself from e !95.
Only the European Commission was excluded. It was held responsible for
the hd -mac debacle by many in the dvb.5 Additionally, its exclusion was
a deliberate attempt to “depoliticize” the development and standardization of
digital television, as one interviewee put it.6 “We decided at an early stage
that we had to keep it [the dvb] away from any regulatory influence,” Peter
Kahl—who was appointed as the first president of the dvb project—was cited
(Homer, 1994). Although the Commission was officially granted an observatory
status, it was encouraged not to participate in the discussions of the dvb.7
The Commission recognized this arguing that, “the group is an independent
body and draws its strength from this. It will not be appropriate therefore that the
2Interview c3 with a member of the dvb Group (2010), Interview c12 with a founding member
of the dvb Project (2010)
3(Interview c3 with a member of the dvb Group, 2010)
4Interview c3 with a member of the dvb Group (2010)
5Interview c2 with a representative of the broadcasting industry (2010), Galprin (2002), Levy
(1997), Brown and Picard (2004), Dai (2008)
6Interview c11 with a representative of the broadcasting industry and now member of the
(2010)
7Interview c1 with a Commission representative (2010), Interview c11 with a representative
of the broadcasting industry and now member of the (2010). Even today that the Commission
appeared willing to support the dvb by mandating some of its standards, such as dvb-H, many in
the dvb still do not want to rely on the Commission even though this could potentially strengthen
its role.
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Commission signs its memorandum of understanding and thus become a member
of the group” (ec, 1993a, p. 24). And Commissioner Bangemann declared:
It is not appropriate to march in with great fanfare, unrolling huge flags and
make pledges for the future in a speech of celebration. We have had all this
once, and it fell apart.
(Martin Bangemann, ep, 1994a, p. 15)
As discussed in the hdtv Chapter (3), the Commission had adopted a new policy
of non-intervention.
As discussed below, however, the Commission’s strategy of non-intervention
was not the result of a learning process or functional considerations on part of the
Commission. This is not to say that policy learning was not possible. However, it
is unlikely to happen as quickly as it happened after the failure of hd -mac. As
argued further below, the hd -mac debacle rather appears to have offered the
Commission—or rather a specific group of Commission employees—to exit its
failing hd -mac policy and to build a new policy alliance with pay tv operators.
This suggest two conclusions. First, it emphasizes the importance of en-
trepreneurial leadership—be it in its public or private form—to organize collec-
tive action. In this case the entrepreneurship was provided by a private group
of actors. It would be a mistake, however, to view this as a weakening of the
hypothesized ability of public entrepreneurs to facilitate collective action. It
merely shows that public entrepreneurship is not the only way through which
collective action problems can be overcome.
Secondly, the emergence of the dvb Project underlines the importance of
epistemic communities that may emerge within the standardization community.
As shown by the ‘sardine moment’ during the gsm standardization process, these
communities can provide a considerable driving force behind standardization
processes.
The entrepreneurial leadership lead to the creation of a standards-writing
organization, which, could be considered as one of the most progressive of its
kind. In order to keep the standardization process manageable and to prevent
it from being gridlocked by diverging interests, the dvb members adopted a
somewhat unique organizational structure. First, the dvb Project broke with
the tradition of consensual decision-making and introduced the possibility of
majority voting in (dvb Project, 1993, Article 6(4)). A priori, should therefore
be expected to be more successful in developing common standards than other
standardization organizations.
Secondly, the structure of the dvb was designed in direct response to the
4. Digital Television 109
hd -mac debacle. The organization was divided into separate Technical and
Commercial Modules. While latter was meant to formulate commercial require-
ments, such as functionality, cost targets and deadlines the role of the former was
deliberately limited to the transposition of these commercial requirements into
technical specifications (dvb Project, 2010b; dvb Project, 1993, Article 7&8).8 This
‘market driven’ approach was meant to ensure that the dvb Project would be able
to respond more quickly to the commercial demands of the industry and to make
sure that standards would only be developed if and when they can be translated
to products, with a “direct commercial value.”9 This was a direct response to the
failed hd -mac standardization process:
The burned fingers (or perhaps burnt-out cheque books) in the age of mac
and hd-mac. [. . . ] The engineers now realized that, before designing a new
broadcast system, it was necessary to decide what the system should do for
the public and how much it should cost to be successful on the European
domestic market.
(Wood, 1995)
Both, the dvb Project’s majority voting and its market driven approach are rather
unique. While many standards-writing organizations are struggling to introduce
majority voting, the dvb project is one of the few exceptions that has been able
to do so.
4.1.2 Transmission Standards: A Private Standardization Suc-
cess Story?
As a result of its innovative organizational structure, the dvb Project could cele-
brate its first successes soon after its foundation in 1993. By 1994, the dvb Group
quickly agreed to a common set of standards for satellite (dvb -s) and cable
(dvb -c) transmission via a common digital compression technology (mpeg -2)
that was just undergoing standardization in the International Standardization
Organization (iso) and International Electrotechnical Commission (iec).10 By re-
ducing bandwidth requirements, digital compression technology allowed satellite
broadcasters to deliver between 6–12 digital channels at the cost of one analogue
channel (New Media Markets, 1998, p. 9; Wood, 1995).11 Therefore, satellite broad-
8The approach was suggested by representatives of the satellite operator astra (Interview c3
with a member of the dvb Group, 2010).
9dvb Project (2010c), Interview c3 with a member of the dvb Group (2010)
10The Moving Pictures Expert Group (mpeg) started in 1988 as Working Group 11, Subcommittee
29, of iso/iec jtc11 with the aim of defining the standards for digital compression of video and
audio signals. In 1994 it published the mpeg-2 standard as iso/iec13818 (Ely, 1995, p. 12).
11Therefore, they were also ready to provide their customers with digital reception equipment
at a subsidized prize to accelerate the transition to digital television.
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casters were one of the main drivers during the early days of the dvb Project
(Reimers, 2006, p. 174).12
Due to cooperation agreements with the etsi and cenelec, the dvb Group
could feed these technical specifications into the latter’s standardization processes.
etsi and cenelec simply rubber-stamped the dvb Project’s specifications and
transform them into formal European standards (Grimme, 2001).
Today, the dvb Project celebrates itself for the fact that more than 500 million
dvb-compliant transmission devices have been sold in Europe and the rest of
the world (dvb Project, 2010a). As a result of this first success the literature,
without exception, has been quite positive about the European digital television
standardization project (de Bruin & Smits, 1999; Cave, 1997). Dai (2008) even goes
as far as to present the case of digital television standardization—in comparison
to European hdtv standardization—as evidence for the superior governance
capacity of private industry and as an argument for non-intervention:
The spectacular failure and the unexpected success of dvb [organization
responsible for digital television standardization, see below] have certainly
dealt eu policy-makers, including the European Commission, the Council
of Ministers, and the French Government, a powerful blow. The eu finally
accepted in 1995 that the outcome of technological standardization should
be determined by market forces, rather than policy makers.
(Dai, 2008, p. 61)
Not without schadenfreude, Dai (2008, p. 60) continues that, “[i]t is rather ironic
that television viewers in France,” a country which the author associates with
interventionist industrial policies, “today are beginning to experience digital tv
from the non-official DVB project, rather than the officially favoured HD-MAC
technology!” According to Dai this stands in stark contrast to the uk, which
he considers to be very non-interventionist country, where digital television is
striving.
Most of the direct participants—some of which were interviewed during the
writing of this chapter—too, were of the opinion that their work had been quite
successful.13
Many commentators, however, failed to acknowledge the subtle but crucial
12The business model of terrestrial (free) tv broadcasters was different. It was based on the
maximization of audience shares with a limited number of channels. Therefore, they did not have
the same incentive to reduce costs and were less keen on digitalizing their transmission systems.
The digital terrestrial television standard (dvb-t) was hence developed three years later.
13Interview c10 with a representative of a large producer of set-top boxes (2010), Interview
c12 with a founding member of the dvb Project (2010), Interview c2 with a representative of the
broadcasting industry (2010), Interview c3 with a member of the dvb Group (2010), Interview
c7 with a representative of a producer of conditional access systems (2010), Interview c8 with a
member of the Digital Broadcasting Project (2010)
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limits of the dvb Projects early success. The dvb failed to agree to a single
common standard for the transmission of television signals for all modes, meaning
satellite, cable and terrestrial broadcasting.14 The example of Japan, where a single
intermodal standard was developed, demonstrated that this would have been
technically feasible. However, cable, satellite and terrestrial operators deliberately
chose to develop incompatible systems for each mode. In the face of technical
convergence and market liberalization, the incumbent operators saw incompatible
standards as an opportunity to minimize competition between the different modes
of broadcasting—i.e. satellite, cable and terrestrial. 15 Incompatible transmission
standards raised the switching costs for consumers. To switch from one mode to
another, consumers had no choice but to replace their existing equipment (Brown
& Picard, 2004, p. 2). Given high initial equipment prices, however, they were
unlikely to do so.
This demonstrates private companies’ difficulty in bridging their short term
interests to achieve common benefits in the long run. A single common standard
could have significantly accelerated the market take-up of digital television by
maximized economies of scale and scope and creating the basis for a competitive
market for set-top boxes, which would have brought down the retail price of
digital tv equipment. However, companies were more concerned with their
relative competitive positions rather than the overall size of the market. The lack
of a single transmission standard was considered, at least partly, responsible for
the relatively modest market penetration of digital television (Brown & Picard,
2004, p. 2; Cawley, 1997, p. 682).
The dvb Project’s mixed success with the standardization of digital trans-
mission systems thus demonstrates both the capabilities and limits of private
governance in the field of technical standardization.
On the one hand, this first—though limited—success of transmission systems
standardization demonstrates that private companies are able to overcome their
collective action problems if a private entrepreneur substitutes the public en-
trepreneurship investigated in this thesis. This is not to say that there are not any
other ways in which private standard-setters may overcome their collective action
problems. However, this is not the focus of this thesis.
On the other hand, the fact that the dvb did at least manage to agree to three
different transmission standards shows that private industry is not completely
14Each is based on different technologies, namely qpsk modulation, qam and Coded ofdm
respectively (Reimers, 2006, pp. 175-176).
15The incumbent telecoms operators, for instance, that controlled cable television in most
European countries were keen to minimize competition from satellite television, which was rapidly
gaining more and more market shares during the early 1990s. Similarly, terrestrial television
providers—public and private—sought to shield themselves from the growing competition from
both cable and satellite pay tv operators.
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incapable of adopting technical standards by itself. the dvb Project’s failure to
agree to a single, universal transmission system, however, demonstrates inability
or unwilling of private industry to engage in variety reduction up to an extent
that would be socially desirable.
Interestingly, this view even seems to be shared by actors from which this
should be least expect. Philip Laven, the dvb Project’s current director, stated
that:
[I]n the strange world of digital tv, many operators have deliberately chosen
standards that are unique to their services. This suggests that self-regulation
will not be successful in this area.
(Laven, 2002, p. 6, emphasis added)
To make things worse, one interviewee argued,16 different countries adopted
subtly different versions of the three transmission standards and even incom-
patible generations of the standards, such as dvb -c and dvb -c2 were made
incompatible. Laven criticized that:
There are now more than 1500 digital satellite tv services using dvb standards
in Europe [. . . ] Regrettably, to receive all 1500 satellite services, you would
need many different digital tv set-top boxes. The reality is that there is a
serious problem with inter-operability.
(Laven, 2002, p. 3)
This failure is not necessarily a direct argument for government intervention.
However, it is not an argument for the capacity of private governance in tech-
nical standardization either. The case of digital transmission standardization
clearly shows that private standardization processes can fail or, at least, produce
socially sub-optimal outcomes and therefore supports the hypothesis that public
entrepreneurship did have a potential role to play here. And if private industry
standardization even fails under such favorable circumstances, it can also be
expected to fail under less favorable ones.
There thus appears to be some scope for government intervention. In this
case, for instance, the standards-setters may have been legally forced to introduce
a single standard for all three modes.
16Interview c11 with a representative of the broadcasting industry and now member of the
(2010)
4. Digital Television 113
4.2 Conditional Access Standardization and the In-
sufficiency of Ex Post Regulation
Conditional Access standardization succeeded the above-described development
of transmission standards. Despite the failure of transmission standardization,
the European Commission and other public actors continued to stay out of
the standardization process. Industry was expected to develop the required
standards itself. Conditional Access standardization provided industry with an
opportunity to increase the overall size of the digital television market. This
section investigates whether and to what extent private standard-setters were
able to seize this opportunity by developing common standards in the absence of
facilitating public interventions.
Because important public interests, such as media pluralism (see Sub-Section
4.2.1), were at stake, however, the ep pressured the Commission to use compe-
tition rules to resolved potential market failures that might result from private
standardization. Therefore, Sub-Section 4.2.2 analyzes the extent to which ex post
regulation through competition rules can be used to deal with the potentially
undesirable consequences of failed private standardization processes. Finally,
Sub-Section 4.2.3 assess whether and to what extent entrepreneurial ex ante
interventions would have led to superior outcomes.
4.2.1 Bottle Necks and Media Pluralism
Conditional Access is the technical basis of pay tv. While pay tv was a small
niche market in many countries, it was considered to be of critical importance for
the commercial viability of digital television. Conditional Access systems allow
broadcasters to scramble their television systems and to restrict the consumption
of their program to paying customers.17 In the era of digital television the
business model of pay-per-view was expected to gain in importance (see oecd,
2009, p. 196). It was expected to open up the market to new broadcasters and
content providers. The increased number of channels that can be broadcasted
through digital transmission technology alone would not have this effect as
these channels need to compete for the same number of viewers. Therefore,
the average advertising revenues per channel and program were expected to
decrease, which would allow less and not more companies to break even on
advertising revenues alone (see Lyle, 2008, p. 125). Pay-per-view, however, would
17The first Conditional Access system, Videocrypt, was developed by Rupert Murdoch’s Sky
tv in 1990. Conditional access allowed Murdoch to make his investments in alleged ‘premium
content’—such as Premier League football and Hollywood blockbusters—profitable (Levy, 1997,
p. 668).
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allow market insurgents to make use of the increased availability of channels. The
overall size of and the number of companies and competition in the television
market was expected to be increased.
Increased competition was expected to promote media pluralism and diversity.
This expectation was based on the ‘Hotelling effect’. In markets that are marked by
a high degree of market concentration, Hotelling (1929) demonstrated, companies
tend to target the same middle ground of consumers by providing a relatively
homogeneous range of products (i.e. programs) to maximize sales (i.e. viewing
time and thus advertising revenues). This was confirmed by a study of the
British Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (2001, Paragraph 1.5), which
suggested that companies with a significant market presence tend to ‘super-serve’
a median audience of young adults rather than to address the full range of
cultural, ethnic and religious niche markets. Only where new companies were
able to enter the market and competition intensified would companies employ
product differentiation strategies and start to offer a more heterogeneous range
of programs catering to niche markets and minority interest (Biggam, 2000).
At the same time, however, Conditional Access constituted a major bottleneck
in the digital television market. For Conditional Access can be (mis)used to
control access of third party providers. Control over Conditional Access therefore
meant control over the market. There is a first mover advantage results from
two factors (Nolan, 1997, p. 601). First, companies that first manage to obtain a
critical mass of subscribers and can exploit economies of scale can reduce retail
price and set off bandwagon effect of accumulative sales. Secondly, switching
costs for consumers were high. Once having purchased one Conditional Access
decoder—which, in the early days, could cost up to e 1,000—consumers were
unlikely to acquire another one only to access services from another pay tv
provider.
The first mover advantage and the dominant position that may result from
it is well illustrated by the emergence of satellite-based pay tv in the uk (see
Table 4.1). Sky tv, which was owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News International
Corporation, began transmission two years before its main competitor bsb. With
the help of an aggressive penetration pricing strategy—leasing receivers to new
subscribers at minimal cost and charging low introductory rates—Sky tv quickly
build up an installed base of 1.5 million consumers before bsb entered the market.
This initial lead turned out to be irrevocable. Only 7 month after going on air,
bsb collapsed and had no choice but to merge with Sky tv—forming bSkyb, in
which Murdoch’s News Corporation had 40% stake (Hart, 2004, p. 36). Within
one year, bSkyb managed to brake even and has held a dominant position in the
British satellite broadcasting market since (see Grindle, 2002, pp. 6-7).
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Many third party providers complained about the terms which bSkyb obliged
them to accept the use of its Conditional Access system, Videocrypt. Therefore, it
was regarded necessary to develop a single common non-proprietary standard
for Conditional Access to ensure an open and dynamic digital television market.
This episode underlines the critical importance of open common Conditional
Access standards to ensure fair competition and to exploit the Hotelling effect.
Table 4.1: The Rise of BSkyB
Subscribers
Date Event of Sky (m.)
1986 Dec. BSB awarded satellite broadcasting
license
1989 Feb. Sky tv starts broadcasting in Pal
(4 channels)
Sept. Sky announces low cost introductory 0.5
offers
1990 Apr. BSB starts broadcasting in D-MAC 1.5
1991 May BSB merges with Sky (BSkyB)
1991 May BSkyB GBP 200m. refinancing 2.0
1992 Mar. Operational break-even 2.6
Sept. Sky Sports encrypted
1993 Jun. Operating profit GBP 60m.
Sept. Subscription package introduced
12 channels + 2 free 3.2
1994 Apr. Further GBP 500m. financing 3.5
Accumulated shareholder debt
GBP 1.6bn.
18 channels planned
Jun. Operating profit GBP 186m.
1999 Shareholder debt repaid
Source: Grindle (2002, p. 6)
To prevent that this bottle neck would be carried over into the digital era,
it was necessary to develop a common non-proprietary standard for digital
Conditional Access that could provide a large number of companies with equal
access to the revenue streams of pay-per-view. Otherwise, the above-described
opportunity to increase media pluralism and diversity via a diversification of the
television market would be sacrificed.
The incumbent pay tv operators, however, were not very keen to give up their
dominant position and share their markets with new entrants. In consequence,
the dvb Project soon found itself in a stalemate between the incumbent pay
tv broadcasters—bSkyb, Canal+, Filmnet, and Nethold—on the one hand; and
4. Digital Television 116
public service and free tv broadcasters, on the other. The pay tv broadcasters
proposed a solution of, what could be described as, minimum standardization.
Public service and free tv broadcasters, by contrast, supported a solution of
maximum standardization to ensure the openness of digital television markets.
The incumbent pay tv broadcasters were keen to transfer their control over
analogue proprietary Conditional Access systems into the world of digital televi-
sion (Verse, 2008, p. 226). They each sought to use their existing installed base of
consumers to launch proprietary systems, speculating that they might turn into
a de facto standards, which would give them a dominant position in the market.
Therefore, they proposed proposed the Simulcrypt system in 1994, which was
meant to allow third parties to simultaneously transmit streams of encrypted
information through the incumbents’ proprietary broadcasting system—therefore
the name ‘Simulcrypt’ (Levy, 1997, p. 668). Sure enough this opened their Condi-
tional Access systems to third parties. However, it also meant that the incumbent
pay tv broadcasters could negotiate the conditions of third party access them-
selves. Public and free tv broadcasters and manufacturers, hence, opposed the
Simulcrypt option, claiming that it gave pay tv operators too much market power.
Ken Sheppard, itv’s representative on the dvb Project’s conditional-access com-
mittee stated: “Our stance is that digital television is a new playing field and that
we should try to make it as even as possible” (New Media Markets, 1994; Screen
Finance, 1995).
Public and free tv operators, by contrast, proposed a system called Multicrypt.
This was based on a Common Interface, a socket in the digital set-top box, that
would allow consumer to access any pay tv operators’ programs by inserting the
given operators credit-card-sized decoder card that contained the information that
was relevant for conditional access into the decoder. Proponents of Multicrypt
argued that it would mean lower risk and lower cost for consumers, which
would no longer be forced to buy a whole new decoder to watch another pay
tv operators programs. They simply needed to acquire the relevant decoder
card. This also reduced their risk of being stranded with a set top box that has
lost the ‘standards war’ to another set-top box. In the medium to long run, its
proponents argued, Multicrypt would therefore lead to deeper levels of market
penetration of digital television and increase competition between Conditional
Access services and create a common European market for Conditional Access
decoders and content. Both could be produced at a larger scale and thus be sold
at a lower price. Multicrypt had the advantage that no rules or regulations were
required to guarantee third party access to digital television markets.
The dvb found itself in a stalemate between the Simulcrypt and Multicrypt
proponents. “Those who drive the market at the beginning want to protect their
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market and they want Simulcrypt. Those who don’t want to be debarred, favour
Multicrypt,” Robin Crossley, of ses astra, summarized the gridlock (M. Brown,
1995). Both sides realized that the dvb Group was not going to reach a consensus
on this issue.
To appease the raising concerns that Simulcrypt could put the Conditional
Access operators in a dominant position, the legal departments of bSkyb and
Filmnet drafted a voluntary and nonbinding code of conduct on fair reason-
able and non-discriminatory conditions (frand) third party access to digital
decoders (Levy, 1997, p. 668). The code of conduct was eventually adopted by
the dvb Project as part of a compromise on Conditional Access, which com-
prised both Simulcrypt and Multicrypt as well as the dvb Project’s Common
Scrambling Mechanism and the recognition of (dvb Project, 1994a, 1994b). The
proponents of Simulcrypt celebrated the compromise as a good example of suc-
cessful self-regulation (Eltzroth, 2007). “This underscored the recognition [. . . ]
that commercial actors were well placed to find a solution for a perceived market
distortion” (Eltzroth, 2007).
In reality, however, this was only a small concession of the pay tv operators.
Under European competition rules, they would have to provide licenses according
to frand rules anyway. Moreover, many critics argued that frand rules were
not strong enough to guarantee fair market access and to limit the dominant
position of the proprietors of Conditional Access systems. First, the legal defini-
tion of what constitutes fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory is rather vague.
Even the dvb Project’s legal director, Carter Eltzroth (2010), admitted that the
concepts lacks a common definition and could only be decided on a case by case
basis. This might force third parties trying to access proprietary Conditional
Access systems into lengthy litigations and potentially act as a deterrent to market
entry. Secondly, the frand condition did not provide any obligation on the
part of pay tv operators to grant a license (Levy, 1997). Thirdly, it was clear that
manufacturers were unlikely to include such interfaces if their main customers,
which were mainly Conditional Access operators and Simulcrypt proponents,
were neither demanding nor paying for their inclusion. “The decision would
be up to the manufacturer, who would have to bear the costs of inserting a
common interface and this would not be in the manufacturer’s interest,” itv’s
Ken Sheppard argued (New Media Markets, 1994).
As the dvb Project’s failure to agree to a single multi-modal transmission
standard this episode, too, demonstrates the limits of self-regulation and private
governance through industry standardization. Where companies strategic and
technological preferences are sufficiently heterogeneous technological, industry is
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unlikely to agree to a sufficient level of variety reduction through standardization.
Industry may reach a compromise involving multiple and incompatible standards
but such a compromise is insufficient where variety reduction is necessary to
achieve the desired market outcome.
The Conditional Access compromise was insufficient to create a competitive
market that would provide a large number of small companies with equal
access to pay per view. Standard-setters missed the opportunity to create a
new, more culturally diverse and politically pluralistic television landscape. The
incumbent pay tv operators could consolidate their dominant position. Their
proprietary control over Conditional Access allowed them to fend off market
insurgents. Second movers never stood a chance. In April 2002, itv Digital
filed for bankruptcy in the uk and the Spanish Quiero tv failed in 2002, with
huge debts and a limited subscriber base (Iosifidis, Steemers, & Wheeler, 2005,
pp. 112-114; Iosifidis, 2007). To date, neither tps in France or Ondigital in the uk
could develop into serious competitors of the incumbent pay tv operators.18
Moreover, it is interesting to note that in many European countries, such as
Germany, pay tv never gained a permanent foothold in the market. The lack of
common standards undermined the growth of the pay tv market overall. More
content diversity and the availability of a larger variety of niche programming
might have attracted more consumers. None of the various Conditional Access
systems appears to have achieved a critical mass in these markets, which em-
phasizes the potential role that public entrepreneurs may play in promoting the
deployment of standards.
From this perspective, self-regulation through technical standardization ap-
pears to have been a clear failure. Although the structure of digital television
markets is probably not any more worrying than the structure of the old analogue
television markets, industry as well as regulators sacrificed a good opportunity
to create a more competitive and dynamic digital television market that might
have increase media pluralism and diversity.
4.2.2 The Insufficiency of Ex Post Regulation
In principle, the failure of private standard-setters to achieve a sufficient level of
variety reduction through private industry standardization should have justified
a public intervention. The Commission’s 1993 proposal for an exit strategy from
hd -mac provided an opportunity to do so. Pursuant to Article 7 of the hd -
mac Directive (92/38/eec), which called on the Commission to report to the
Council on market developments and effect of the directive, the Commission, on
18See Levy (1999, pp. 65-67), Rediske (1996), Cable and Satellite Europe (1996)
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November 15th 1993, proposed a Directive on Advanced Television Standards
(ec, 1993b). Its primary purpose was “to respond to the changed circumstances”
(ec, 1993b, 5 and Article 7) by repealing the 1992 hd -mac Directive (92/38/eec).
Despite the fact that there was no reference to the dvb Project nor the Conditional
Access issue, the Multicrypt proponents took this as an opportunity to make
their preferred Conditional Access solution mandatory by law.19 Initially, the ep
turned to quite sympathetic to the Multicrypt proponents’ arguments:
We in the Parliament have been very aware that there are many broadcasters
across Europe who have very legitimate concerns about the dangers to
pluralism and to free and fair competition in the future which could arise
from the dominant gatekeeper position held by these pay tv broadcasters.”
(Read (pse), ep, 1995, p. 6)
However, the Commission opposed the adoption of more coercive, arguing that,
“it would be inappropriate to base a public law exclusively on a specific private
initiative, the dvb” (ec, 1994b, p. 3). And Bangemann told the ep that, “if
we bring in a standard prematurely, then we will do the opposite of what is
rational for industry, consumers and also for a competitive European industry”
(Bangemann, ep, 1994a, p. 15). Therefore, the final Directive only included the
obligation that operators of Conditional Access systems should be obliged to
grant frand access to third parties (European Parliament and Council, 1995).20
As described in the hdtv Chapter (3), the Commission had replaced its
interventionist policy with a policy of laissez faire and non-intervention. This
development was largely driven by internal political struggles within the Com-
mission. Those Commission employees that were involved in the Commission’s
involvement in hd -mac and some of which still supported a more interventionist
approach had to realize that they had lost all political capital and credibility they
required to intervene into dvb standardization—be it in an entrepreneurial way
or through hierarchical policy instruments.21 Moreover, their opponents within
the Commission had created an elaborate policy network with pay tv operators,
which represented a perfect ally for the Commission.22. Unlike, the public service
broadcasters, which were still closely entangled into national politics, pay tv
operators were looking to market their services on a eu-wide scale. They became
19A vigorous lobbying campaign began, up to point where German member of the ep, Karsten
F. Hoppenstedt, remarked that, “[t]he number of lobbyists involved in this game of poker has
mushroomed almost out of control” (ep, 1995, p. 7).
20The inclusion of the frand clause was based on an amendment of the ep, which was
approved by all the main parties and passed with the required majority (ep, 1994b), that forced
the Commission revise its initial proposal (ec, 1994b).
21Interview c1 with a Commission representative (2010)
22Interview c1 with a Commission representative (2010), Interview c11 with a representative of
the broadcasting industry and now member of the (2010), Interview c8 with a member of the
Digital Broadcasting Project (2010)
4. Digital Television 120
an important political ally of the Commission against national governments
and the European Parliament. This confirms the hypothesis that functionalist
considerations only played a minor—if any—role in the decisions of public actors.
What is more important in its interactions with private standard-setters is the
opportunity to build political alliances against rival public actors.
Therefore, the Commission maintained its non-interventionist policy stance
and justified this with the suggestions that potentially negative market outcomes
could always be overcome through ex post interventions based on European
competition rules. As opposed to ex ante intervention, A. W. Brown (2005) of dg
InfoSoc,23 argued in an widely-read policy paper:
[t]]he main mechanism is therefore an [ex post] assessment of market power
on individual network operators in the style of competition law and the de-
ployment of appropriate remedies—including access remedies—to networks
and to associated facilities.”
(A. W. Brown, 2005, p. 2)
This also had the added advantage for the Commission that competition policy
is an exclusive Commission competence. In the case of all other policy interven-
tions, it needs to cooperate with member states’ governments and the European
Parliament.
Ex post interventions through competition rules, however, turned out to be in-
adequate to guarantee third party access to essential facilities such as Conditional
Access—or the Application Programming Interfaces discussed below—and to
create competitive horizontal markets based on common standards. frand rules
are vaguely defined and the remedies at the competition authorities’ disposal are
limited. Unlike American anti-trust law, eu competition law does not allow for
the break up of companies deemed too large. Therefore, it is often considered a
“blunt instrument:”
In general, it applies only when there is evidence that a market player has
abused a dominant position: in such circumstances, it may be too late to
intervene because the gatekeeper may already have gained an unassailable
position in the market place, thus preventing true competition.
(Laven, 2002, pp. 7-8)
Implicitly accepting this, the Commission argued that horizontal markets
based on open and universal standards were no longer necessary and that vertical
markets based on competing, proprietary standards were sufficient to create a
new market for digital television (A. W. Brown, 2005).24 Ex post regulation through
23Although this article was written ten years after, it still reflects the way of thinking during the
mid 1990s quite accurately.
24In vertical markets companies control every aspect of the value chain, such as set-top boxes,
Conditional Access systems, and interactivity.
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competition law was argued to be strong enough, Commissioner Liikanen argued,
to create “[. . . ] strong vertical pay tv markets” (Liikanen, 2001).25
This argumentation was reinforced by the pay tv operators who suggested
that vertical markets would lead to more innovation and investment in the digital
television infrastructure. Pay tv operators reminded legislators how their vertical
control over proprietary standards had made it financially viable to introduce
analogue satellite television. To jump start the market penetration of satellite
television, pay tv operators had provided consumers with expansive satellite
decoders at a low or now charge. The cross-subsidize satellite decoders, led to
a rapid consumer take-up of satellite television. In the same way, they argued,
they would also promote the introduction of digital television. If they had to give
up proprietary control over Conditional Access and Application Programming
Interface, they would lose the investment incentive to cross-subsidize digital
receiver sales. In that case, retail prices for digital receivers would be much
higher, putting a brake on the market led switch-over to digital television:
Disproportionate regulatory intervention, or even the threat of such action,
could inhibit the investments and innovation needed to sustain current
growth in digital and interactive tv. The imposition of mandated technical
standards or the use of artificial economic incentives and subsidies will
impede digital tv rather than promote continued progress towards eventual
switch-off of analogue terrestrial broadcasting.
(Digital Interoperability Forum, 2003)
This turned out to be an excellent lobbying strategy. Throughout Europe, govern-
ments saw the switch-over to digital terrestrial broadcasting as an opportunity to
auction off some of the radio frequencies previously used for analogue broad-
casting. Because of this ‘digital dividend’ digital television standardization was
seen by many as, “the opportunity of the decade” (Wood, 1994, p. 12). The digital
dividend could only be reaped, however, if households switched-over to digital
television. Therefore, the idea of a market-led, industry subsidized switch-over
was very tempting to many governments in Europe.
The slow market penetration of digital television, however, demonstrates that
vertical competition only constitutes a limited driver of the digital switch-over. By
2002, all of the large pay tv operators had migrated to digital television,26 which
25The political nature of the Commission’s choice for vertical markets based on competing
standards is highlighted by the comparison to the case of umts standardization (see Chapter 2),
where the Commission, in rather similar circumstances, argued for horizontal market. The only
difference between the two cases appears to have been that in the case of umts the Commission’s
allies favored horizontal markets and in the case of Conditional Access standardization, they
favored vertical markets.
26In 1996, Canal+ in France, Telepiu in Italy and the Kirch Gruppe in Germany launched the
first digital television services in Europe. Between 1998 and 2001, bSkyb also switched to digital
television.
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many governments saw as a confirmation of their strategy of non-intervention.
Soon, however, pay tv and vertical competition seemed to have lost its steam. As
soon as the demand for pay tv was saturated, the market penetration of digital
television began to stagnate. Even in countries such as France and the uk, where
pay tv has been a great success, take-up has flattened off at 30% to 40%. In
countries like Germany, pay tv has remained a small niche market to date. “In
such circumstances,” Philip Laven (2002, p. 8) from the ebu suggested,“it seems
foolish to expect that pay tv will be the mechanism that can achieve universal
adoption of digital tv.” The Commission’s strategy of a market led, pay tv
driven introduction of digital television appears to have failed.
The argumentation for vertical markets, however, had further important
weaknesses. Vertical markets are inadequate to exploit the ‘Hotelling effect’ that
could lead to greater media pluralism and diversity. Vertical markets can not
sustain enough companies to exploit the ‘Hotelling effect’. New market entrants
need to employ costly penetration pricing strategies and invest in premium
content such as football or blockbuster movies to obtain enough consumers to
break even. With limited market profits, however, vertical markets can therefore
only sustain a limited number of companies. This is confirmed by the following
two examples. In the uk, itv Digital’s overbidding on Premier League football
rights had pushed the consortium into insolvency (Iosifidis et al., 2005, pp. 112-
114). In Spain, Quiero tv failed in 2002 because it could not afford to give their
set-top-boxes away for free as its competitors Canal Satellite Digital and Via
Digital, which merged eventually, were able to do. Instead Quiero tv had to sell
its decoders for around e 400 to e 500 (Iosifidis et al., 2005, pp. 112-114; Iosifidis,
2007).
Therefore, Europe remains stuck with a limited number of broadcasters that
‘super-serve’ a median audience with content that represent the lowest common
denominator that audience’s tastes. Again ex post regulation through competition
law does not provide a remedy. It does not allow competition authorities to
take media concentration into account. Which is obviously problematic where
levels of market concentration that are still considered in line with competition
rules, already have a detrimental impact on media pluralism. Therefore, only a
horizontal market is porous enough to guarantee market access to a sufficient
number of companies that is necessary to promote media pluralism and diversity.
In light of these findings, non-intervention, only backed by ex post regulation,
was a clear mistake.
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4.2.3 The Need and Scope for Ex Ante Intervention
This section investigates whether and to what extent ex ante intervention might
have lead to superior outcomes.
Horizontal markets based on common, non-proprietary standards would
have had two advantages. First, horizontal markets would have been able to
maintain a much larger number of competitors because pay tv would have
become a much more widely available and accessible business model. With an
open Conditional Access system, for instance, content producers might have been
able to cut out broadcasters and market individual programs through pay tv
rather than advertising revenues.
Secondly, horizontal markets might have also accelerated the market penetra-
tion of digital television and Conditional Access alike, without the cross subsidies
of the dominant pay tv operators. Common open standards could have maxi-
mized economies of scale and scope that would have eventually brought down
the price of digital Conditional Access and Application Programming Interface
decoders too. And for the switch-over to digital television this option would have
actually been superior. The economic literature has already pointed out that open
and universal standards have the advantage of reducing uncertainty about the
identity of the winning standard (see Quelin et al., 2001). Hesitant consumers
would be reassured that they will not be orphaned or stranded with a proprietary
system that has lost the vertical competition against another system that became
the de facto standard.
Since the hd -mac debacle, however, ex ante interventions were associated
with the type of coercive, hierarchical interventions used by the Commission to
force the marked deployment of hd -mac. Such interventions were therefore
rejected by most stake holders. And given the strong opposition of the pay tv
operators, a hierarchical intervention mandating compliance with or subsidizing
the market deployment of any given standard are very likely to have failed and
ended up in the political contestation of the standardization process. As Gerard
Caudron, member of the ep (pes, France), pointed out, however, this would not
have been the only type of ex ante intervention:
The vicissitudes of D2 mac and hd-mac should not and cannot be used
as an argument against any type of regulation, as the ultra-liberals of all
hues would have us believe, particularly when this guarantees them de facto
monopolies.
(Caudron, ep, 1994a, p. 12)
Public entrepreneurship might have offered an alternative form of intervention.
There might have been some scope for public entrepreneurship. A public
entrepreneur might have been able to build a broad alliance involving both public
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service and free tv as well as the incumbent pay tv operators. An entrepreneur
might have prevented the emergence of the decision-making deadlock between
the proponents of simulcrypt and multicrypt by reminding them of their com-
mon interests and mutual dependence. By collaborating on common standards,
companies might have been able to increase the overall size of their market—not
just digital television but also pay tv. After all, pay tv had always been a
niche market. Through common, open standards, however, it might have been
transformed into a mass market, just like mobile telephony grew from a niche
market into a mass market as a result of European standardization.
Yet the reach of such entrepreneurial interventions appears to be limited
and it appears to depend on a number of rather tough necessary conditions.
First, public entrepreneurs would have had to intervene at a sufficiently early
point in time, namely before the technology has matured and when there still
is relative uncertainty about the strategic and commercial implications of the
resulting standard. Secondly, there would need to be a situation of crisis for
an entrepreneur to organize collective action. Therefore, it is not clear whether
public entrepreneurship would have succeeded in the case of Conditional Access
standardization. As demonstrated above, however, non intervention and ex post
regulation were not a solution either.
4.3 Application Programming Interfaces Standardiza-
tion under the Shadow of Hierarchy
This section focuses on the hypothesis that, instead of prompting private actors to
behave in a given way desired by public actors, the shadow of hierarchy is bound
to expose technical standardization processes to political contestation. This section
is organized in three sub-sections. Sub-section 4.3.1 examines the limits of private
standard-setting. Sub-Section 5.2.3 describes the role of Application Programming
Interfaces and first attempts to develop a common standard. Sub-Section 4.3.3
examines whether and to what extent public entrepreneurship—rather than the
threat of public interventions—might have led to superior outcomes.
4.3.1 The Late Arrival of the Common Standard
An Application Programming Interface is the operating system that connects
software applications and hardware. Its role can be compared to that of operating
systems, such as Unix or Windows, for personal computers. Similar to personal
computer operating systems, Application Programming Interfaces serve as the
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platform for a variety of potential interactive television applications, ranging
from shopping and gambling to Internet browsers, ecommerce and egovernment
services (Klinkenberg & Schiek, 2008, p. 400; mhp Knowledge Project, 2006,
pp. 23-28).27
Like Conditional Access, Application Programming Interface standardiza-
tion was considered one of the critical steps toward the establishment of digital
television in the market. Interactive television, which depends on Application
Programming Interfaces, was often regarded as the ‘killer application’ that might
generate enough demand to jump start the a market led introduction of digital
television. This expectation was based on the realization that a larger availability
of television channels alone was not going to prompt consumers to make the
costly switch to digital television. Analogue television via cable and satellite
broadcasting already allowed for the transmission of a large number of channels.
“Besides the better quality of picture, there are no real other benefits for viewers
switching from analogue to digital,” Sebastian Loudon from the Austrian com-
munications regulator rtr explained (Werner, 2007). Therefore, high hopes were
put in interactivity, which is specific to digital television and not possible with
analogue TV.28
As the development of transmission, encoding and Conditional Access was
deemed more urgent, the dvb Project did not start standardization of Applica-
tion Programming Interface until October 1997, when the dvb Steering Board
eventually approved the commercial requirements for a system called Multime-
dia Home Platform (mhp) and adopted it as a full standard in 1998 (Morris &
Smith-Chaigneau, 2005, p. 7).29 To be able to operate on many different types of
set-top boxes, mhp was based on the widely used programming language Java.30
By that time, however, it was already too late. Many operators had organized
outside the dvb Project and introduced their own, proprietary Application
Programming Interface systems (Klinkenberg & Schiek, 2008, p. 402). In 1997,
an industry consortium named the Multimedia Hypermedia Experts Group had
already published the mheg standard, which was soon adopted by the bbc. In
27The success of services sold over Teletext shows, even with a primitive interface, the willing-
ness of customers to do this.
28At the same time, Application Programming Interface, too, constituted another potential bottle
neck. Proprietary control over the Application Programming Interfaces would give operators
significant powers over how and what interactive television applications are consumed. Just like
Conditional Access, it is therefore going to influence the structure, size and growth of the digital
television market.
29In 1999, the dvb Group successfully fed the new mhp standard into the standardization
processes of etsi. On July 12th 2000, mhp was formally adopted as a European standard
(Technical Specification (ts) 101 812 v1.1.1).
30The choice of Java made mhp a direct competitor to and incompatible with the html and
Java Script standard supported by Microsoft and Intel—also known as ‘Wintel’.
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1998, the Advanced Television Enhancement Forum (atvef) was founded soon
introduced a further Application Programming Interface standard. By the time
that mhp was introduced, it also faced the competition of Opentv, Liberate,
nds, Microsoft and Canal+. As much as 25 million proprietary Application
Programming Interface devices had been sold that were all incompatible with
mhp (Wynn & Flynn, 2003). Although the dvb Project as well as the European
Broadcasting Union called their members to migrate to mhp, it was clear that
operators with investments in their own Application Programming Interface
systems were not going to switch. Particularly, the pay tv operators were
unwilling to give up their first-mover advantage. Nor were consumers expected
to switch. mhp was significantly more expensive than all alternative proprietary
platforms (Näränen, 2002, p. 6). To date, over 25 different combinations of middle-
ware systems are still in use in Europe today (Morris & Smith-Chaigneau, 2005,
p. 483) and neither mhp, Opentv, mheg and Microsoft tv managed to tip
the market. Important scale economies are sacrificed and set-top boxes prices
markets remain high, further contributing to the low market penetration of digital
television.
The Application Programming Interface standardization, too, thus demon-
strates the limits of private industry standardization. It highlights that—just
like public decision-making processes—the decision-making processes of private
standards-writing organizations can be rather slow. And where network effects
allow individual companies or small groups of companies to pursue unilateral
standardization strategies, these decision-making processes tend to be too slow.
This demonstrates that public entrepreneurship can play a decisive role by ac-
celerating the standardization process and providing standard-setters with a
first-mover advantage over their rivals.
4.3.2 The Shadow of Hierarchy
The proponents of mhp sought to use the negotiation of the telecoms package,
which was formally intended to take account of the increasing convergence
between telecommunications, broadcasting and it sectors (ec, 2000a, p. 3), to
have mhp be made a mandatory standard by law. The Commission, however,
as in the case of Conditional Access, wanted to leave this issue out of secondary
legislation and did not mention it in its proposal (ec, 2000b).31 Commissioner
Liikannen posited that:
31The Commission merely agreed to carry frand provision of the Advanced Television stan-
dards Directive 95/47/ec into the package’s access Directive.
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Given the fact that the mhp standard was agreed on the assumption that it
would remain a voluntary standard, and given the widespread support for
it, I see no need to make implementation of the standard mandatory in our
Directives, as some suggest.
(Liikanen, 2001)
However, the ep, by contrast, insisted on the inclusion of an explicit shadow
of hierarchy. It was concerned that the failure to agree to a single application
programming interfaces standard would have detrimental effects for cultural
diversity and media pluralism (see ep, 2001a, Amendment 1, Recital 7):
If we do not [mandate mhp], then I fear the future of satellite television
might be dominated by the tv culture of quiz shows featuring stripping
housewives, squeezing out educational and public interest programmes.”
(McCarthy (pse) ep, 2001b)
Therefore, it was argued that:
Interoperability of digital interactive tv services and terminal equipment,
at the level of the consumer, shall be encouraged in order to ensure the free
flow of information, media pluralism and access of consumers to cultural
diversity.”
(ep, 2001c, Amendment 3 (Recital 30a), emphasis added)
The ep had been lobbied intensively by public service broadcasters, particularly
from Germany.32
Upon the pressure of the ep an explicit threat of to make compliance with one
standard obligatory was included into the Framework Directive 2002/21/ec of
the Telecoms Package that was adopted in April 2002 (European Parliament and
Council, 2002). According to this Directive, the Commission was to draw up a
list of standards that whose usage Member States were meant to encourage. This
list was always intended to contain several standards, not just mhp. There was
no obligation to comply with this list. It was also agreed that the Commission
should review the market situation after the Directive’s entry into force (ec,
2001a; ep, 2001c, Amendment 30). “If interoperability and user choice had not
been adequately achieved,” the Commission may make a standard from the list
obligatory, “to the extent strictly necessary to ensure such interoperability and to
improve freedom of choice for users” (Article 17(3)).
According to the shadow-of-hierarchy hypothesis, as mentioned in Chapter 1,
this threat should be expected to prompt industry to switch over to mhp. This
expectation is strengthened by the fact that industry considered this shadow of
32Adler (2001), Interview c4 Interview with a participant of the MHP standardization process
(2010), Interview c11 with a representative of the broadcasting industry and now member of the
(2010)
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hierarchy to be quite credible. Just as the direct use of hierarchical instruments,
as in the case of hdtv standardization (Chapter 3), the mere threat to use
hierarchical instruments, too, lead to political contestation.
In response to the formulation of this threat, pay tv operators formed the
Digital Interoperability Forum in 2003 to prevent the mandation of mhp.33 Its
main message was that:
Disproportionate regulatory intervention, or even the threat of such action,
could inhibit the investments and innovation needed to sustain current
growth in digital and interactive tv. The imposition of mandated technical
standards or the use of artificial economic incentives and subsidies will
impede digital tv rather than promote continued progress towards eventual
switch-off of analogue terrestrial broadcasting.
(Digital Interoperability Forum, 2003)
The Digital Interoperability Forum used the implication of the ep, Council and
the Commission in the decision-making process, to lobby against the enactment of
the threat. Their main counter narrative against mhp was that public attempts to
impose a standard would crowd out private investment and innovation. Therefore,
the mandation of mhp would “put brakes” on future investment in digital
television, as bSkyb’s Sheila Cassells told New Media Markets (Wynn & Flynn,
2003). Alex Blowers, head of regulatory affairs at ntl that later became Virgin
Media, warned that if mhp was mandated industry would stop cross-subsidizing
their proprietary set-top boxes. According to Blowers, this practice had made the
uk the most advanced digital television market in Europe (Adler, 2001). While
this narrative was not strong enough to tip the entire debate it destroyed the
policy consensus upon which the formulation of the threat was based. It helped
the opponents of mhp to ensure that there was not a sufficient majority to enact
the threat.
While the ep was quite sympathetic toward mhp, the mhp opponents had
convinced the Commission not to take policy action. The Council was divided.
Therefore, the Commission concluded in July 2004, that there was no clear case
for mandating mhp or any other standard pursuant to Article 18(3) (ec, 2004c).
Instead, it added two direct competitors of mhp—wtvml (Worldwide tv Mark-
up Language) and mheg 5—to the list of standards in line with Article 17. The
Commission reconfirmed its decision two years later (ec, 2006a). This provides a
direct parallel to the cases of hdtv and intermodal transport standardization,
where the hierarchical interventions, too, had a completely unintended effect. In
33Interview c9 with a representative of a pay-TV service provider (2010). The members of the
forum include: Advanced Digital Broadcast, bSkyb, Canal+, Espial, Flextech, Liberate, Microsoft
tv, Nagravision, nds, ntl, Numéricable, Opentv, Pace Micro Technology, Sky Italia, Telewest,
tf1, tps, upc/chellomedia and ZetaCast.
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the end, they turned out to support the standard they were meant to weaken.
Chapter 5 will return to the issue of the shadow of hierarchy.
In lack of a common standard for Application Programming Interface, in-
teractive television never took off. Consumers seemed to have waited with the
adoption of one standard or another in order to avoid stranding or being or-
phaned with the losing standard (see Besen & Johnson, 1986, p. 119; Besen, 1992).
Neither mhp, nor any of the other proprietary Application Programming Inter-
face systems could gain a permanent foothold in the market. Only in Belgium
(20 %), Poland (8.1 %), Finland (5 %), Austria (5 %) and Italy (40 %) mhp could
gain moderate market shares (mhp Knowledge Project, 2006, p. 40). In most of
these countries broadcasters have by now stopped to provide interactive content
through mhp.
The failure of interactive television, too, had a negative impact on the mar-
ket take up of digital television. It deprived digital television of what could
potentially have been its ‘killer application’. It was widely recognized that the
improved screen quality of digital television alone was not enough to convince
a lot of consumers to switch to digital tv (de Bruin, 1997). Without interactive
services that could boost the demand for digital television, digitalization seemed
‘crippled’ (Kleinsteuber, 1998).
4.3.3 Scope for Public Entrepreneurship
As during the Conditional Access standardization process, an entrepreneurial
intervention might have circumvented the failure of private industry standardiza-
tion.
First, a public entrepreneur might have been able to make companies start
collaborating on the development of a single common Application Programming
Interface standard much earlier—that is before the technology has matured
and when there still is relative uncertainty about the strategic and commercial
implications of the resulting standard. At this point, no firm would have made
any significant investments in alternative technological paths of development and
there also generally still is relative uncertainty about the strategic and commercial
implications of the resulting standard. Under these circumstances, there would
have been a comparatively large scope for mutually acceptable agreements.
Companies would have found it relatively easy to commit to—the development
of—a single common Application Programming Interface standard, no matter
how diverse their strategic interests might otherwise have been. Pre-normative
r&d subsidies prevent an effective way to prompt industry to start to collaborate
early enough. Thereby, such governmental intervention might have persuaded
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the dvb Project’s members to develop a common Application Programming
Interface standard before rival consortia standards would have been able to win
an irrevocable first-mover advantage.
Secondly, a public entrepreneur might have provided the coordination that
was necessary to deploy mhp successfully. In the case of mhp, this could have
had a decisive effect. According to Gupta, Jain, and Sawhney (1999, p. 397) as well
as Morris and Smith-Chaigneau (2005, p. 484), one of the reasons why the market
take-up of mhp remained below expectations was a ‘chicken-and-egg’ dilemma
faced by equipment and content providers. Without a sufficient supply of mhp
compatible equipment, applications and content providers had no incentive to
provide interactive applications. And without a sufficient availability of mhp
compatible applications and content, manufacturers had no incentive to produce
mhp equipment on a scale that would allow for sufficient price reductions. In
theory, this was merely a simple coordination problem. A governmental actor
might have coordinated among the different actors’ and provided a focal point—
such as a simple introduction date—around which actors preferences could have
converged (see Garrett & Weingast, 1993). In the case of gsm standardization,
the European Commission demonstrated its ability to do so. Similarly, the
Commission might have concerted the introduction of mhp.
4.4 Conclusions
Despite the fact that more then 200 million dvb compliant products could be
sold in more than 40 countries to date, the case of European digital television
standardization through the dvb Project demonstrates the clear limits of private
industry standardization. This case study highlights the limited capacity of
directly competing companies to achieve sufficient levels of variety reduction by
agreeing to a single set of common standards where their technological prefer-
ences diverge. In the case of transmission, Conditional Access and Application
Programming Interface standards, the dvb Project failed to achieve sufficient
levels of variety reduction. This seems to have had devastating consequences for
the marked-led introduction of digital television as well as media pluralism and
diversity.
These findings suggest that under the following conditions, private standard-
ization processes are likely to fail where:
1. Companies have already made non-negligible pre-investments in diverg-
ing technological paths so that there is no scope for common, mutually
acceptable standards;
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2. Companies have diverging strategic interests and the decision-making pro-
cedure of the given standards-writing organization provides individual
companies with the opportunity to hold out agreement or to employ other
bargaining strategies provoking the failure of the process;
3. Individual companies or a groups of companies expect a deterioration
of their market position through the adoption of common standards and
therefore veto the adoption of that standard;
4. Network and scale economies allow individual companies to unilaterally
set de facto standards.
In these circumstances there still is a large scope for the potentially facilitating
role of public entrepreneurs.
Considering the fact that digital television standardization failed in rather
favorable circumstances—large and evenly spread gains, progressive voting
rules and the market oriented approach of the dvb Project—private industry
standardization can also be expected to fail in more favorable circumstances.
Furthermore, this case study demonstrates that neither non-intervention—only
backed by ex post regulation through competition rules—nor the shadow of hierar-
chy are adequate to improve the performance of private standard-setters. Instead,
this Chapter suggests ways and conditions under which targeted entrepreneurial
interventions might have led to superior outcomes.
This Chapter also demonstrates, however, that functionalist considerations
only play a limited role in public actors choice of policy strategy and instruments.
Opportunities to build political alliances appear to be more important than
functionalist considerations which policy instrument would lead to superior
outcomes.
Finally, this case study demonstrated demonstrates that far from being a
purely ‘technical’ issue, which can be safely delegated to technicians, the setting of
standards does in reality constitute a battleground on which a range of regulatory
philosophies, economic and political interests clash.
Chapter 5
Intermodal transport
This case study of European intermodal transport standardization investigates
the impact of the New Approach, already mentioned in Chapter 1. This policy
instrument was specifically designed to increase the influence of public actors
on private standardization processes and to depoliticize the regulatory process.
With the help of this instrument, the Commission sought to prompt industry
to develop standards for loading units—i.e. shipping containers—that could be
used interoperably across multiple modes of transport (ec, 2003b).
As the name suggests, the New Approach was a response to the ‘old approach’
to the harmonization of national regulations and standards, as set out in the 1969
General Programme on the Removal of Technical Obstacles to Trade. The removal
of technical barriers to trade through this legislative procedure turned out to be
too cumbersome and time-consuming (Egan, 2001, pp. 78-81), for it was often
held up by the politicization of technical aspects of legislation. As a result, the
decision-making process was often gridlocked.
The New Approach in turn was meant to overcome this problem by delegating
the ‘technical’ aspects of market integration to the European standards-writing
organizations. These include cen, cenelec and etsi. While this was also seen
as an opportunity to make use of the allegedly superior information of industry,
this was also expected to allow the European legislators to concentrate on the
political objectives, such as health and safety levels, of eu single market legislation,
without being held up the politicization of technical aspects. Thereby, the New
Approach was supposed to accelerate the completion of the single European
market.
In the light of the political contestation hypothesis developed in the introduc-
tory Chapter 1, the New Approach therefore represents a rather interesting case.
While it may de-politicize the European public policy-making process, it is rather
difficult to predict whether or not it would lead to a politicization of the tech-
nical standardization process instead. On the one hand, the New Approach does
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not raise the stakes of the game because mandated standards, like all technical
standards, remain voluntary. Therefore, a multiplication of veto players should
not necessarily be expected. On the other hand, like all secondary legislation, the
New Approach increases the number of veto points by directly implicating the ep
and Council in the standardization process. The two institutions need to specify
the ‘essential requirements’ that the standard has to fulfill. This makes it difficult
to make a prediction based on this thesis’ political contestation hypothesis. There-
fore, this Chapter investigates whether or not and, if so, to what extent the New
Approach can expose technical standardization processes to political contestation.
Furthermore, the case study of European intermodal transport standardization
provides an opportunity to investigate the impact of the so-called shadow of
hierarchy on technical standardization processes. The Commission threatened
industry to introduce further more coercive secondary legislation subsidizing or
mandating compliance with its preferred loading unit standard, if industry was
not going to agree to and adopt a single common standard. According to the
shadow-of-hierarchy hypothesis (Börzel, 2009; Héritier & Rhodes, 2011b; Héritier
& Lehmkuhl, 2008; oecd, 2003, 1999b; Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995), such a threat
should have prompted industry to intensify its standardization efforts in order to
prevent the introduction of more coercive secondary legislation. As suggested in
the introductory Chapter 1, however, such a threat should have raised the stakes
of the game thus increasing the number of veto players and reducing the scope
for agreement on common standards.
This Chapter is organized in two main Sections. Before this Chapter can turn to
the investigation of the Commission’s intervention, Section 5.1 provides important
background information on the international and historic context of intermodal
transport standardization; the inadequacy of international standards and the
resulting need for European standards; and how European standard-setters have
responded to this need. Section 5.2 describes and investigates the impact of the
European Commission’s intervention into intermodal transport standardization
via the New Approach and the threat of more coercive interventions.
5.1 The Success of International and the Failure of
European Standardization
5.1.1 International Container Standardization: An American GSM?
Standardization plaid a critical role in the international success story of container-
ization, which, in the words of Levinson (2006), “made the world smaller and the
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world economy bigger.” Europe, however, only played a minor part in this story.
Although the first freight containers were already developed at the beginning of
the 19th century in Europe and elsewhere, it was not until the 1958 when the
American Standards Association (asa) standardized its dimensions that the con-
tainer became an international success.1 With the help of government subsidies
the American standard container quickly gained a critical mass in the us and
than in the intercontinental deep-sea shipping (see Levinson, 2006, Chapter 7).
This demonstrates, once again, how a coordinating role governmental actors, as
in the case of gsm standardization, may provide the catalyst for network effects
to take over and to establish a given technology as the de facto standard.
When the us proposed its domestic container standard to the iso two years
later, European industry already found itself in the ‘second mover’ position. The
American standard had already achieved a significant installed base and proved
its ability to minimize shipping costs. Therefore, the European and other coun-
tries’ iso delegates had little choice but to adopt the American standard as the
international de jure standard. In 1968, the iso members agreed to the iso Series
1 containers, which were largely based on the American asa containers.2 The iso
container rapidly asserted itself as the de facto standard in international deep-sea
transport. Today, approximately 20 million iso containers are in international
circulation. (Studiengesellschaft für den kombinierten Verkehr, 2007, p. 36) and
all modern container ships and ports nowadays are optimized for the handling
of iso containers.
This episode, once again, demonstrates how a small and exclusive group of
standard-setters is able to set a standard for a large group of standard-takers. It
also confirms the assumption that technical standardization is unlikely to have
been possible had it not taken place in such a small and exclusive circle. Had
all the affected stake-holders with their diverging technical preferences for the
dimensions and design of the international loading unit standard—determined
by their domestic regulations on vehicle weights and dimensions or diverging
pallet sizes etc.—directly participated in the process it is unlikely that they would
have been able to agree to a single common standard. Only because a small and
homogeneous group of American companies was able to agree to a common
loading unit and, with the support of network effects eventually confront the iso
with accomplished facts, did the container standardization process succeed. The
1The container’s width (8 feet) was determined by road regulations and its length (40 feet)
was determined by railway regulations. These dimensions were also later adopted by the iso.
2The Series 1 iso standards defined the terminology, dimensions, ratings and identification
markings of containers. In addition to the 40 feet long container, 10, 20 and 30 feet length were
specified. In 1970, the corner fittings and minimum internal dimensions of general purpose fright
containers were defined.
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obvious price that had to be paid for this ‘success’ was that many actors ended
up with a container that was not compatible with their technical preferences.
1.2
0 m0.80 m
12.027 m
2.3
3 m
Figure 5.1: Pallet-loading capacity of the ISO 40 foot container
For instance, the international container standard did not take account of the
standardization work on pallets that had already been carried out in 1947. As a
result the iso container was incompatible with the standard pallets commonly
used in Europe.3 As illustrated by Figure 5.1, the iso Series 1 containers sacrificed
valuable cargo space. This is a critical determinant of transportation costs. The
marginal cost of transporting and handling not fully-loaded loading units tends
to be minimal. In container terminals, for instance, the price charged per crane
lift generally does not vary with the size, weight or load of the loading unit. Also
labor costs, the highest cost factor in road transport, do not increase with the size
of the loading unit. At the same time pallets could not be adapted to the new
container standard. Although wooden pallets would be relatively inexpensive to
replace, assembly lines and warehouses across Europe were already optimized for
the handling of pallets. Adapting these to the international container standard,
however, would be prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the ISO container is
uncompetitive with pallet compatible loading units in intra-European transport.
The iso Series 1 containers hence never gained any significant market shares in
intra-European transport.4 In international transport, including the transport in
and out of Europe, however, it is the uncontested de factos standard.
The success story of international containerization was like an American
gsm. While the us came too late in the case of mobile telecoms standardization,
the coordination provided by American government in the case of container
standardization provided the American container with a first-mover advantage
that eventually tipped the entire world market. In lack of leadership, Europe had
3One generally distinguishes between Euro- and uk pallets, however, this paper will only refer
to the former. Both pallets were also standardized by the iso but in competition to the Series 1
container. According to Egyedi (2000), they were intentionally left incompatible with the Series 1
containers.
4There appear to be two reasons why pallet-incompatibility has not affected the proliferation
of the iso container elsewhere in the world. First, several countries use different pallet sizes.
Second, iso containers are not always loaded with palletized goods. Particularly, in countries
where labor costs are very low, containers are still loaded and unloaded by hand.
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not choice but to pay th cost of adapting to the international standard.
5.1.2 The European Lack of Leadership
Instead of developing a single common standard for intra European transport in
response to the international container standard’s incompatibility with European
pallet standards, however, European industry responded in a largely uncoordi-
nated way. Multiple, largely incompatible loading units were developed, without
paying any attention to the loss of efficiency that this meant for the transport
system as a whole. Operators from each mode of transport—road, rail, short sea
and inland waterway—largely followed their own technical preferences in the
development of new loading units, as summarized in Table 5.1.
Rail and road transport operators, for instance, have no interest in stack-ability
as it is generally not allowed to transport containers stacked on top of each
other on European roads or rail ways. Therefore, road haulers have traditionally
preferred light-build loading units over more robust stack-able loading units
in order to minimize the tare weight of loading units in order to reduce fuel
consumption. Both road and rail transport operators also share an interest in the
maximization of payload by increasing the hight and width of loading units to
pallet-width, fully exploiting the limits set by Directive 96/53/ec on maximum
vehicle dimensions, in order to spread their fixed and labor costs over a larger
quantity of transported goods.
Table 5.1: Modal preferences
Stack- Top-lift- Tare Pallet- High
Mode ability ability weight width cube
Road X X X
Rail X some
Deep-sea X X X
Short-sea X X some X
Inland waterways X X
Combined transport some X X
While operators of all modes share an interest in the reduction of handling
costs, they have each found different solutions to this. Road haulers for instance
developed the so-called swap body. This unstackable loading unit owes its name
to four up-folding legs that made it possible to ‘swap’ them from one trailer to
another, or to leave them at a loading bay, without the help of a crane. This had
the advantage that road haulers could separate their fleet more flexibly from
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their loading units.5 The various versions of the swap body today account for
approximately 70% of all loading units used in intra-European transport.
Deep- and short-sea operators, for instance, were interested in stack-ability
of loading units. Moreover, almost all modern container vessels are fitted with
special cellular frames that match the width and length of the iso containers
to increase load stability at sea and to accelerate the (dis)charging process at
port. Therefore, they were relatively inflexible when it came to the width and
length of loading unit dimensions but they are open to extra high containers,
such as the so-called ‘high cube.’ Inland waterway operators, by contrast, tended
to oppose such higher containers for the hight of bridges and locks sets a limit to
the container dimensions that they can transport.
As a result of these diverse preferences, European transport operators devel-
oped an even more diverse fleet of loading units. Even the swap body, which
accounted for the majority of loading units used in intra-European transport was
subject to significant variations. “The chaos on this is the biggest abyss of all,”
Sol Katz, one of the pioneers of American container standardization, argued. “In
Europe, when it comes to containers there is no longer a standard, or even the
hope of a standard” (in Freudmann, September 15, 1998). This perception is also
shared by many Europeans.“We have an uncontrolled growth of diverse Euro-
containers that companies develop and enter into the transport chain” (Deutsche
Verkehrszeitung, 2003a, author’s translation), it was argued by Georg Waischnor of
the German Short Sea Shipping Council. Table 5.2 tries to shed some light on the
installed base of European loading units. In reality, however, the situation was
even more complex and unorganized than suggested by the complexity of Table
5.2.
The heterogeneity of loading units and the failure to achieve a sufficient
level of variety reduction had—and still has—devastating consequences for the
European economy and the environment alike.
5The swap body experienced its breakthrough with the development of pneumatic suspensions
for trucks in the 1970s. Trucks only had to deflate their suspensions to drive under the loading
unit suspended on its four legs. This was much quicker and less maintenance intensive than the
the mechanical systems that were originally used for the loading and unloading of swap bodies.
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1. It significantly increased transportation costs.6 The lack of interoperability
between systems often required the reloading of fright from one loading
unit to another, whenever national or modal boundaries were crossed, thus
defeating the purpose of containerization;
2. The excessive heterogeneity of loading units undermined automation, thus
jeopardizing potential efficiency increases even further;
3. The lack of standardization significantly increased the number of empty
back-hauls, exacerbating the problem of traffic congestion. Europe’s trucks
ran empty 35% to 40% of the time (Freudmann, October 21, 1999); and
4. It crippled the integration of different transport networks, undermining
the utilization of unused capacities of the rail, inland waterway, and short-
sea networks.7 Because of the high frictional costs involved in integrating
different modes of transport, a lot of fright that could be transported more
efficiently by alternative modes never leaves the road. Therefore, 72% of
all inland fright transport is still carried out by road (Eurostat, 2007, p. 68).
This does not only lead to a more road congestion but also increases the
number of accidents and environmental pollution.8
The failure of European standardization demonstrates the importance of a
public actor or entrepreneur in mobilizing and coordinating the development of
common standards. The divergence of preferences should not be misunderstood
to mean, however, that industry would not have been able to agree to a common
standard because their preferences were too diverse. The case of the us, where in-
dustry managed to adopt a single common standard, suggests that this could not
have been the case. While everyone had a strong interest in common standards,
which would significantly increase the overall efficiency of the entire transport
industry, each modal actor preferred its own loading unit to become the common
standard. This meant that although interests diverged each participant of the
intra-European transport economy had a common interest in standardization.
A public actor, like the European Commission in the case of mobile telecoms
6The European transport industry accounts for 7% of the eu’s gross national product (gnp),
7% of all jobs, which is quite large considering that it is merely meant to be an intermediary
(Eurostat, 2007).
7Air and pipeline transport also commonly regarded to constitute distinct modes of transport.
Therefore, they are deliberately excluded from this case study. Because they either require very
specialized loading units (round containers in the case of air transport) or no loading units at all
(pipeline transport) they generally do not play a role in intermodal transport standardization.
8The transport sector accounts for 30% of the Community’s energy consumption and the
maintenance and adaption of the transport infrastructure ties 40% of member states’ public
investment (Eurostat, 2007).
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(Chapter 2) and the first phase of hdtv standardization (Chapter 3), should have
been able to provide the necessary coordination and commitment to overcome
this divergence of interests. Initially, however, neither the European Commission
nor any other public actor intervened.
5.2 The Involvement of the European Commission
5.2.1 Agenda-Setting?
At first sight, the intervention of the European Commission resembled its agenda-
setting in the cases of mobile telecoms and hdtv standardization (Chapter 2 &
3).
First, during the 1990s, it identified the lack of common European standards
as the main policy problem in European transport. Faced with growing transport
volumes it was estimated that by 2010, the total volume of fright transport would
have grown by 38%, outstripping the capacity of the European transport system
(ec, 2001b, p. 11).9 It appeared clear that a better integration of national transport
systems alone would not suffice to meet the growing demand for transport
capacity.
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9Road fright transport would increase by 50% over its 1998 level, which translates into an
additional 156 billion ton-kilometers (ec, 2001b, p. 11).
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Secondly, the Commission identified the policy of intermodalism as a potential
solution to this problem. Intermodalism suggests that by combining multiple
modes of transport–air, rail, road, inland waterways, short and deep-sea–it is
possible to take advantage of each mode’s inherent economies. According to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd), from which
the Commission adopted this policy:10
Intermodal transportation is at the heart of global trade and provides the
arteries through which freight moves efficiently and cost-effectively across
oceans, along coastal and inland waterways, through ports and terminals, on
rail and by highways and roads. Global economic growth and development
could not be sustained without intermodal transport
(oecd, 2001, p. 14).
Intermodalism was supposed to unleash unused capacities, relieve pressure
on the existing infrastructure, reduce carbon emissions, traffic jams and ac-
cidents. “Better integration of transport modes is essential. This will mean
greater recourse to environmentally friendly and energy-saving modes offering
unused or potential capacity, more modal connections and greater interoper-
ability,” Directorate-General for Energy and Transport (dg tren) argued (ec,
1995). To achieve intermodalism, dg tren, suggested that common standards
needed to be developed, for the lack of common intermodal standards, Patrick
Mercier-Handisyde from dg tren argued, “creates friction costs, which makes
intermodal transport uncompetitive” (Freudmann, September 15, 1998). And in
its 1997 Communication on Intermodality and Intermodal Freight Transport the
Commission suggests that, “unless standards are harmonized . . . the growing
complexity of logistics requirements and the growth in international trade will
reinforce a tendency for transport modes to diverge, (and) the use of specialized
containers will increase the occurrence of their empty returns” (ec, 1997c, p. 8).
The Commission successfully assumed the first two agenda-setting functions.
However, the Commission does not appear to have played a direct role in the
mobilization of standardization coalition, the third function of an agenda-setter.
By the time that the Commission first took up the issue of standardization, a
group of companies that had specialized in the combination of rail and road
transport—and therefore became known as the ‘combined transport’ sector—
had already taken the issue in their own hands. As the transfer of freight
between different modes was at the core of their business, the combined transport
operators had a natural interest in intermodal interoperability. Initially they were
mainly concerned with the combination of rail and road transport but they also
10As the mobile telecoms (Chapter 2) and hdtv case studies (Chapter 3) showed, this case, too,
demonstrates the Commission’s ability to integrate new policy ideas from third parties.
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sought to expand their business model into other modes of transport eventually.
Therefore, they started to meet in the Technical Committee for “Swap bodies
for combined goods transport” (tc119) of cen to start working on common
standards. Particularly the German combined-transport community around the
sgkv (Study Group for Combined Transport) supported this development. They
pushed for the development of an intermodal loading unit based on the design
of the swap bodies.11 To be able integrate other modes of transport, such as
short-sea and inland waterway transport, and to decrease handling costs and to
increase the capacity of intermodal terminals, in which space tends to be scarce,12
however, they sought to diverge from the original design of the swap body by
making it top-liftable and stack-able.
This demonstrates that it is methodologically possible to distinguish between
outcomes that were achieved through agenda-setting and outcomes that only
appear to have been achieved through agenda-setting but were actually achieved
by the relevant agents themselves (see Chapter 1). In this case, agenda-setting did
not play a role for the combined transport community appears to have overcome
its collective action problems itself. Its ability to do so was based on two factors.
First, this was a case where a group of actors value the collective good so much
that they provide themselves, as for instance labor unions negotiate the collective
good of higher wages for members as well as non-members (see Olson, 1971).
Secondly, the combined transport community managed to gain control of the
standardization process and managed to reduce the cost of collective action by
developing container standards according to their own technical and strategic
preferences. As suggested in the introductory Chapter 1 and confirmed by
the mobile telecoms case study (2) the exclusivity of standardization coalitions
represents one of the main facilitating factors for the private development of
technical standards.
Participation in the tc119 was highly exclusive. The committee was domi-
nated by the combined transport industry. Operators from other modes did not
participate. Deep-sea transport had traditionally focused their attention on the
iso’s Technical Committee (tc)104 and the International Maritime Organization
(imo). Inland waterway transport, in turn, was generally not concerned with
technical standardization. Moreover, neither the companies themselves, nor their
industry associations have the financial resources, expertise nor staff to do partic-
ipate in formal standardization processes, an industry representative argued.13
11The sgkv is a think tank for combined transport, with close ties to the Union internationale
des sociétés de transport combiné Rail-Route (uirr) and fakra.
12Interview b9 with an offical of a national standardization organization (2009), citetInterview-
Sorgetti
13Interview b14 with a representative of the inland waterway industry (2009)
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Only the short-sea shipping operators occasionally participated, particularly in
the Dutch and British shadow committees.14
Also the organizational structure of the tc119 appears to have been biased
toward the combined transport community. The chair of tc119 was traditionally
provided by the uirr.15 The secretariat was hosted by the Normenausschuss
Kraftfahrzeuge (Fakra AA-D4) of din. The provision of the chair and the
secretariat meant a significant advantage to the combined transport community.16
According to the rules of procedure of cen, companies or trade associations are
not allowed to participate directly in the technical committees. They have to seek
representation through national delegates that are informed by their respective
national standardization organizations’ shadow committees.17 Through the chair
of the tc119 the combined transport industry was therefore the only industry
that was directly represented in the committee.
The exclusive membership and biased organization of the tc119 did not
only decrease the cost of collective action by allowing the standard-setters to
recoup some of their development costs by making sure that the developed
standards conformed with their technical and strategic preferences and that all
other actors had to pay the cost of adapting to that standard. The exclusive
and homogeneous membership of the tc119 also meant that there was a much
larger scope for mutually acceptable agreements on common standards than if
all modes of transports had actively participated.
5.2.2 Strategic Alliance
Although the European Commission does not appear to have mobilized the
collective action of the combined transport community, it welcomed its work
and identified the combined transport industry as its ‘natural ally.’18. As the
Commission, the combined transport industry had a strong interest in modal
interoperability. The competitiveness of their business model critically depended
14Interview b9 with an offical of a national standardization organization (2009). While the
chair or individual members of tc119 would sometimes informally consulted the waterborne
transport industries (Interview b8 with a representative of the combined transport industry, 2009;
Interview b9 with an offical of a national standardization organization, 2009), this happened at
their personal discretion only.
15Both tc119’s current chair, Martin Burghardt and his predecessor Dr. Christoph Seidelmann,
are/were employed by the UIRR.
16Interview b4 with a participant of cen’s tc119 (2009), citetInterviewLeGrand, citetInterview-
Burghardt
17The shadow committees’ of German, France and Italy are among the most active. While the
industry participation within the national shadow committees varies, the waterborne transport
industries tend not to participate (Interview b4 with a participant of cen’s tc119, 2009; Interview
b7 with a representative of cen, 2009; Interview b8 with a representative of the combined transport
industry, 2009).
18Interview b2 with a representative of the European Commission (2009)
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on it. Given their shared interests, a strategic alliance soon emerged between
the dg tren and the combined transport industry. Just as in the cases of
mobile telecoms and hdtv standardization (Chapters 2 & 3), companies used
this alliance to develop their non-market strategies, i.e. to create a favorable
regulatory environment for their businesses. The Commission on the other hand,
used the alliance with industry to get access to the invaluable technical and
market information that it needed to advance and defend its policies against its
institutional rivals—the ep and the Council.
Together, the Commission and the combined transport community managed
to install intermodalism as the dominant policy paradigm, which allowed it to
claim broad policy competences that went beyond the originally assigned task of
promoting the integration of the European transport market. And, largely upon
the pressure of the combined transport community, ‘modal shift’ was defined
as a main objective of European transport policy. It meant that freight transport
was to be shifted off the road, onto alternative modes of transport. The objective
of modal shift thus played directly into the cards of the combined transport
community. This was reflected most strongly in the 2001 White Paper, which
defined the target to reduce the market share market share of road haulage to
the level of 1998 by 2010 (ec, 2001b, p. 11).
With the political support of the combined transport community, the Com-
mission managed to push the Marco-Polo program—replacing the pact (Pilot
Actions for Combined Transport)—through the Council and the ep. With a
budget envelope of e 75 million, it was designed to shift 12 billion ton-kilometers
per year off the road by subsidizing of intermodal transport operations. The
Marco-Polo program was to be administered by the European Commission and
demonstrates how to the Commission the political alliance with the combined
transport industry was quite beneficial. Therefore, the concept of agency capture—
i.e. the capture of the Commission by the combined transport community—would
be too one-dimensional. It would neglect the fact that the alliance was mutually
beneficial.
The policy objective of modal shift, allowed the combined transport com-
munity to call for an increase of the regulatory burden on road haulers and to
improve its own regulatory environment.19. In a technical report prepared by a
hand-full of technical experts under the auspice of International Container Bureau
(bic), which stood close to the combined transport community, for instance, they
demanded that loading units specialized for road transport should be subjected
to the same minimum quality standards and maintenance requirements specified
19Interview b3 with a representative of the road haulage industry (2009), citetInterviewHuegel,
citetInterviewBerry, citetInterviewStockmann
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by the Convention for Safe Containers for sea transport. 20 Furthermore, the
experts suggested that loading unites used for combined transport should be
exempted from European regulations on maximum vehicle dimensions (Direc-
tive 96/53/ec) to give it a competitive edge vis-à-vis alternative loading units.
At the same time, the ‘technical’ report stated that:
The European Commission must keep a clear focus against the constant
pressure to allow greater road vehicle dimensions than given in European
Directive 96/53/ec and refuse such requests.
(bic, 2003, pp. 13–14).
Many of these recommendations were incorporated in the Commission’s follow-
ing policy proposals, discussed below.
With the formation of this political alliance with the combined transport com-
munity and the completion of the standards-development process by the latter in
the tc119, two further crucial conditions appear to have been met that should
have allowed the Commission to promote the market deployment of the loading
unit standards developed in the tc119. Instead of relying on entrepreneurial
policy instruments, such as the coordination of the market deployment, the solu-
tion of commitment problems and the mediation of decision-making problems as
in the case of mobile telecoms standardization, the Commission sought to rely on
more legally binding policy instruments instead.
uti-Norm, a Community funded r&d project launched 1998, was another
product of the alliance between the Commission and the combined transport
community. Formally, it was meant to support the development of a European
intermodal loading unit that met the technical requirements and preferences of
all modes of transport. In reality, however, the project was dominated by the
combined transport community. It was led by the combined transport community
represented through bic and the uirr.21 The European short-sea and inland
waterway industries did not participate. This misrepresentation was also reflected
in the project’s final report. It proposed a unit that was strongly biased toward
the technical preferences of the land-based transport modes in general and the
combined transport industry in particular. Although being stackable and top-
liftable, which is crucial for waterborne transport, it is too wide and too long to
fit into modern container vessels canal barges, reflecting the current work of the
20Only stackable loading units had to comply with this set of minimum standards. Swap
bodies were excluded. Therefore, particularly the combined transport community pressured to
the Commission to expand these rules to swap bodies to have the same regulatory burden on all
modes of transport (see bic, 2003, p. 11).
21They were supported by one German and one British consultancies Hannoversche Consulting
für Verkehrswesen, Transporttechnik und elektronische Datenverarbeitung, and Three Quays
Marine Services Ltd.
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tc119.22 The results of the project turned out to be the basis for the tc119’s
work.
After long negotiations the tc119 participants came to a preliminary agree-
ment on the basic parameters of a long and a short intermodal loading unit
in May 1997 (see Deutsche Verkehrszeitung, 1997). The units were supposed to
comply with iso stacking, top-lift-ability and rigidity criteria. To achieve the
necessary rigidity, the combined transport community even accepted a slightly
increased tare-weight. This choice did not result from the pressure of the deep–
and short–sea shipping industry but because their mass production made the
more rigid and heavier iso compliant corner posts (ISO 1496) and other relevant
container parts less expensive than lighter and less rigid components (Deutsche
Verkehrszeitung, 1997).23
In order to allow for better pallet accommodation, however, the tc119 com-
munity deliberately decided to diverge from the iso norms by increasing the
unit width in order to achieve better pallet accommodation. Only pallet-wide
loading units, it was argued, would make the unit competitive for road trans-
port. Therefore, it was deliberately accepted that the loading units would be
incompatible with modern container ships and terminals that are specifically
designed for the operation with narrower iso Series 1 containerss. A justification
commonly mentioned by the intermodal transport community was that the first-
best loading unit—“the egg-laying full-cream milk sow” (see International Union
of combined Road-Rail transport companies, 2004, p. 2)—cannot be realized in
practice. It would either have to be pallet-wide or iso-compatible and, because
of the important role of pallets in European transport, the tc119 community
suggested the former.24 At the same time, it was argued that these loading units
were specifically designed for intra-European transport. And if they were to be
used in international deep-sea transport they should simply be stowed above
deck, where this does not play a role (bic, 2003). As shown below, however, this
argumentation was not shared by everyone.
In February 2003, two month prior to the publication of Commission’s pro-
22uti-NORM suggested two units of the following external dimensions: 2,550 mm x 2,900 mm
x 13,600 mm and 7,450 mm respectively.
23Therefore, an initial proposition to limit stacking height and to sacrifice rigidity to make the
loading unit as light as possible, was discarded eventually.
24As mentioned below, however, this does not appear to have been the complete story. The
loading unit does not have to be either pallet-wide or iso compatible. The container manufacturer
GE SeaCo, for instance, has already developed an iso-compatible pallet-wide container. Because
of its thin walls, however, it damages very easily. Therefore, it is not very well liked among
shippers. Although this may be true, this shows that there are more technical opportunities than
suggested by the intermodal transport community. Several stakeholders have therefore complaint
about the committees lack of innovativeness and its failure to develop a body that is acceptable to
everyone (Interview b16 with a representative of the logistics industry, 2009).
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posal, discussed in Section 5.2.3 below, the tc119 formally approved the short
version as a Technical Specification (ts 13853). Two years later, in December
2004, cen also adopted the long version as an official Technical Specification
(ts 14993).25 There appear to have been two reasons why the two units were
initially not adopted as full European Norms but as Technical Specifications,
which are only valid for a maximum period of twice three years and which
do not require the withdrawal of conflicting national standards. First, the com-
mittee first wanted to see how the market would respond to these standards.
Secondly, the intermodal transport community did not want to adopt the final
version of the standard before the ensuing legislative process, discussed blow,
was completed. The two technical specifications could have been transformed
into European Norms at any time. There appears to have been sufficient support
for the two loading units within cen. This is proven by the fact that the two
technical specifications were successfully adopted through the same voting rules
that apply to the adoption of European Norms.26.
The formal agreement on common standards—if only in the form of Technical
Specifications provided a further demonstration of the facilitating role of exclusive
membership structures. Had more representatives of the deep–, short–sea and
road transport industry participated in the voting process, cen is unlikely to
have adopted these specifications. The deep– and short–sea shipping industry is
likely to have vetoed the specifications because the specifications were wider than
their preferred iso containers. And road haulers are likely to have voted against
the specifications because they were heavier than their preferred swap bodies.
Favorable Deployment Conditions
Despite the fact that the majority of the transport industry was not directly
involved in the development of these standards and despite the fact that they
were slightly biased toward the technical preferences of the combined transport
community, however, the conditions surrounding their market deployment appear
to have been quite favorable. It would not have been surprising had the standards
been deployed successfully in the market. The initial deployment conditions
appear to have been rather favorable.
25The explanation for these publication dates appears to be quite obvious. By adopting these
specifications around the publication date of the Commission’s proposal, the tc119 was hoping
to feed its technical specifications into the New Approach procedure discussed below, which
could potentially transform these standards into Harmonised Documents. This intention is
directly reflected in the reports prepared for the Commission by tc119 and bic. As Harmonized
Documents the two standards would enjoy a significantly stronger legal status and were hoped
to have a much stronger impact on the market.
2670% of the weighted votes, Article 6.2.1 of cen’s statutes) that is need for the adoption of full
European Norms and Technical Specifications (Article 6.1.5(b)
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First, both versions of the loading unit developed by tc119 appeared to
represent the state-of-the-art in loading unit design. Despite the fact the units
clearly reflected tc119’s bias toward combined transport operators—which
mainly manifests itself in the units’ comparatively large width; waterborne
transport operators would have preferred narrower units—both loading units
constituted a vast improvement compared with the existing units used in intra-
European transport for it combined pallet compatibility, with top-lift-ability
and stack-ability before. Particularly the last two aspects meant an important
concession to the interests of sea and canal operators. Therefore, the units offered
an opportunity to make better use of the combination of multiple modes of
transports, which is considered to more efficient than single-modal transport for
it exploits the economies of each mode.27
The two units allowed for large and broadly spread gains. The proposed units’
increased loading capacity should have outweighed all short term adaptation
costs. First, they offered clear advantages to regular swap bodies for they were
stackable and top-liftability. This did not only provide an opportunity to make
terminal operations for road and rail transport more efficient. It was also essential
for the better integration of short-sea and inland waterway transport into the
intra-European transport system. At the same time, the loading units developed
by in the tc119 were only slightly heavier, which was crucial for the tear weight-
conscious road haulers. Secondly, both the short and long version also appeared
to show clear advantages to the comparable 20 foot and 40 foot long iso Series
1 containers. Tables 5.4 and 5.3 show that despite relatively small dimensional
difference, the units offer significantly better loading capacity, both in terms
of gross mass and pallets. Whereas the comparable iso container can only
accommodate a maximum of 25 pallets, the large version could accommodate up
to 33 pallets, as shown in Figure 5.3. That would have meant an increase of 21%
in transport capacity.
Therefore, the basic constellation of interests at the time of the Commission’s
proposal was such that although actors’ technical preferences diverged (see Table
5.1), every actor should have preferred a standard that was not completely in line
with its preferences to no standard.
Therefore, not only the combined transport community but also road, rail
and canal transport operators could be expected to adopt these units. In the
short run, their relatively large external width may have posed some adaptation
27The quality of a technology, however, does not appear to be crucial for it becoming a de facto
standard anyway. The literature on the economics of the QWERTY-keyboard (David, 1986, 1985)
and water-cooled reactors (Arthur, 1989a) as well as the example of the iso Series 1 container’s
success story have demonstrated that a technical standard’s quality, or the lack thereof, tends to
have little influence on its market proliferation.
5. Intermodal transport 150
13.20 m
2.4
0 m
1.20 m
0.8
0 m
Figure 5.3: Pallet-loading capacity of the proposed European intermodal loading
unit
Table 5.3: Short TC119 unit vs. 20 foot ISO
Internal Internal Pallet Maximum
length (m) width (m) capacity gross mass (t)
Short EILU 7.20 2.40 18 16.0
20 foot ISO 6.096 2.33 25 30.4
Difference 0.65 0.07 7 14.4
Table 5.4: Long TC119 unit vs. 40 foot ISO
Internal Internal Pallet Maximum
length (m) width (m) capacity gross mass (t)
Long EILU 13.20 2.40 33 34.0
40 foot ISO 12.027 2.33 25 30.4
Difference 0.65 0.07 7 6.4
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costs to the waterborne transport industry. In the long run, however, all modes
of transport should have been able to benefit from the adoption of these units.
Especially the waterborne transport modes, facing short term adaptation costs,
should have been among the largest beneficiaries of the new units. The units’
pallet compatibility, stack-ability and top-lift-ability should have made it easier
to integrate these modes into the transport mix. The canal shipping industry
had traditionally suffered from the frictional costs involved in loading cargo onto
and off canal barges. Therefore, the canal shipping industry was—and still is—
operating below capacity while the capacity of the European road network had
long been exceeded. The units’ stack-ability and, especially their, top-lift-ability
was bound to decrease these frictional costs.
Secondly, the network effects that had established the American container
standard as the de facto international standard, might also establish the tc119’s
loading units as the de facto standard for intra-European transport. It is even
conceivable that the loading unit would have eventually penetrate the interna-
tional transport market. Once the units had achieved a critical mass in Europe
that allowed for the mass production and exploitation of scale economies, their
decreasing price should be expected to reinforce the network effects. Therefore,
non-European producers, particularly producers of low value-added goods that
mainly had to compete on costs, may be compelled to take hinterland transporta-
tion costs in Europe into account and switch to European Intermodal Loading
Unit (eilu)s.
The existence of a large installed base of loading units might weaken these
network effects but should not be overestimated. In intra-European transport
no individual unit had achieved a critical mass yet (see Table 5.5). Even the
most successful swap body had only achieved an installed base of around 55
thousand units, which is rather insignificant compared with the 1 million 20
foot and 40 foot iso containers in international circulation. And in international
transport the position of the traditional iso containers was not as dominant
as it seemed. The the number of non-standard containers such as the 45, 48
and 53 foot containers was growing faster than the number of conventional iso
Series 1 containers (Vasiliauskas & Bazaras, 2006, p. 234). This was explained
by the increased loading capacity that these new units appeared to offer. As
argued above, also the tc119 units could offer more loading capacity. Therefore,
the eilu would not be competing against the conventional 20 foot and 40 foot
containers with their installed base of no more than 10 million units but rather
the longer units with an installed base of only 120 thousand units (see Table 5.5)
(bic, 2003, p. 19). Moreover, also gsm and dvb standards had to compete against
an installed base of analogue units and nonetheless managed to use the inherent
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network effects to their advantage.
Table 5.5: Installed base of loading units (2003)
Loading unit Length Installed base (1,000s)
ISO container 20 ft. 4,993
Marine container 24 ft. 11
ISO container 30 ft. 12
ISO container 40 ft. 4,881
New ISO container 45 ft. 120
US domestic container 48 ft 82
US domestic container 53 ft. 43
European swap bodies 6 m – 7.8 m 253
European swap bodies 9 m – 9.2 m 29
European swap bodies 12.2 m – 13.7 m 55
Source: bic, 2003, p. 19
Third, the public support signaled by the European Commission represented
the last favorable deployment condition. As the role of American government
in international container standardization (see Section 5.1.1) and the role of
the European Commission in mobile telecoms standardization (see Chapter 2)
had demonstrated, that public actors may provide an important catalyst for the
exploitation of network effects. Whether and to what extent the Commission was
able to provide this support is discussed in the following section.
5.2.3 Hierarchical Intervention
New Approach Mandate
Despite these favorable deployment conditions, the European Commission sought
to boost the deployment of the tc119’s standards by giving them it a formal basis
in secondary legislation (Deutsche Verkehrszeitung, 2003a). In 2003, the Commission
made a formal proposal for a New Approach Directive mandating cen with
the development of an intermodal loading unit. While standards mandated
through the New Approach remain voluntary, a New Approach mandate tends
to strengthen the deployment of the mandated standards by entitling them
to free circulation around the eu. Individual Member States would not have
been easily been able to restrict their circulation for New Approach standards
are to be presumed to conform with the essential requirements as well as the
General Product Safety Directive 2001/95/ec and, in the case of intermodal
transport, Directive 96/53/ec on vehicle weights and dimensions etc. At the same
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time, the mandation of a European standard meant that conflicting standards
at national level had to be withdrawn. Moreover, mandated standards were
privileged in public procurement. Therefore, it was commonly expected that a
New Approach standardization mandate would give the technical specifications
already developed in the tc119 a boost.
The Directive was based on the New Approach procedure, a legislative inno-
vation from 1985 (European Council, 1985b), which was meant to accelerate the
removal of technical barriers to trade and to allow the European legislators to
take advantage of the superior technical expertise of private standard-setters.
It was commonly expected that by delegating the task of harmonizing techni-
cal standards to European industry’s technical standards-writing organizations,
would depoliticize and therefore accelerate the market-integration process. In
contrast to the ‘old approach’ of harmonization through technical regulation at
the legislative level, the New Approach left the development of the actual standards
to the private standard-setters themselves. The eu’s legislators—the Commission,
ep and Council—however, retained the right to specify the limits within these
standards could be developed. Therefore, standardization mandates were to
include ‘essential requirements’ to be fulfilled by the desired standards.
Officially, the proposed mandate stated that the advantages of the European
swap body and the iso Series 1 containers should be combined and that the
technical requirements and preferences of all modes of transport should be
accommodated (ec, 2003b). In practice, however, the essential requirements
suggested in the Commission’s proposal were directly based on the specifications
developed by the combined transport community in the tc119. Tables 5.3 and
5.4 provide on overview of the dimensions suggested by the Proposal.
This does not only demonstrate the influence of the combined transport
community but also the benefits that the strategic alliance with these companies
brought to the Commission. Without the technical information and support of
the combined transport community, the Commission would have been unlikely to
develop an equally detailed and technically sophisticated proposal. The combined
transport community, in turn, was obviously happy to provide this information
in order to have their preferred loading units adopted as the official European
standards. Given the reciprocity of this relationship it is not possible to speak of
regulatory capture.
Shadow of hierarchy
The Commission’s proposal for a New Approach mandate was accompanied by
an implicit threat that compliance with the eilu standard would be made
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mandatory and that other types of loading units would also have to comply with
the Directive’s essential requirements, if industry did not adopt the proposed
standard voluntarily. Industry perceived the threat to be very credible despite the
fact that the proposal stated relatively clearly that all types of loading units would
be allowed to remain on the market as long as they complied with the safety and
security norms defined in the international Convention for Safe Containers (1972,
Article 2(b) and Annex I), of which all eu member states were signatories.28
Only the mandated eilu standard, would additionally have to comply with the
dimensions and handling features specified in the proposed Directive (Article 2(c)
and Annex II). Very soon, however, rumors emerged that other types of loading
units would only be allowed to remain on the market for a transition period of
several years.
The Commission actively nourished these speculations by refusing to clarify
its future strategy. In a consultation paper, for instance, the Commission had
formulated the expectation that the old loading units would gradually disappear
from the market during the following five to fifteen years (ec, 2002), without
specifying whether this was going to happen through regulatory intervention or
market forces alone. At an open forum organized by cen, the Commission skill-
fully ignored all questions on this issue.29. The credibility of the Commission’s
threat was reinforced by the fact that over the years dg tren had gained the
reputation of superimposing legislation on industry.30
Moreover, it was widely expected that if the Commission turned out to be
unsatisfied with the market deployment of the eilu standard would be financially
subsidized by making eligibility to Marco Polo funding conditional on the use
of—and compliance with the—eilu standards. Moreover, industry expected that
Members States would be allowed to provide tax incentives and favor the eilu
standard in public procurement (Deutsche Verkehrszeitung, 2004).
According to the shadow-of-hierarchy hypothesis (Börzel, 2009; Héritier &
Rhodes, 2011b; Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008; oecd, 2003, 1999b; Mayntz & Scharpf,
1995), the Commission’s threat to introduce coercive secondary legislation should
have prompted industry to intensify its standardization efforts and to adopt
and comply with the proposed intermodal loading unit standard in order to
prevent the adoption of more coercive secondary legislation. The fact that the
Commission’s threat—though implicit—was perceived to be very credibly should
28While the Convention for Safe Containers already applies to iso Series 1 containerss, swap
bodies have been so far been exempted.
29cen (2003), citetInterviewBurghardt
30According to a Commission employee, dg tren had lost a lot of credit over the years because
of its top-down approach to policy making (Interview b2 with a representative of the European
Commission, 2009).
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have amplified this effectiveness of the shadow of hierarchy (Héritier & Eckert,
2008, p. 116).
5.2.4 Multiplication of Veto Players and Veto Points
The Commission’s intervention raised the stakes of the game for all actors in-
volved. Therefore, no group of actors could no longer afford not to get involved
the standardization process. Many actors that were previously not involved in the
standardization process started to participate. If the adopted standard ever was
to become mandatory, all affected actors wanted to make sure that the standard
was aligned with their technical preferences. Many actors, though they may
have endorsed the standardization process in general, also sought to prevent
that the mandation of compliance (see German Business Digest, March 1, 2004;
Deutsche Verkehrszeitung, 2003a). Therefore, the road, rail, canal and sea transport
operators, which were previously not involved in the tc119 started to participate.
The Commission’s intervention directly increased the number of potential veto
players.
The New Approach proposal also caused a multiplication veto points. As
mentioned above, New Approach mandates are decided on through the co-decision
procedure, thus directly implicating the ep and the Council. This provided the
eilu opponents with two extra veto points. These veto points appear to be far
more accessible than technical standardization committees, such as the tc119.
The participation threshold in the public policy-making processes appeared to
be much lower than that of technical standards-writing committees, such as the
tc119. While the tc119 would have required these new veto players to commit
significant amounts of time and resources, the cost of participating in the public
policy making process turned out to be much lower. The the formal industry
consultations of the Parliament and the Council as well as the information
dependence of policy-makers provided these new veto players with access to the
public decision-making process. A representative of the European Barge Union,
for instance, suggested in an interview that the inland-waterway industry would
not have the time, resources or expertise to participate in the standardization
process.31 In the political debate, by contrast, the European Barge Union was able
to play an active role and provide a range of policy recommendations. Instead of
drafting a technical report, delegating a technical expert to a national standards-
writing organization’s shadow committee to present and defend this report, and
hoping that the national committee would finally submit this report to the tc119,
actors such as the European Barge Union could simply telephone a Member of the
31Interview b14 with a representative of the inland waterway industry (2009)
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ep or national ministries to try to influence the outcome of the process. Therefore,
actors that had previously shied away from the high costs of participating, such
as the road, short-sea and inland waterways operators, joined the standardization
process.
The shadow of hierarchy, however, only was supporting rather than a nec-
essary condition for the multiplication of veto players. Without the shadow of
hierarchy, the issue may have lost some of its urgency to many affected actors.
While the New Approach alone may not have increased the stakes of the game, the
lower participation cost of the public-decision making process that was initiated
through it, however, changed the terms of the game. Some actors that chose not
to participate in the technical standardization committees because of the high
cost involved, may have used the opportunity to influence the outcome of the
standardization process by appealing to the public bodies of decision-making in
order to influence the definition of the essential requirements. Therefore, also
the proposal of the New Approach Directive alone without a shadow of hierarchy
looming over it can be expected to have led to a multiplication of veto players.
The increased number and heterogeneity of participants (see Table 5.1) had
two direct consequences. First, it destroyed the consensus that had existed in the
tc119 before the Commission’s intervention and that had facilitated the adoption
of the two technical specifications mentioned above. Therefore, cen never called
for a vote on the issue. And after a review of the ‘market responses’ to the two
technical specifications in January 2005, the tc119’s secretariat decided ‘to put
the issue on ice.’32
5.2.5 Deconstruction of the Policy Consensus
The second effect that the multiplication of veto players and veto points had is
that it also destroyed the policy consensus upon which the Commission’s inter-
vention was based. Directly in response to the threat of mandatory compliance,
the various industry players—the new veto players—started to appeal to the ep
and the Council—the new veto points. First, to undermine the legitimacy of the
intermodal transport community and the Commission’s proposal—which was
presented as an opportunity to increase the overall efficiency of the transport
industry—by emphasizing the (re)distributive implications of the proposed stan-
dards and by pointing out the weaknesses and inconsistencies in the intermodal
transport community’s argumentation to justify their technical choices. And
secondly, as discussed below, the eilu opponents launched an alternative policy
32Studiengesellschaft für den kombinierten Verkehr (2005), Interview b4 with a participant of
cen’s tc119 (2009), Interview b8 with a representative of the combined transport industry (2009)
and Interview b12 with a participant of cen’s tc119 (2009)
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paradigm co-modalism to challenge the dominant paradigm of intermodalism
upon which the Commission’s proposal was based.
The public decision-making process, it turned out, even allowed those actors
that would not have had the capacity to participate in the private standardization
process. The above-mentioned European Barge Union, for instance, was going to
play an important role in the public decision-making process. Below the different
actors argumentations are summarized briefly.
The European Barge Union, for instance, argued that because eilus were
wider than iso containers many barges would only be able to place three instead
of four loading units latter next to each other. This would mean a loss of loading
capacity of 25%. While this problem could be circumvented by adapting the
design of barges, as suggested by the combined transport community, the canal
transport operators argued that the eilus were still too high for most bridges,
ports and terminals. Therefore, the introduction of the eilus would not only
require massive private but also public investments (cen, 2003; European Barge
Union, 2004, pp. 19–21).
The European Rail Freight Association, for instance, complained that manda-
tory compliance with the eilus would reduce flexibility and threaten their
income stream from the transportation of iso containers (Hailey, October 6, 2003).
The road haulers, represented by the International Road Transport Union, argued
that the market rather than policy-makers should be allowed to decide which
standard to adopted (Deutsche Verkehrszeitung, 2003b).33 The deep-sea industry
also opposed mandatory compliance to be able to continue using its preferred iso
containers. Industry’s passionate response to the potential introduction of further
secondary legislation making compliance with the eilus standards mandatory,
also demonstrates how credibly the Commission’s implicit threat to do so was
perceived by industry.
The deep-sea shipping operators, represented by the European Community
of Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA), complained that the proposal failed to live
up to the expectation of combining the advantages of both swap bodies and iso
containers (European Community Shipowners’ Association, 2004). The criticism
was echoed by the European ports (see comments by bremenports, 2006, pp. 55-56;
European Sea Ports Organisation, 2003; Dempster, 2004; Psaraftis, January 22,
2004). As expected, the industry was one of the strongest opponents of the eilu
33Given their dominant position in intermodal transport—the last mile also tends to be deliv-
ered by road—this argumentation is hardly surprising. It resembles the market narrative of the
American equipment manufacturers in the case of third-generation mobile telecoms standardiza-
tion and the argumentation of the hd-mac opponents in the case of hdtv standardization. In
each case market lead standardization appeared to be more likely to lead to a selection of the
technical specifications preferred by these actors.
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proposal. The main reason for their opposition was that the eilus were too wide
and too long to fit into the cellular frames of today’s container vessels.34
The representatives of the deep-sea shipping industry also sought to challenge
the combined transport community’s justifications of the specific dimensions
of their preferred loading units, also reflected in the Commission’s proposal.
First, the latter had consistently argued that the eilu cannot be compatible with
both international containers as well as the pallets used in Europe. And since
the latter where much more important in intra-European transport, the eilu
should sacrifice container compatibility. A representative of the deep sea shipper
nen-Norfolk line, however, pointed out that there was a way to achieve both
by using the thin-wall technology developed by the container manufacturer ge
Seaco (see Peter Sijs cen, 2003). This was a significant blow to the credibility of
the combined transport community. It eventually lost control of the issue.
The intermodal transport community, by contrast, had always discarded
this option as unpractical because the thinner the walls the more vulnerable
to damage they would become. It was argued that this compromise was not
necessary because the eilu was too long to fit into the cellular frames below
deck of today’s container vessels, they would anyways have to be stowed on
deck, where loading flexibility is supposed to be higher (bic, 2003; cen, 2004).
Therefore, it was suggested unnecessary to make this compromise.
The shipping industry, however, pointed out that an increasing number of
container vessels are nowadays fitted with cellular frames that can also fit 45 foot
containers. Therefore, the eilu’s length did not provide any need to place it on
deck. Moreover and although the cellular frames do not extend above deck, the
width of containers were even more important on deck because containers need
to be directly lashed together. Therefore, the eilu would also be too wide for
on-deck transport. 35
The International Road Transport Union (iru), responded in a very nuanced,
though clearly negative way. It accepted the need for intermodal transport for
capacity reasons but rejected the Commission’s proposal for the economic impact
it would have on the road transport industry (International Road Transport Union,
2003). While it was not directly concerned about the units’ dimensions, the iru
took issue with its relatively high tare weight that resulted from its stackability
(see Table 5.1).
34Erik Hansen of Maersk Sealand, for instance, added that while the European container
fleet could probably be modified at a very considerable cost, this would render it inoperable in
international deep-sea transport where the iso containers will continue to be used (cen, 2003,
see).
35Interview b13 with a participant of cen’s tc119 (2009), Interview b18 with a container
manufacturer (2009)
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According to the International Union of Railways (uic), stackability, which
caused the higher tare weight, was an “expensive price to pay for potentially
very little benefit” as the rail industry only seldomly required stackability (uic,
2004). Like road haulers the railway industry criticized that stackability would be
interesting only in transport chains where inland waterway transport was used.
In all other cases, the non-stackable but significantly lighter swap bodies should
be used. The Community of European Railways added that the increased tare
weight would jeopardize the viability of rail-road combined transport services,
which mainly rely on the use of much lighter units (Community of European
Railway and Infrastructure Companies, 2005, p. 18).
Furthermore, the railway community pointed out that in some countries,
such as Italy and the uk, the eilus would be too high for many bridges and
tunnels (see response by the English, Welsh & Scottish Railway in Department
for Transport, 2003). Nonetheless, the railways demanded to increase the hight to
2,900 mm, if not more, in order to stay competitive against road haulers. A lower
unit would not be able to compete with the higher semi-trailer, for instance. For
that purpose many operators, had invested in low platform wagons that make it
possible to transport such high units anywhere in the eu (International Union of
Railways, 2003).
As mentioned above, the eilu opponents also used the political debate in
the arena of European politics to launch a new policy paradigm. Instead of
intermodalism they suggested co-modalism as an alternative policy paradigm. In
contrast to intermodalism, which implied the policy objective of modal shift and
the forcing of fright off the road, co-modalism had the objective of maximizing
the efficiency of each mode of transport in its own right. The underlying logic of
co-modality was that once each mode was allowed to achieve its full potential,
fright traffic would automatically shift to the most efficient combination of modes.
Instead of pushing freight traffic to what policy-makers deemed to be the most
efficient combination of modes of transport, the new policy objective was to
rely on the market pull of the mode that turns out to be the most efficient in
practice.36 In contrast to intermodalism, co-modalism did not provide a direct
role for government intervention.
The road transport and shipping operators used this counter narrative to
call for a revision of Directive 96/53/ec on vehicle weights and dimensions
to permit alternatives larger and longer loading units. Road haulers, on the
one hand, used this narrative to call for a exemption from the Directive to
36Interview b3 with a representative of the road haulage industry (2009), Interview b5 with a
representative of the road haulage industry (2009)
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start operations with the Gigaliner , a 25 meter long and 60 ton vehicle, which
breached Directive 96/53/ec.37 This was opposed by the rail and combined
transport industry, which feared to lose market shares to road haulers that would
be able cut in their long-distance fright transport business. Road transport
operators argued that even though the introduction of the Gigaliner might hurt
individual sectors of the transport industry it would be beneficial for society as a
whole by making road freight transport more efficient, safer and environmentally
sustainable (Smets, 2009; Lloyd’s List, 2009). Road haulers played on the fact that
in contrast to the anti-road bias of intermodalism and the objective to shift fright
transport volumes off the road, co-modalism was not categorically opposed to an
expansion of road transport, provided that it turned out to be more efficient than
alternative modes of transport.38
The sea shipping industry, on the other hand, employed the new notion of
co-modalism to call for an extension of the exemption that Directive 96/53/ec on
vehicle weights and dimensions had granted the 45 foot iso container (Brookes,
2006; Stares, 2006). After the expiration of the Directive’s exemption in 2007—ten
years after the adoption of the Directive—the 45 foot container would start to
breach Directive 96/53/ec for it exceed the allowed length.39 Therefore, the
Maritime Industries Forum, which included shipowners and the ports industry,
launched an aggressive lobbying campaign which build on the notion of co-
modalism to call for the continued permission of 45 foot containers in European
transport (Brookes, 2006; Stares, 2006).
The launch of an alternative policy paradigm constitutes a direct parallel to
the political contestation investigated in the case of European hdtv standardiza-
tion. There, the hd -mac opponents challenged the existing policy paradigm of
interventionist industrial policy with the paradigm of laissez faire. This confirms
that the political debate resulting from hierarchical policy interventions provides
opponents of European standardizations with an opportunity to challenge the
justifications for European standardization as well as the policy paradigm upon
which this policy is based. This does not even depend on the opponents to have
the better arguments. While in neither case this appears to have been the case, it
may even be concluded that the validity of the argumentations advanced in the
37Currently, the maximum vehicle length is 16,650 mm and the maximum weight is 40 tons for
road transport and 44 tons for combined transport.
38Interview b2 with a representative of the European Commission (2009), Interview b11 with a
Member of the European Parliament (2009)
39To give industry a chance to slowly withdraw the 45 footers from the market, a ‘grandfather
clause’ had been included into the Directive (Article 4(6)) in 1997. This clause allowed Member
States to permit the container on their roads for a transition period of ten years until 2007. Because
an increasing number of container vessels have adapted their cellular frames to accommodate 45
foot containers, however, the number of 45 footers used in European transport continued to grow
until the end of the transition period (Deutsche Verkehrszeitung, 2006).
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political debate does not matter. Opponents only need to propose an alternative
argument and paradigm to deconstruct the initial policy consensus upon which
the initial policy intervention was based.
As stated in previous Chapters, however, it is not this thesis’ intention to
assess the actual validity of these arguments. Instead it is more concerned with
the effect that these arguments have on the political debate. As could already be
observed in the hdtv standardization case study, the use of these arguments
allowed the opponents of the European standard to destroy the policy consensus
that had initially existed. This is not to say that they gained dominance over
the public decision-making process all together but they forced the Commission
and standardization alliance that had formed around the combined transport
community to justify their standardization decisions. Suddenly European stan-
dardization appeared less technical and more political than it had initially seemed.
This is not to say that the eilu opponents managed to convince all policy-makers
of their position. However, they succeeded to destroy the initial policy consensus
upon which the Commission’s eilu proposal was based.
As a result the Dutch Council presidency decided after only one round of
discussions that the proposal did not have sufficient support among the ministers
and removed it from the agenda.40 The ep initially endorsed the Commission’s
proposal. As a result of the debate and upon extensive lobbying by the deep-
sea shipping operators, however, the ep began to demand the eilu’s external
width to be decreased,41 so that it would fit into the cellular frame of container
vessels (ep, 2004).42 This obviously defeated the purpose of standardizing an
intra-European loading unit because such a container would not have been
pallet compatible, therefore rendering uncompetitive in intra-European transport.
Under these conditions, the combined transport industry lost interest in the
standardization process. Without the ability to develop the standard according to
their technical preferences, they would not have been able to recoup the cost of
developing the standard.
Therefore, the tc119 eventually had to put the project on ice.43 The combined
transport community could no longer control the nature and terms nor the locus
of and participants in the debate. And as it was no longer able to shape the
standards according to their own technical and strategic preference, the alliance
40Interview b3 with a representative of the road haulage industry (2009), Interview b5 with a
representative of the road haulage industry (2009)
41From 2,550 mm to 2,500 mm
42In its amended proposal from 2004, the Commission changed the width back to 2,550 mm
(ec, 2004d).
43Interview b12 with a participant of cen’s tc119 (2009), Interview b4 with a participant of
cen’s tc119 (2009)
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that was once providing the expertise and financial muscle for the standardization
process lost interest. This, too, constitutes a direct parallel to the case of hdtv
standardization, where the equipment manufacturers ceased to support the hd -
mac standard after the ep and the Council had watered down the secondary
legislation that was meant to support its market deployment.
5.2.6 Policy Shift
With the intermodal transport community, however, standardization did not only
lose its main supporter. The Commission also lost an important political ally,
upon which it depended for information and expertise. Therefore, their support
for the paradigm of intermodalism began to crumble. Individual members of
dg tren had embraced and used the paradigm of co-modalism for internal
organizational struggles within their dg. This, too, bears close resemblance to
the case of hdtv standardization where the newly emerged policy paradigm
of laissez faire was used by individual Commission employees to advance their
careers at the cost of those that had supported the old standardization policy
based on the interventionist paradigm. This group of Commission employees
formed an alliance with the eilu opponents and suggested co-modalism as a
more pragmatic alternative to intermodalism. After all, the 2005 midterm review
of the 2001 White Paper revealed how much effort the intermodal policy had
cost and how little impact it had. To strengthen their position within dg tren
they started to forge alliances with road haulers and the sea shipping industry.
After the appointment of a new Commissioner who sought to win the support of
this raising group of Commission employees, and as a result of a re-shuffling of
units and responsibilities within dg tren, the proponents of co-modalism were
suddenly stronger than the proponents of intermodalism.44
The rise of this new group of Commission officials and the emergence of new
political alliances with the road and short sea transport operators is reflected in
the Commission’s sudden willingness to reopen the debate on Directive 96/53/ec
on road vehicle weights and dimensions. Previously, the Directive was viewed by
the Commission as a Pandorra’s box (Seidelmann, 26 September, 2006). Remem-
bering the difficult negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Directive, the
Commission had always resisted to “open the floodgates to industry demands
for ever larger road vehicles.”45 Under the policy of co-modality, however, the
44Interview b2 with a representative of the European Commission (2009). The Commission
remains internally divided. Contrary to the general policy direction of dg tren, many officials
still pay lip service to the idea of intermodalism (Interview b2 with a representative of the
European Commission, 2009). Even Commissioner Barrot was reported to be skeptical about his
dg’s Gigaliners policy (Stares, 2008).
45Interview b2 with a representative of the European Commission (2009)
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increase of road vehicle dimensions was suddenly viewed as an opportunity to
transport more freight at a lower economic and environmental cost (ec, 2008c).
Upon the pressure of the Maritime Industries Forum (Brookes, 2006; Stares,
2006), the Commission therefore eventually published a communication that
‘reinterpreted’ the relevant clauses of the Directive (ec, 2006c). Although the
ep complained about the Commission’s unilateralism—“Could the commission
explain how it has changed the contents of a Directive of the European Parliament
and Council without amending the legislation?” (Stares, 2008)—the Commission
thereby allowed for the continuous carriage of the 45 foot containers in national
road transport operations. This led to the paradoxical situation where the shadow
of hierarchy, as the consequence of the resulting political contestation, led to less
rather than more rigorous regulatory standards.
Secondly, the Commission eventually withdrew its eilu proposal on March
25th 2008, suggesting that it was assessing alternatives to the eilus, namely the
Gigaliner (Dahm, 2009; Wahl, January 23, 2009). Therefore, the third manifestation
of the policy shift within the Commission is reflected in a more positive stance
toward the introduction of Gigaliners. Two studies commissioned by dg tren
confirmed the fears of the rail and combined transport sector. They anticipated
a clear drop of rail’s and combined transport’s market shares. An interviewed
Commission representative, however, argued that this was an acceptable price to
pay.46 The studies concluded that heavier and longer vehicles would be beneficial
for society as a whole, with road freight transport becoming more efficient, safer
and better for the environment (Smets, 2009; Lloyd’s List, 2009). Therefore, they
directly appear to fit into the gap opened by the new paradigm of co-modalism.
Both the exemption of the 45 foot container from Directive 96/53/ec as well
as the potential permission of Gigaliners, drew the last nail into the eilus’ coffin.
Compared with the 45 foot container and especially the Gigaliners, the eilu did
not provide enough loading capacity to be competitive.
The extent as well as the speed of the failure of the eilu proposal and the
policy paradigm shift that accompanied was rather remarkable. While the ini-
tial proposal of the Commission, which was based on the policy paradigm of
intermodalism, was meant to boost the deployment of the eilu and thereby to
pursue the policy objective of shifting freight transport volumes of the road, the
resulting politicization of the decision-making process led to a policy outcome
that seemed like the direct opposite of the initial policy objective. The dominant
policy paradigm was replaced by the new paradigm of co-modalism; the Commis-
sion and the combined transport community lost control of the standardization
46Interview b2 with a representative of the European Commission (2009)
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Table 5.6: Intention and Effect of the Commission’s Intervention in Intermodal
Transport Standardization
Intention Effect
Installation of the EILU as de facto
standard in intra-European transport
Competing loading units, such as the
45 foot container and the Gigaliner,
stronger than before
Reduce the market share of road
transport
Increased competitiveness of road
transport
Strengthening of the political position
of Commission employees adhering
to the policy of intermodalism
A new group of Commission
employees supporting the policy of
co-modalism is strengthened
process; instead of promoting the deployment of the eilu, the 45 foot container
and the Gigaliner turned out to be the winners of the standardization process;
and instead of weakening the road transport sector, road haulers were looking
forward to increasing market shares. This development conforms with Baum-
gartner’s and Jones’ (1993) theory of incrementalism and radical policy change.
When policy venues—or policy images—change, as happened in consequence
of the Commission’s proposal that shifted the standardization process from the
technical committees of cen into the arena of European politics, they suggest,
radical policy change is possible.
5.3 Conclusion
Considering the fact that the New Approach was originally intended to de-politicize
the decision-making process, the political contestation observed in this case study
is rather interesting. The Commission’s New Approach proposal did not only led
to a multiplication of veto players and veto points and thus politicization of the
technical standardization process. The politicization of the technical standardiza-
tion process also spilled over into the public decision-making process. The actors
and interests that were previously not involved in the technical standardization
process and/or would not have been involved actively pushed into the arena
of European politics to make their voice heard. Instead of going through the
technical committees of cen, they rather sought to influence the outcome of
the standardization process through the public decision-making process on the
essential requirements. This shows that it does not matter whether the technical
aspects of market integration are delegated to the standards-writing organiza-
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tions, as in the new approach, or whether they are directly negotiated in the main
European decision-making bodies, as in the old approach. Where the vested inter-
ests are too heterogeneous—and potential veto players cannot be excluded from
the decision-making process—there is unlikely to be an agreement an common
European standards/rules. This may explain the puzzling underperformance of
the New Approach. Since its introduction in 1985, no more than 30 Directives were
based on this procedure.
Furthermore, this case study also shows that the shadow of hierarchy con-
tributes to this phenomenon. By raising the stakes of the game, it contributes
to the multiplication of actors and interests reducing the scope for mutually
acceptable agreements in the standardization committees as well as the public
decision-making bodies.
In light of the fact that the New Approach proposal and shadow of hierarchy had
this effect in circumstances that should have rather undermined a politicization
of the process, as listed below, these instruments can also be expected to have a
similar effect in less favorable circumstances.
1. The proposed loading unit seemed to allow for significant improvements
in the efficiency of the European transport industry without making any
particular group of actors worth off in the medium to long run;
2. Standardization appeared to promise large and broadly spread gains to the
entire transport industry;
3. Initially the Commission’s intervention enjoyed the political support of the
ep as well as large parts of industry;
4. As a result of its close collaboration with the combined transport community
the Commission enjoyed a significant informational advantage against the
ep and Council;
Finally, it may be concluded that if even such modest or indirect forms of
hierarchical policy intervention, such as the New Approach and the shadow of
hierarchy, cause a politicization of the standardization process, also the more
direct hierarchical interventions will also have this effect.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis demonstrated that public actors can play a decisive role in private
standardization processes. In fact, public interventions even tend to be necessary
where the private development of technical standards is constrained by collective
action and decision-making problems.1 Without the facilitating interventions of
public actors, technical standardization would fail—i.e. no common standard
would be adopted and deployed. To be able to facilitate the private development
of technical standards, however, public actors need to rely on entrepreneurial
rather than conventional policy instruments that are based on the power of
institutional hierarchies or hard law. Due to their lack of formal powers, how-
ever, entrepreneurial policy interventions only turn out to have an effect where
a number of conditions are met. These conditions include early intervention,
the presence of industry crisis and the presence of positive feedback mecha-
nisms (see Section 6.2). Unlike conventional policy instruments that are based
on institutional hierarchies and the power of hard law, policy entrepreneurship
protects technical standardization processes from political contestation by rival
companies—i.e. veto players—and rival public actors—i.e veto points (see Section
6.3). Entrepreneurial interventions tend to pass underneath the radar of conven-
tional politics and public entrepreneurs may contribute to the insulation of private
standard setters from political contestation. Such entrepreneurial interventions,
however, raise serious concerns about the democratic legitimacy of this processes
(see Section 6.4). These findings are elaborated in greater detail below.
The findings of this thesis, however, do not only speak to the literature on
technical standardization. Despite its narrow focus, the findings of this thesis
may also apply to a wider universe of cases and contribute to a variety of debates
1This thesis suggested that these constraints are often present. Where they are not, however,
private standard-setters may very well be able to develop the desired standards themselves. Also,
this thesis cannot exclude and does not argue that there are other ways through which private
standard-setters might overcome these constraints.
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beyond technical standardization.
This concluding Chapter is organized around the main themes of this thesis.
The failures of private standardization (Section 6.1), the conditions of public
intervention (Section 6.2), the failures of public intervention (Section 6.3), and
the legitimacy dilemma of technical standardization (Section 6.4). Section 6.5
returns to one of the puzzles of European standardization, which was mentioned
in the introduction 1. It interprets the high number of European standards and
addresses systemic differences between European and us American standard-
ization. Each section summarizes the main findings and elaborates potential
contributions to the wider literature.
6.1 The Failures of Private Standardization
6.1.1 Findings
Although potentially being based on superior information and technical exper-
tise, this thesis demonstrated that private technical standardization is not as
successful as it may seem—or as it may be presented. The failures of private stan-
dardization were well illustrated in the case study of digital video broadcasting
standardization (Chapter 4).
Despite the fact that more then 200 million dvb compliant products could be
sold in more than 40 countries to date, the case of European digital television
standardization through the dvb Project demonstrated the clear limits of private
industry standardization. This had devastating consequences for the marked-led
introduction of digital television as well as media pluralism and diversity. The
dvb Projects’ failures suggests that, under either one of the following conditions,
private standardization is likely to fail:
1. Companies have already made non-negligible pre-investments in diverging
technological paths at the time of standardization, so that there is no scope
for common mutually acceptable standards;
2. Companies strategic interests diverge and the decision-making procedure
of the given standards-writing organization provides individual companies
with the opportunity to hold out agreement or to employ other bargaining
strategies provoking the failure of the process;
3. Individual companies or a groups of companies expect a deterioration
of their market position through the adoption of common standards and
therefore veto the adoption of that standard;
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4. Network and scale economies allow individual companies to unilaterally
set de facto standard.
dvb standardization failed despite the fact that it took place in rather favorable
circumstances. The gains from standardization were relatively large and evenly
spread; the dvb Project is generally considered as one of the most progressive
standards-writing organizations that introduced majority voting and a market
oriented approach; and Member States’ governments had a strong fiscal interest
in a smooth transition from analogue to digital television as this allowed them to
free up and sell valuable radio spectrum to telecoms service providers. Because
of the fact that digital television standardization failed in these rather favorable
circumstances, the private industry standardization can also be expected to fail in
more favorable circumstances where the above mentioned conditions are present.
The failures of the dvb Project also demonstrate that the high number of
technical standards produced by private standardization organizations cannot
necessarily be interpreted as an indicator for the superior governance capacity
of this form of private rule-making, as argued by Mattli and Büthe (2007) and
Blind (2004). The sheer number of technical standards produced may just as well
be a sign for the failure of private standard-setters to achieve sufficient levels of
variety reduction.
While this failure itself is not necessarily a direct argument for government
intervention—though the following Section will argue that it is—it is not an argu-
ment for the capacity of private governance through technical standardization
either. Moreover, this case study (Chapter 4) demonstrated that where important
public interests are at stake—such as media pluralism and diversity—private
standard setters/industry cannot be trusted to take these into account. There-
fore, there does appear to be some functional scope—and potentially even the
normative need—for government intervention.
6.1.2 Potential contribution: The Scope for Self-Regulation and
Private Governance
The second lesson that may be learned from this study of technical standardization
is that, in the absence of facilitating interventions by public actors, self-regulation
or private governance is difficult. In addition to the well known compliance issues,
the case of technical standardization suggests that the private development of
common self-regulatory measures is difficult too. It tends to be constrained by
significant decision-making problems. These decision-making problems can also
be expected to be present in other cases of co– or self–regulation where two
conditions are met. First, the given regulatory objective can be achieved by more
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than one regulatory measure but companies—i.e. self-regulators—need to agree
to one common regulatory measures to achieve this objective. And secondly,
companies’ preferences with regards to which measure should be chosen diverge.
The need to agree to common self-regulatory measures is not particular to
the case of technical standardization. Also in the case of regulating minimum
or maximum quality levels, for instance, it is often necessary to agree to a single
quality level, even if the way how these levels may be achieved is not specified.
On the demand side, the coexistence of different quality levels would lead to,
or fail to solve, the Akerlofian information asymmetries (Akerlof, 1970). On the
supply side, races to the bottom or the top could be the result.
Also the divergence of preferences with regards to which specific regulatory
measure is chosen is not specific to the world of technical standardization. Al-
though industry is often wrongly conflated into a unitary actor that has one
objective, which is to thwart regulation,2 companies regulatory preferences often
tend to diverge, also—but not exclusively— with regards to the level of regula-
tion, i.e. public, self- or co-regulation. Market insurgents, for instance, can be
expected to oppose self regulation where this gives the incumbent market players
an over-proportional influence over the content of regulation. The liberalization
of national utilities markets—i.e. telecoms, gas, electricity etc.—provided many
examples for a divergence of companies’ regulatory preferences with regards to
the level of regulation. Industry also often tends to have diverging preferences
as to the rigor and content of regulatory measures. Whenever this is the case,
the development of self– or co–regulatory measures can be expected to be con-
strained by significant decision-making problems. Therefore, the join-decision
trap that is considered to constrain public decision-making (Scharpf, 2006), can
also be expected to undermine private decision-making, which has been largely
overlooked by the governance literature.
In sum, self-regulation per se cannot be expected to lead to better and more
responsive regulation. This study showed that regardless of the issue of compli-
ance and the fact that industry’s preferences may be incompatible with the public
interest, which tend to dominate the debate on self-regulation, self-regulation is
difficult for it is constrained by significant collective action and decision-making
problems. Therefore, the delegation of regulatory authority from public to pri-
vate rule-makers simply tends to replace public decision-making problems with
private decision-making problems. These private decision-making problems can
be expected to become more visible and common given the trend toward new
forms of co-regulation in which public actors simply specify what goals are to be
achieved through co-regulation and let industry to decide how to achieve these,
2See Bartolini (2011, p. 9), Héritier and Eckert (2008) and Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2011, p. 55)
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as observed by (Jordan, Wurzel, & Zito, 2005, p. 483). Several authors encourage
such ‘norm setting’ by private companies rather than ‘norm consumption’ be-
cause it allows governance to be more flexible more cost effective (Héritier, 2002,
p. 11; T. Porter, 2005, p. 222). This thesis, however, raises serious doubts whether
this is always the case.
6.2 The Conditions of Public Intervention
6.2.1 Findings
Given the collective action and decision-making problems of private standard-
setting, there is some scope for public interventions to facilitate the privet devel-
opment of technical standards. However, the ability—and willingness—of public
actors to facilitate the private development of technical standards depend on a
number of conditions. Public actors need to limit themselves to non-hierarchical,
entrepreneurial policy instruments. This thesis distinguished between three en-
trepreneurial instruments: First, agenda-setting during the mobilization phase of
the standardization process. Second, consensus building and conflict mediation
during the development and deployment phases of the process, and finally, the
insulation of technical standardization from political contestation. These three
types of entrepreneurial interventions are discussed below.
Where public actors rely on the power of institutional authority or hard
law, by contrast, the next Section (6.3) will show, they only expose technical
standardization processes to political contestation.
Public Agenda-setting in Private Standardization
The empirical investigations of this thesis suggest that agenda-setting may not
only work in public policy-making but also in private rule-making—i.e. public
entrepreneurs set the agenda of private rule-makers, rather than the other way
round. In the investigated case studies—gsm, umts, and the first stage of hdtv
standardization—this thesis showed that the European Commission was able to
perform all three vital functions of the agenda-setter:
1. Identification of standardization problems: In each of the three investigated
cases the European Commission identified the European industry’s lack
of competitiveness as the main problem. As the root of this problem the
Commission identified comparatively small degree of scale economies of
the not-yet-integrated national markets. The lack of scale, the Commission
argued, did not allow European industry to compete with its international
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competitors in the us and Japan that could build on much larger integrated
markets. Especially in the ict sector, where economies of scale have a
particularly strong impact on market success due to high fixed costs, the
European industry’s lack of scale was considered to be fatal.
2. Proposition of standardization solutions: As a solution to the lack of scale
economies, the European Commission proposed the collaborative devel-
opment of common European standards. The Commission suggested that
common standards would allow European companies to pool their r&d
expenses and to create the returns to scale that were necessary to regain
international competitiveness.
3. Mobilization of standardization coalitions: This turned out to be the most
difficult task of the agenda-setting process. In each case, the Commission
appears to have proceeded on the basis of trial and error. Before it eventually
succeeded to mobilize potent standardization coalitions, had to go through
a lengthy process of trial and error. It approached several groups of actors
before it eventually succeeded to mobilize potent coalitions. In each case,
the standardization coalitions conformed with the hypothesized exclusivity.
They were each relatively small and homogeneous. As argued above,
a precondition for the overcoming of the inherent collective action and
decision-making problems.
In each case, the mobilization of a standardization coalition was helped by
an acute sense of industry crises. Industry saw its international competitiveness
declining. In consumer electronics, European industry had just experienced de-
feat in the video-cassette standards war. In the second generation telecoms case,
the deregulation of at&t in the us, was perceived as a great threat because it
allowed the newly privatized company to move into foreign markets, such as the
European one. In the case of third generation mobile telecoms, the rise of Chinese
competition in mobile telecoms had such an effect. As these crises forced the
industries’ leaders to reconsider their existing strategies and to come up with new
ones, the crisis opened a window of opportunity for the Commission to convince
companies of its problem analysis and to propose the collaborative development
of common European standards as the solution to industry’s problems. In the
case of hdtv standardization, for instance, it was not until Japan proposed to
adopt its domestic technology as the international standard at the ccir, that the
Commission was able to mobilize collective action. The Commission skillfully
reinforced this perception of crisis by emphasizing the threat of foreign—mostly
American and Japanese—competition to underline the need for a collaborative
European response. In the case of third-generation telecoms standardization,
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this also allowed the Commission to maintain its influence on Europe’s telecoms
industry despite the fact that the success of gsm had transformed European com-
panies into global players. By emphasizing the threat of Japanese and especially
Chinese competition, which could soon challenge Europe’s dominant position
the Commission managed to convince companies to continue to collaborate on
common standards. Therefore, the initial hypothesis that industry crisis was a
necessary condition for public entrepreneurship to succeed could be confirmed.
The Commission’s successful performance of the three basic functions of the
agenda-setter in second– and third–generation mobile telecoms as well as hdtv
standardization also demonstrates how public entrepreneurs may overcome their
alleged information problems. Clearly, the problems and solutions were neither
very innovative nor was the Commission likely to have been the first to have
discovered these. The notion that scale economies were important to industry
competitiveness, for instance, was an old idea which could not have been new
to the leaders of European industry and the makers of national industrial policy.
The fact that technical standards could be used strategically should not have been
new to them either. As the critics of entrepreneurship and agenda-setting theory
have rightly pointed out (see Moravcsik, 1999, p. 272), the entrepreneur—i.e. in
this case the Commission—did not possess an informational advantage over those
it sought to influence.
What was new, however, was the context in which the Commission presented
the various ideas. The idea to open up national markets through the definition
of common European standards, for instance, was radically new in strategic
industries like telecoms, which used to be governed by the principals of mo-
nopolization and public ownership. Surely, the idea of market integration had
been around since the Treaty of Rome and before. The telecoms sector, as most
network industries and utilities, however, had long been off limits. To the in-
dustry leaders, especially in the telecoms and consumer electronics industries,
however, this was mostly seen as a threat to challenge their domestic market
position rather than to strengthen their position in international markets. This
also becomes particularly clear in the field of technical standardization, where
national standards were mostly used to protect rather than to expand domestic
markets. Like the business entrepreneur, described by Schumpeter (1939, p. 102),
who combines preexisting factors of production in a way that makes it possible to
either produce a new product or to produce an existing product more efficiently,
the public entrepreneur combines existing policy problems, solutions and actor
coalitions to create something new.
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Consensus Building, Conflict Mediation and Managing Commitment
The European Commission also had a decisive influence during the subsequent
stages of the standardization process. It was able to facilitate private decision-
making on technical standards in three ways:
1. Consensus building;
2. Conflict mediation; and
3. Ensuring commitment.
Without its successful agenda-setting during the first phase of the standardization
process, however, the Commission would not have been able to assume these
three functions.
At each stage, the entrepreneurial leadership of the European Commission
was instrumental in building a basic understanding and consensus among the
standard-setters upon which the gsm and umts standards were build. It did so
in two ways.
First, it prompted companies to start to collaborate on the development of
common standards at a comparatively early point in time, namely still during the
r&d phase. In both cases the Commission achieved this by setting the agenda at a
sufficiently early point in time. Thereby, it was ensured that companies followed
a common rather than diverging paths of technological development. This
minimized the divergences of technological preferences as companies developed
a single technology from the beginning. In each case, this left a much larger
scope for a mutually acceptable agreement on a single technology for a common
standard, rather than several technologies and competing standards. Both in the
case of gsm and umts standardization (Chapter 2), they quickly managed to
agree to the technological basis of these two standards. This stood in stark contrast
to the cases of dvb as well as intermodal standardization where companies
arrived at the negotiation table with diverging technological preferences. The
cases of dvb and intermodal transport standardization demonstrate how difficult
it may be to achieve a consensus on a single technology as the basis of a common
standard once technological preferences have started to diverge.
The second way in which the Commission facilitated consensus building was
to push the standardization process into technocratic, rather than political or
company-strategic venues, such as the technical committees of standards-writing
organizations or the research committees of large European r&d programs. The
Commission emphasized this effect by organizing the provision of pre-normative
r&d subsidies to the standard-setters. These venues provided comparatively
6. Conclusion 174
large scope for mutual learning rather than strategic bargaining. And they even-
tually produced epistemic communities among the technical experts that were
involved in these committees. These epistemic communities had a particularly
strong influence on the gsm standardization process, contributing to the overcom-
ing of a decision-making conflict that had emerged over the choice between two
different variants of technological basis of the gsm standard by simply adopting
one variant as their working hypothesis and discontinuing the development of
the other.
Without the early intervention of the European Commission, however, this
intervention would not have been possible. Therefore, early intervention is a
necessary condition for the entrepreneurs ability to build consensus. Also the
emergence of the epistemic communities of engineers and technical experts,
which turned out to be a driving force in the observed standardization processes,
depends on the early intervention of an entrepreneur. They too can be expected
to suffer from collective action problems. Therefore, it requires an entrepreneur
to mobilize them. And because epistemic communities do not form over night it
is important that this happens relatively early.
During the development of the gsm and umts standards, the Commission
also appears to have resolved decision-making conflict between the standard-
setters on two variants of the technological basis of gsm and umts. Through the
proposal to adopt a ‘basket standard’ incorporating features of the two variants
of the technologies proposed (Bach, 2000), the Commission provided a ‘focal
point’ around which the negotiators preferences could converge (see Garrett &
Weingast, 1993).
Finally, the Commission’s intervention in gsm standardization demonstrated
that public entrepreneur can also exert a strong influence on private standardiza-
tion processes by ensuring the commitment among standard-setters and standard-
takers. By negotiating a mou that committed all relevant actors to a common
market deployment strategy, the European Commission helped to concert the
introduction of gsm without having to rely on hierarchical, positive or negative
sanctions.
Again, however, neither of these intervention were possible without the
Commission’s early intervention during the r&d phase. Compared to the case
of Conditional Access standardization, for instance, the divergence of interests
was relatively modest. Companies had already agreed upon the technological
bases of gsm and umts. Only with regards to the specific variants of these
technologies, their preferences diverged. This would not have been the case had
not the Commission brought the standard-setters together during the r&d phase.
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Therefore, early intervention can also be considered a necessary condition for the
entrepreneurial conflict mediation as well as the management of commitment.
The evidence presented by the second– and third–generation mobile telecoms
standardization cases suggests that the adoption of common standards would
not have been possible without the Commission’s role in building consensus,
mediating bargaining conflicts and managing commitment. Without its agenda-
setting at a sufficiently early stage, however, it would not have been able to
play any of these roles. Once again, this underlines the importance of early
intervention for public entrepreneurship to have an effect.
Through the combination of, first, agenda-setting and then, subsequently
mediating bargaining conflicts and managing commitment, the European Com-
mission helped European standard-setters to gain a first-mover advantage for
gsm and umts against competing American, Japanese and Chinese standards.
This, too, underlines the crucial importance of early policy interventions. Through
its consensus building and conflict mediating roles it made sure that this first-
mover advantaged was not lost right away. While American standard-setters
were still fighting over the selection of the American mobile telecoms standard,
European industry had already agreed to a single standard and start to deploy it.
The Commission’s role in concerting the deployment by committing all market
participants to a common introduction schedule helped to quickly gain a critical
mass of consumers for gsm and umts. From this point onward, the deployment
of the two standards was driven by self-enforcing positive feedback effects. Once
the critical mass of consumers had been achieved reached network effects tipped
the European market toward the European standards. The European market
then provided scale economies, which by decreasing the price of the European
standards reinforced network effects internationally, until the entire global market
was locked into the European standard. The American, Japanese and Chinese
standards who arrived later did not stand a chance.
Therefore, the cases of gsm and umts as well as the case of American inter-
modal transport standardization, as discussed briefly in the context of intermodal
transport case study (Chapter 5), all suggest another necessary condition, namely
the presence of positive feedback mechanisms, such as network effects, which
cause compliance with these standards to be self-enforced. Once a critical mass
is achieved, network effects lead actors that excluded from the definition of the
standard as well as actors that might have even preferred an alternative technol-
ogy as the basis of the standard to comply with it. So the European Commission
served as the catalyst that triggered this positive feedback process. Section 6.2.2
below elaborates the contributions that this thesis may make to the literature(s)
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on positive feedback mechanisms.
Insulation from Political Contestation through Policy Entrepreneurship
By relying on entrepreneurial rather than hierarchical policy instruments (see
Section 6.3 below), the European Commission was able to insulate the technical
standardization processes from political contestation by rival actors and interests.
In contrast to the European Commission’s hierarchical interventions in hdtv
and intermodal transport standardization, which are discussed in the following
Section (6.3), its entrepreneurial interventions in mobile telecoms standardization,
however, did not alarm rival standard-setters and non-participating but poten-
tially affected companies. Therefore, these potential veto players did not mobilize
against the Commission’s intervention. And since they do not rely on the power
of hard law or institutional hierarchies they do not directly implicate other politi-
cal institutions—i.e. veto points—such as the Parliaments and the courts. Neither
in the case of second– nor third–generation mobile telecoms standardization did
the Commission’s intervention expose the standardization process to political
contestation. In the case of hdtv, the political contestation only began after the
Commission had started to use hierarchical policy instruments.
Both in the cases of mobile telecoms and the first phase of hdtv standard-
ization, the Commission also actively contributed to the insulation of technical
standards-writing processes from broader public participation and political in-
terference. In both cases it provided standards-setters with a narrative justifying
their work and defending their isolation from broader participation and political
interference. It managed to link standardization to widely accepted core political
objectives, such as industrial competitiveness and economic growth, objectives,
which are hard to contest. Given its elevated position in European politics, this
was much easier for the Commission than standard-setters themselves. Further-
more, the Commission deemphasized potentially normative and (re)distributive
implications in the debate and emphasized the purely ‘technical’ nature of the
issues, implying that standardization was merely concerned with the solution of
technical problems and the realization of technological progress.
The Commission also assisted standard-setters in the creation of institutional
structures insulating the standard-setters from broader participation. In the case
of hdtv standardization, it helped set up the e !95 project within eureka, which
allowed the tv set manufacturers to control the standardization process and
merely gave broadcasters and content providers with an affiliate status without
voting rights. In the case of mobile telecoms standardization, the Commission
helped transfer the gsm project from the ptt-controlled cept to the industry-
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driven etsi. This step proved to be critical in that it allowed France Telecom,
Alcatel, aeg and Siemens to accept the technological solution preferred by Scan-
dinavian industry against the pressure of the French and German governments.
The insulation from broader participation allowed the standard-setters to
develop the given standards in relatively small and homogeneous groups of
companies, which minimized the risk of bargaining problems to emerge and
increased the scope for mutually acceptable agreements on common standards. If
all affected stakeholders had participated, it is unlikely that they would have been
able to agree to single common standards. Moreover, the exclusiveness allowed
standard-setters to recoup the costs of developing the standards by using them
strategically. The implications for the democratic legitimacy of such technical
standardization processes are discussed in Section 6.4 below.
6.2.2 Potential Contribution: Changing but Persistent Role of
the State
Furthermore, there are a number of conclusions that may be drawn from this
thesis investigation of the role of the European Commission in technical stan-
dardization for the role of government in the governance of increasingly complex
markets characterized by an accelerating pace of technological change and eco-
nomic internationalization more generally. This thesis suggests that public actors
are still to be reckoned with. First, public actors can be expected to intervene in
such private processes where this allows them to draw political capital out of such
interventions, regardless of their functional problem-solving abilities. Secondly,
the private decision-making problems, described in the preceding Section (6.1.1),
suggest that there may be a functional need for public actors to in private rule
making-processes, if only in a entrepreneurial and facilitative way. Wherever
such decision-making problems are present, a public entrepreneur may be able to
play a role similar to that of the European Commission discussed in this thesis.
Given the fact that the entrepreneurial interventions described in this thesis
do not depend on formal competences and hierarchical authority, a wide range
of public actors can be expected to be able to assume the role assumed by the
European Commission in the case studies of this thesis. Despite the fact that be-
cause of its supranational position, size and mandate, the European Commission
should not be the only public actor that could play such an entrepreneurial role.
As pointed out by Conlan, Beam, and Wrightson (1995, p. 135) and Baumgartner
and Jones (1993, p. 122), policy entrepreneurs are not defined by the position they
hold but by the actions they take. And the ability to take such entrepreneurial
actions, in turn, depends on the three above-mentioned qualities (see Kingdon,
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1984, pp. 189-190).
1. They must be taken seriously either as experts or as leaders of powerful
interest groups, or as authoritative decision-makers;
2. Second, they must be known for their negotiating skills;
3. They must be persistent.
Clearly, the Commission is not the only public actor that possesses these qualities.
For example, national ministries, parliamentary committees, or non-majoritarian
regulators, to mention but a few, may also possess these qualities and provide
entrepreneurial leadership. A recent example for such entrepreneurship, is
provided by the European Central Bank (ecb). It played a crucial role in the
private development of the settlement and payments systems of Single Euro
Payments Area (sepa).
Given the technical complexity of technical standardization, it may be argued
that if public actors are even able to play a purposeful role in this case, they should
also be expected to be able to play a role in less complex cases of self-regulation.
Moreover, this thesis highlighted that technical complexity should not necessarily
be understood as a constraint for public actors but as a smokescreen behind
which they can hide their political maneuvering. This provides an interesting
parallel to the regulation of financial markets, where the high complexity of
modern derivatives is often advanced as a argument against regulation.
This thesis has also shown, however, that although public entrepreneurship
may be very effective, it has its clear limits. First, it lack input legitimacy, as
discussed in in Section 6.4. And Secondly, it depends on a range of necessary
conditions, including early intervention, industry crisis and the presence of posi-
tive feedback mechanisms, such as network effects or scale economies, because
in lack of hierarchical authority public entrepreneurs cannot enforce compliance
themselves. This last condition may seem like a rather restrictive condition. In
practice, however, such positive feedback mechanisms are quite common. Ac-
cording to Baumgartner and Jones (2002, p. 21), positive feedback mechanisms
are almost always present where actors’ decisions are directly affected by the
decisions previously taken by other actors around them.3 Therefore, network
effects and scale economies are not the only feedback mechanisms that may lead
to the self-enforcement of self-regulatory arrangements. Alternative mechanisms
3As examples, Baumgartner and Jones (2002, p. 21) mention agglomeration effects in New
Economic Geography (Krugman & Venables, 1990), bank runs, fashions, fads, and fund raising of
candidates standing for political offices. As potential donors have no interest in giving money to
the losing candidate, the candidate considered to have the highest chances of winning ends up
winning because she is able to raise more funds than her competitors.
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may, for instance, include learning effects (see Milner & Yoffie, 1989), mimetic
isomorphisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) or the setting of market expectations.
Moreover, the compliance problem may be overcome through mechanisms that
are not based on positive feedback such as the incorporation into private contracts,
as a defense against tort or as in insurance policies (Majone, 1996, pp. 23-26).
The findings of this thesis may also contribute to the various literatures on
positive feedback mechanisms. This thesis may help understand what factors
trigger such mechanisms. Though under different names, positive feedback mech-
anisms are the basis of a whole range of theories in political science, sociology
and economics. At this point, however, only three examples shall suffice.
The New Economic Geography literature, for instance, talks about “cumulative
causation.” Depending on transportation costs, labor mobility and wage flexibility,
such positive feedback mechanisms are used to explain the concentration of
economic activity in one place rather than another (Krugman & Venables, 1990).4
In political sociology, Putnam’s (1993) explanation of the diverging levels of
civic trust and norms of reciprocity in northern and southern Italy, to mention
another example, is also based on positive—and negative—feedback mechanisms,
which he calls virtuous or viscous circles. The more citizen trust the governance
institutions that surround them, Putnam shows, the better these institutions
perform, which in turn increases citizen’s trust in these institutions. In political
science, Converse and Pierce’s (1986) study of the French riots and demonstrations
during May 1968 and Lohmann’s (1994) study of the political protests in the
German Democratic Republic that eventually led to the fall of the Berlin Wall
may serve as an example. Both studies are based on the assumption that while
individual citizens cannot protest alone, the more ready people are to join such
demonstrations the more people already participate. This, however, is not an
exhaustive list.5 Theories on positive feedback mechanisms can be found in
almost all the social sciences.
What all these theories have in common, as pointed out by Baumgartner and
Jones (2002), appears to be that these mechanisms only come into play once a
specific threshold or critical mass is achieved. In some cases the threshold may
4When a company relocates in one place and brings along its employees it increase the size of
that market. Therefore, other companies have an incentive to relocate to that market up to a point
where all companies have agglomerated in one market (Krugman, 1991). A similar mechanism
is believed to operate on the supply side (Krugman & Venables, 1995). Where companies are
suppliers of business inputs to each other, they will relocate to the market where these inputs are
most widely available until all companies have relocated to that market.
5The list could easily be extended by Chong’s (1991) social movements, bank runs, economic
business cycles, campaign contributions raised by candidates for political office that are deemed
most likely to win (see Baumgartner & Jones, 2002) etc. The Arab Spring and the recent riots in
London could serve as further examples.
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be reached by a single actor, in other cases it take a larger number of actors
to trigger these feedback processes. A priori, however, it is often difficult to
predict when the critical mass is achieved and by whom. Usually multiple
outcomes—equilibriums—are possible. Different candidates are just as likely
to win a critical mass of campaign funding, different regions are just as likely
to become the economic core or periphery, and different technologies may as
the result of network effects become the de facto standard. In the literature, the
tipping of toward one equilibrium rather than another is attributed to random
events. In the economic standardization literature, for instance, the tipping
of the market toward one standard rather than another is usually ascribed to
‘random historical event’ Arthur (1989a, pp. 126-128). Also in the New Economic
Geography literature the initiation of the cumulative causation processes leading
to the concentration of economic activity in one market rather than another is
attributed to random events. Randomness, however, is a non-explanation.
This thesis’ findings may help to replace the supposed ‘randomness’ with
a more systematic explanation. It highlights the politics that may drive these
processes and it may explanation how public actors may influence these feedback
processes, which are generally deemed beyond their control. By mobilizing
collective action, setting the agenda, building consensus, mediating decision-
making conflicts and organizing commitment, for instance, public entrepreneurs
may help achieve the critical threshold levels. The thesis’ findings also tie in
nicely with the suggestion of the New Economic Geography literature that
conventional interventions in the form of infrastructure investments tend to have
a counterproductive effect on the geographic concentration of economic activity.
Entrepreneurial interventions, as discussed in this thesis, however, may help to
trigger a cumulative causation process leading to the agglomeration of companies
in one place or another.
Despite its limitations, however, public entrepreneurship may be necessary
where conventional hierarchical policy interventions have the effect of exposing
private rule-making processes to political contestation. This is not specific to
private standardization. Also other forms of self– or co–regulation can be ex-
pected to be run the risk of being exposed to political contestation, provided
that exclusivity plays a similar role as it does in technical standardization. Wher-
ever the exclusivity of self-regulatory processes is key to overcoming collective
decision-making problems, hierarchical policy interventions by public actors can
also be expected to have a similarly unintended and counterproductive effect.
The exclusiveness of decision-making procedures, however, is not particular
to the case of technical standardization. Many private decision-making processes
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are characterized by this ‘club’ model of governance. Many of the so-called
new modes of governance, which generally bypass conventional democratic
decision-making venues, limit the number of actors involved in the decision-
making processes (Eberlein & Grande, 2005, p. 164; see Héritier & Lehmkuhl,
2011, p. 68). (Greven, 2005) speaks of a general trend toward the depoliticization
and informalization of policy making. Informalization is increasingly used to
overcome the decision-making problems that tend to constrain conventional
public policy-making processes and lead to costly political stalemates. “The
informality of the decision-making processes guarantees and outcome that really
solves the problems, or at least prevents complete blockage,” it is argued by
Héritier (1999, p. 56). Therefore, Eberlein and Grande (2005, p. 164) argue that
“access to informal decision-making bodies is necessarily selective and not subject
to any classical democratic control.” Exclusivity thus is not the price to be
paid for but the objective this informalization of policy-making. Therefore,
any hierarchical intervention in such informal governance arrangements can be
expected to expose it to political contestation.
In addition to the legitimacy concerns that this may raise (see Section 6.4), the
strategic instrumentalization of the exclusiveness of private standards-writing
processes highlights the politics that is involved in self-regulation as well as
entrepreneurial interventions in self-regulation. This thesis could neither confirm
the popular expectation of regulatory capture of nor the apolitical view that
policy entrepreneurs genuinely problem-oriented. It emphasized the need to
understand public entrepreneurs to be purposefully opportunistic, which not be
entirely opposed to solving problems but which are primarily by their quest to
expand their institutional competences.
6.3 The Failures of Public Interventions
6.3.1 Findings
However, this thesis did not only identify the conditions under which public
interventions in private standardization succeed. This thesis also provides an
answer why and in what circumstances public interventions may fail to have
purposeful influence on private standardization processes. It suggests that the
failure of public interventions is to be expected where public actors rely on
conventional policy instruments based on hierarchical authority or the power of
hard law.
Hierarchical instruments—and even the threat of using hierarchical instru-
ments as in the shadow of hierarchy—tend to have the unintended effect of
6. Conclusion 182
exposing technical standards-writing processes to political contestation. Such
interventions tend to undermine the exclusiveness of standards-writing processes
by mobilizing rival interests—i.e. veto players—as well as rival public actors—i.e.
veto points. Even the mere threat of using hierarchical instruments may have this
effect. The instruments that were investigated and categorized as hierarchical
interventions by this thesis include:
• The legal mandation of compliance (hdtv);
• Financial subsidies targeted at the deployment of standards (hdtv);
• The mere threat to use the two previously mentioned instruments (inter-
modal transport, Application Programming Interface) ;
• The use of the New Approach procedure to prompt industry to develop
standards for a given technology (intermodal transport).
The first effect that hierarchical interventions had on private standardization
processes is that they raise the stakes of the game. Expecting that they might
actually have to comply with the given standard eventually, more companies
start to participate in the standardization process in order to make sure that the
resulting standards conform with their technological and strategic preferences.
Even companies that previously chose to remain rationally ignorant, hoping
that the cost of adapting to the final standard would not exceed the immediate
costs of participating in the standardization process, will be compelled to start to
participate once hierarchical interventions have raised the stakes of the game.
Such a mobilization of actors and interests that were previously not involved
in the standardization processes but expected to be affected by it in response to
hierarchical policy interventions could be observed very clearly in this thesis. In
the case of intermodal transport standardization (Chapter 5) the road, rail, canal
and sea transport operators mobilized themselves in response to the Commis-
sion’s attempt to strengthen the standards developed by the combined transport
community. Even the politically weak and unorganized canal transport operators,
which initially could not afford to participate in the standardization process,
were able to start to get involved. In the case of the Commission’s mandation of
compliance with and subsidization of the hd -mac standard, the proponents of
the rival pal standard mobilized themselves against the hd -mac proponents.
And in the case of Application Programming Interface—i.e. digital video broad-
casting standardization—the threat to legally mandate compliance with the mhp
standard mobilized the proponents of rival Application Programming Interfaces
against the Commission’s intervention.
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A direct consequence of the multiplication of actors and interests involved
in the standardization process was that the scope for mutually acceptable agree-
ments within the standards-writing organizations and within the public decision-
making processes was significantly reduced. In the case of intermodal transport
standardization (Chapter 5) the consensus on the loading units that was already
achieved within cen was destroyed. The new participants did not support the
consensus that had been achieved on intermodal loading units before they had
become involved. Also in the political arena the mobilization of rival interests
eroded the support for the Commission’s legislative proposal. In the case of
hdtv (Chapter 3) standardization, the Commission’s intervention, too, caused a
political backlash. The proponents of the rival pal standard had organized into
a strong opposition that eventually vetoed the Commission’s plans.
A further result of hierarchical interventions is that it makes it more profitable
for companies that have less to lose or gain from a given standard to use the
raised stakes of the game to hold out agreement and demand concessions from
companies that do. In the case of Conditional Access standardization for instance,
the pay tv providers held out agreement and forced the public service broad-
casters and free tv providers to accept a compromise involving the technical
solution preferred by the pay tv operators.
The second effect that hierarchical public interventions in private standard-
ization processes have is that they open up new avenues of appeal—i.e. veto
points. In pluralist political systems, the use of hierarchical policy instruments
conventionally requires the consent of—and is subjected to the scrutiny of—other
public actors, such as parliaments and the courts. These provide opponents of the
given standard and policy intervention supporting that standard with effective
veto points that cannot only veto public interventions promoting a given standard
but which could also change the policy upon which it is based.
The European Commission’s attempted use of hierarchical policy instruments
in the case of hdtv and intermodal transport standardization intended to pro-
mote the market deployment of its preferred standards—i.e. the hd -mac and
eilu standards—directly implicated the ep and the Council. The Commission’s
interventions were based on the co-decision and co-operation procedures, which
required the consent of both institutions to implement the instruments it had
proposed. This turned the ep and the Council into effective avenues of appeal
to the opponents of the standard that the Commission sought to support. They
did not even have to get involved in the technical standardization organizations
themselves—which is rather costly and time consuming—to influence the makeup
of the standard or to prevent the adoption of a common standard. The opponents
could simply influence the outcome of the standardization process by appealing
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to the ep and the European Council.
Appealing to the ep and the Council rather than getting involved in the
standards-writing organizations also had the advantage to the opponents of
the given standards that they were more accessible than private standardization
organizations. In hdtv, the broadcasters and program makers that were formally
excluded from eureka, were able to make their voices heard in the ep and
Council. In the intermodal transport case study (Chapter 5), many companies
and industry associations that neither had the technical expertise nor the financial
resources to participate directly in the standardization process were able to
play an decisive role in the debate surrounding the legislative decision-making
process. A representative of the European Barge Union, for instance, suggested
in an interview that the inland-waterway industry would not have had the time,
resources or expertise to participate in the standardization process.6 In the
debates within the ep, however, it was able to play a leading role influencing the
final decision of the ep.
The shift of the standardization process into these political venues also
changed the way technical standards were negotiated. In contrast to the technical
standardization committees, which were generally focused on the engineering of
technical progress and thus resembled a positive-sum game, the political venues
are mainly concerned with the (re)distributive implications of the standards. They
turned the process into a zero-sum game. In the case of intermodal transport
standardization (Chapter 5) the road, rail, canal and sea transport operators used
the political debate in the ep and Council to point out the potentially negative
effects that the introduction of the eilu standard might have on their business,
neglecting the potential that the eilu or another standard might have in increas-
ing the overall efficiency of the European transport system. Similarly, in hdtv
standardization broadcasters and program makers put a lot of emphasis on the
adaptation costs that the introduction of the hd -mac standard would impose
upon them, without considering the overall potential of hd -mac or comparable
standards. Also in the case of Application Programming Interface standardization,
the opponents of the mhp standard rather emphasized how much it had already
invested in rival standards rather than proposing an alternative way to use the
potential that Application Programming Interface standardization provided for
the industry as a whole.
In all three cases, the opponents of standardization initially merely employed
a defensive strategy. By pointing out the potentially (re)distributive implications
that the introduction of positive or negative sanctions promoting the deployment
of the Commission’s standard might have, the opponents managed to destroy
6Interview b14 with a representative of the inland waterway industry (2009)
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Table 6.1: Intentions and Effect of the Commission’s Intervention in Intermodal
Transport Standardization
Intentions Effect
Installation of the EILU as de facto
standard in intra-European transport
Competing loading units, such as the
45 foot container and the Gigaliner,
stronger than before
Reduction of road transport’s market
share
Increased competitiveness and market
share of road transport
Strengthening of the political position
of Commission employees adhering
to the policy of intermodalism
A new group of Commission
employees supporting the policy of
co-modalism is strengthened
Table 6.2: Intentions and Effect of the Commission’s Intervention in HDTV
Standardization
Intentions Effect
Installation of the HD-MAC as the de
facto standard
Digital television is strengthened
Strengthening of the HD-MAC
alliance
Strengthened PAL alliance
Strengthening of the political position
of Commission employees adhering to
the policy of dirigiste industrial policy
A new group of Commission
employees supporting the policy of
laissez faire is strengthened
the policy consensus that had initially existed on the issue and upon which the
Commission’s interventions were based. In all of the three cases the ep and the
Council either vetoed the Commission’s proposals or diluted their content to such
an extent that the standardization alliances driving the standardization process
lost interest. The evidence therefore does not suggest that it was not possible to
adopt legislative decisions on standardization issues. However, it turns out to be
rather difficult to achieve the consensus that is necessary to adopt and support
a single common standard. Given the heterogeneity of interests involved in
legislative processes most agreements come in the form of compromises. Where
variety reduction is the purpose of technical standardization, however, such
compromises are usually not good enough.
What is remarkable about the inclusion of the above-mentioned veto players
and veto points is that it did not only destroy the initial policy consensus. Even-
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tually, it also left to a complete policy shift. Both in the intermodal transport and
the hdtv case the Commission’s interventions backfired completely. In the case
of European intermodal transport standardization (Chapter 5), for instance, the
Commission’s intervention was based on the policy paradigm of intermodalism
and was meant to boost the deployment of the eilu and to strengthen the com-
bined transport industry against road haulers. The implication of the ep and
the Council through the Commission’s policy intervention, however, allowed the
opponents of the eilu standard to reverse the policy completely. They managed
to win legislative support for competing standards, such as the 45 foot container,
and to replace the dominant policy paradigm of intermodalism with the new
policy paradigm of co-modalism which was more favorable toward the road
transport industry. Similarly, instead of promoting the hd -mac standard and
strengthening the standardization alliance that had developed this standard, as
intended, the Commission’s intervention in hdtv standardization had the, a
priori, paradoxical effect of supporting the opponents of that standard.
This had to do with the fact that as a result of the shift of the standardization
process from the technical committees into the political arena the standardization
alliances lost control of—and therefore interest in—standardization. Thereby, the
European Commission lost its important allies, which were the main supporters
of their standardization strategies. At the same time new alliance opportunities
opened up. Reinforced by Commission-internal struggles, new alliance with the
previous opponents of the standardization coalitions were formed eventually.
These dramatic policy shifts directly conform with Baumgartner’s and Jones’
(1993) theory of radical policy change. When the policy venues change or a new
policy venue, such as in this case the ep and the Council—are included in the
policy-making process, the image of the policy shifts, which itself enforces the
venue shift and further amplifies the policy shift.
6.3.2 Contributions
While hierarchical policy instruments have recently undergone some criticism,
they are still considered more effective than entrepreneurial instruments (Braith-
waite, 2002, p. 19). Moreover, they are generally considered necessary to strengthen
entrepreneurial policy instruments,7 as for instance through the shadow of hi-
7In the regulation literature, this view is supported by Braithwaite (2002, p. 19), tn the principal-
agent literature it is assumed that the stronger public principals’ hierarchical control over their
private agents, the less likely private industry is going to behave in an undesirable way (Bendor
et al., 2001; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins et al., 1987; Pollack, 1997; Rasmussen, 2005;
Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2002), and even in the early entrepreneurship literature, which will be
discussed in the following Section, it is argued that the greater the initial grant of authority to the
policy entrepreneur the stronger its influence will be (Sandholtz, 1993, p. 251).
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erarchy.8 This thesis, however, demonstrated that, in circumstances mentioned
below, this does not need to be the case. Far from being a necessary condition,
hierarchy represents an exacerbating factor.
This study has shown, however, that hierarchical interventions, if only through
the shadow of hierarchy, do not necessarily need to prompt industry to develop
the desired standards. This finding may not only apply to public interventions
in private industry standardization. It may apply to self-regulation in general.
Where the following conditions are met, such interventions should be expected
to expose any self-regulatory process to political contestation, drawing in further
veto players and veto points. This conditions are:
1. The objective of self-regulation can be achieved through several self-regulatory
measures but firms need to agree to a single measure for self-regulation to
succeed;
2. In the absence of governmental intervention, self-regulation tends to take
place in exclusive groups of firms.
As argued above, neither condition is very uncommon as suggested by the
classic literature dealing with systems of exclusive rule-making ranging from
policy monopolies (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), policy whirlpools (Griffith, 1939),
sub-systems (Cater, 1964), iron triangles (Freeman, 1955) and issue networks, to
unitary advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988).
6.4 The Legitimacy Dilemma
6.4.1 Findings
Finally, this thesis also revealed the legitimacy problems of private standard-
setting in general and the role of public actors in technical standardization in
specific.
Confronted with this issue, standardization practitioners often tend to argue
that the input legitimacy really was not such an issue because of two related
reasons. First, it is often pointed out that compliance with technical standards—
in contrast to laws or regulation—was completely voluntary. And secondly, it
is argued that the market itself provided the necessary democratic control, as
consumers were free to chose another, non-compliant product. However, the
market competition is a bad surrogate for democratic decision-making. In the
8See Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, pp. 35-40), Braithwaite (2002, p. 19), Bercusson (1993), Börzel
(2009), Héritier and Rhodes (2011b); Héritier and Lehmkuhl (2008), and Mayntz and Scharpf
(1995).
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presence of positive feedback mechanisms, such as network effects and scale
economies, consumers actually have little choice. In theory only the first user(s)
and early adopter(s) can influence the selection processes. Once a technology
is locked in and becomes the de facto standard—and the literature has shown
that also inferior technologies can become locked in (Arthur, 1989b)—subsequent
adopters have no choice but to choose the standards chosen by previous adopters.
Because of the intrusive nature of technical standardization, however, output
legitimacy alone does not appear to suffice. The thesis’ case studies showed very
clearly that technical standardization is not as technical as it may seem—or as
some standard-setters may try to make them appear. Technical standardization
tends to have direct normative and redistributive consequences. In each case
there were clearly identifiable winners and losers. In the case of digital video
broadcasting standardization (see Chapter 4), for instance, standardization turned
to have come at the expense of public service and free tv broadcasters in specific
and the general public in general. Moreover, the decrease—or at least the failure
use the opportunity to increase—of media pluralism provides an example for the
potential normative consequences.
A rather sad example for the intrusive—and sometimes even disastrous—
impact of technical standards is provided by the recent nuclear disaster in
Fukushima, which is potentially the worst of its kind since Chernobyl. Fukushima’s
power plant used the so-called light-water reactor technology, which is the de
facto—compatibility not quality—standard for nuclear power plants around the
world. Unlike alternative reactor technologies, such as solid graphite and heavy
water reactors, however, light-water reactors suffer from a well-known weakness.
Their water cooling system tends to be comparatively unreliable, as demonstrated
by the events in Fukushima. If any of the alternative reactor technologies had
been used the nuclear catastrophe of Fukushima would not have happened—at
least not the way it did and potentially it would not have happened at all.
For an explanation why this technology became the international standard
despite its technological inferiority, it is necessary to go back to the 1950s. As
laid out in Arthur’s (1989b) seminal paper on increasing returns and lock-in by
historical events, which founded the economic standardization literature, the
success story of the light-water reactor started with a generous r&d subsidy
awarded by the us Navy. This subsidy provided the development of the light-
water technology with a first-mover advantage. None of the other technologies
ever stood a chance. Eventually it tipped the entire market toward the light-
water reactor, despite the fact that much of the engineering literature had argued
that, given equal development, the other technologies would have been superior
(Agnew, 1981). Given the alternative technologies relative underdevelopment,
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however, they could not compete with the light-water reactor. Its head start
had made the light-water reactor more economical and rendered the competing
technologies uncompetitive. Therefore, also the operators of Fukushima’s power
plants chose this rather than another, potentially superior and safer, technology.
One of the reason why the us Navy initially chose to subsidize the develop-
ment of the light-reactor rather than any alternative reactor technology had to do
with the fact that the former could be used on nuclear submarines. It is unlikely,
however, that the us Navy could have predicted the nuclear disaster that the
light-water reactor would cause more than half a century later in Fukushima.
Moreover, it cannot be excluded that an alternative reactor technology might have
caused a nuclear disaster too, had the Navy awarded its subsidies to the develop-
ment of an alternative reactor technology and had that technology become the
international standard. Also, it cannot necessarily be claimed that a more demo-
cratic standardization process could have prevented the disaster of Fukushima,
that, however, is not an argument against greater input legitimacy. For the intru-
siveness and—potential disastrousness—of technical standards, however, greater
input legitimacy should be deemed necessary.
Increasing input legitimacy, however, is not an easy task. This thesis confirmed
the hypothesis by Kerwer (2010) that there was a dilemma between input and
output legitimacy. The higher the input legitimacy—in terms of accessibility and
broad participation by all affected stakeholders—the lower the output legitimacy
appears to be and vice versa. The inclusion of a more representative and thus
heterogeneous set of actors only appears to lead to insurmountable decision-
making problems which prevent the adoption of common standards. This raises
the question whether public actors could solve the dilemma between output and
input legitimacy.
The case studies showed, however, that neither hierarchical nor entrepreneurial
interventions solve this dilemma. While hierarchical interventions may improve
input legitimacy, they also tend to decrease output legitimacy by exposing tech-
nical standardization processes to political contestation at the same time. For
entrepreneurial interventions it turns out to be the opposite. Entrepreneurial
leadership, as provided by the European Commission in the cases of mobile
telecoms and the first phase of hdtv standardization, may improve the output
legitimacy by facilitating private collective action and decision-making problems.
The increased output legitimacy, however, directly turns out to come at the price
of input legitimacy. If anything, the Commission’s entrepreneurial interventions
only increased the exclusivity and insulation from broader participation of pri-
vate standard-setting processes. And given the political self-interest of public
entrepreneurs, as described in this thesis, they cannot necessarily be trusted to
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protect the public interest. While they are not generally opposed to protecting the
public interest, they are unlikely to get intervene unless it is in their institutional
self-interest.
This was also shown by this thesis and becomes particularly apparent in the
comparison between the mobile telecoms and the dvb case studies. Whereas the
Commission appears to have found it beneficial to intervene in the case of mobile
telecoms standardization, it chose not to in the case of dvb standardization.
Commissioner Bangemann realized that, after the Commission had burned its
fingers in the case of hdtv standardization, there was no political capital to be
gained from an intervention in dvb standardization. To the contrary even, a
group of Commission employees that had forged a elaborated policy network
with the pay tv operators, saw it profitable not to intervene for the pay tv
operators benefited most from the status quo and non-intervention.
The cases of mobile telecoms and dvb standardization also illustrate the
variable use of the public interest as a political argument by public entrepreneurs
such as the Commission. In the case of mobile telecoms standardization, the
Commission argued since the 1980s that the technological interoperability of
mobile telecoms systems was in the public interest thus justifying ex ante policy
interventions. In the case of dvb standardization, by contrast, it was argued
in relatively similar market circumstances that interoperability was not in the
public interest despite the fact that standardization offered an opportunity to
improve media pluralism and diversity. Instead the Commission argued that
access regulation was sufficient to maintain the public interest, which, as this
thesis case study (Chapter 4) showed, was not the case.9
The reason for the Commission’s different argumentation in the two cases
appears to have been linked to the political alliances that it allowed it to make. In
the case of dvb standardization (Chapter 4), non-intervention and the Commis-
sion’s alliance with pay tv operators allowed it to strengthen its position vis-à-vis
the ep and Council. And in mobile telecoms, the Commission’s entrepreneurial
leadership and its close ties with industry allowed the Commission to expand its
competences in telecoms as well as industrial policy. Therefore, the Commission
9In European mobile telecoms standardization—particularly in the case of third-generation
technology—it could be argued that there had a strong case for a governmental limitation to ex
post regulation. Protect by the dominant policy paradigm of interoperability and on the basis
of the common European gsm standard, the European telecoms equipment manufacturers had
managed consolidate their market position and the degree of concentration in the market had
reached worrying dimensions. More competition between standard-setters might have resolved
some of the anti-trust concerns. In the case of dvb standardization, by contrast, the analysis of this
thesis shows that the governmental limitation to ex post regulation was not sufficient to construct
a competitive market for digital television equipment and services. Moreover, it could be argued
that the opportunity to increase media pluralism seems to have provided a good case for ex ante
government interventions to ensure digital interoperability.
6. Conclusion 191
also appears to have been happy to tolerate increasingly worrying degrees of
market concentration in the European mobile equipment industry.
This irreconcilability of output and input legitimacy in technical standard-
ization raises the question what is more important input or output legitimacy.
It was suggests that output legitimacy alone was not sufficient. If increased
input legitimacy is only to be achieved at the price of output legitimacy, however,
should no standards be preferred to democratically illegitimate standards? This
thesis does not appear to provide a conclusive answer to that question. On
the one hand, the failure of hdtv suggests that no standard was preferable
to an illegitimate standard developed by an exclusive group of multinational
companies. On the other hand, the failure of dvb standardization rather suggests
that the failure to adopt single common standards represented the worst possible
outcome. European standard-setters sacrificed a great opportunity to increase
media pluralism and diversity. However, this is not directly an argument for
a democratically illegitimate standardization processes. It rather demonstrates
the limits of private standardization processes. When important public interests,
such as media pluralism, are at stake, alternative governance processes seem
necessary. How these should look as if it could not be answered by this study
and may require further research.
6.4.2 Contribution?
The dilemma between input and output legitimacy described in this thesis
is not specific to the case of technical standardization. Kerwer (2010, p. 4)
has argued that this was a more generic phenomenon affecting many global
governance institutions, which, as the result of global regulation having become
more intrusive and wider in scope, are facing increasing pressure to become
more democratic. At the same time, however, the effectiveness of many of these
organizations depends on this club model. As an example, Kerwer mentions
the wto, which with now over 150 member states, is struggling to conclude the
Doha round. Therefore, the dilemma identified in this thesis may also apply to a
wider universe of cases.
Bellamy et al. (2011) and Greven (2005, p. 264), for instance, point out that
many new modes of governance, which tend to bypass conventional policy
processes and/or include private rule-makers, are faced with this dilemma
between input and output legitimacy. They, in fact, criticize that the enhanced
problem-solving—i.e. output legitimacy—of these new modes has come at the
price of input legitimacy—i.e. democratic accountability.
As a solution to this dilemma, they suggest that a credible threat of hierarchical
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interventions by democratically elected actors looming over private rule-making
processes would ensure both output and input legitimacy (Bellamy et al., 2011,
p. 162; Börzel, 2007, p. 46; Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011, p. 70). If something went
wrong, they were there to defend the public interest with hierarchical policy
instruments. This thesis, however, demonstrated that, under the circumstances
mentioned above, this solution is not viable. The shadow of hierarchy does not
solve the dilemma between input and output legitimacy either.
Having identified the weaknesses of the shadow of hierarchy, however, this
thesis could not present an alternative solution to this dilemma. Above it sug-
gested that where there is a trade-off between input and output legitimacy the
question whether input or output legitimacy could or should be sacrificed can
only be assessed on a case by case basis. To full grasp the output legitimacy of a
technical standard, however, a more technical analysis would be necessary, which
goes beyond the scope of a social sciences thesis. This is, perhaps, one of the
main limitations of this thesis.
6.5 Explaining the Growth of European Standards
Finally, the role of the European Commission in European standardization that
was identified in this thesis may explain the specific nature of European standard-
ization. European standardization distinguishes itself from other standardization
systems by its high degree of cooperation among standard-setters, which takes
place in highly formalized standards-writing organizations. In the us, by con-
trast, the development of standards tends to be more market led. Given the
collective action and decision-making problems discussed above, this collabora-
tive approach of European standardization should be expected to constrain the
adoption of European standards. As shown in Figure 6.1, which is reproduced
from Chapter 1, the three official European standards-writing organizations cen,
cenelec, and etsi have published more standards per year since the 1990s than
the international or even the most active national standards-writing organizations,
the German din.
There are several approaches to explaining this phenomenon. First, neo-liberal
opponents of government intervention, for instance, might argue that the double
delegation of (1.) regulatory authority from national public policy-makers to the
European level and (2.) from European policy-makers to private standard-setters,
finally provided private actors with the room and freedom to demonstrate their
superior governance capacity. This argumentation, however, has three weaknesses.
First, according to this argumentation, the majority of technical standards should
be expected to have been set at the international, rather than the European level.
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Figure 6.1: Annual standards output at national (Germany), international and
European level (1986-2008)
Source: perinorm , iso , iec , cen , cenelec , etsi catalogues, see Mattli and
Büthe (2007).
At the international level, the role of public policy-makers is far weaker than
at national or, to a lesser extent, at the European level. The scope for private
governance is hence much larger at the international level. Yet in reality the
majority of standards was developed at the European level.
The second weakness of the above-mentioned argumentation is that it neglects
the collective action and bargaining problems that constrain the private develop-
ment of technical standards as described above. These decision-making problems
should have been exacerbated by the European market integration project. The
systematic reduction of (public) tariff barriers should have prompted national
industry to build on (private) non-tariff barriers, such as technical standards, to
protect their markets. Especially, the companies that were bound to be hurt by
the opening of their markets to European competition should have been expected
to veto the adoption of European standards and build on national standards
instead.
Mattli and Büthe (2007, pp. 25–26) provide another potential explanation
for the comparatively higher degree of European standardization activity. They
argue that this has to do with the formalized inter-institutional cooperation
among national—and between national and supra-national— standards-writing
organizations in Europe. The inter-institutional cooperation is governed by a
variety of private agreements between standards-writing organizations and eu
regulations.
Mattli’s and Büthe’s formal institutionalist approach, however, leaves several
questions unanswered. It fails to answer how this institutional structure came
about. The new institutionalist literature on the varieties of capitalism reveals the
diversity of standardization institutional standardization traditions that coexist in
Europe (Tate, 2001). If anything, Tate (2001) argues, the institutional differences
keep diverging rather than converging. This underlines the question how the
inter-institutional cooperation observed by Mattli and Büthe came about.
Moreover, such an institutionalist perspective brings attention to the fact that
the European standards-writing organizations operate rather slowly. Despite the
introduction of qualified majority voting, the principle of consensus has prevailed
as the main mode of decision-making (Hawkins, 1995; Schepel, 2004), which often
leads to gridlocks. The development of European standards takes several years.
Therefore, this perspective does not provide an explanation for this phenomenon.
If anything, it underlines the puzzle.
The findings of this thesis, however, may provide an agency-based explanation
of the sudden increase in European standardization, which coincided with the
growing occupation of the European Commission with standardization issues.
Although similar regulatory actors may exist at the national level the European
Commission is rather unique in that it is located at the interface between national
and international standardization and in that its formal policy competences are
limited. Therefore, it can be expected to be more likely to rely on entrepreneurial
policy instruments than other public actors with greater hierarchical authority
and access to hierarchical policy instruments. As argued in this thesis, the use of
entrepreneurial instruments is crucial. Therefore, the unique role and inclination
of the European Commission to rely on entrepreneurial instruments may explain
why more standards are developed at the European rather than the national or
international level. Given the methodological focus of this thesis, further research
seems necessary to test this hypothesis.
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Glossary
Application Programming Interface is the operating system that connect soft-
ware applications and hardware in digital decoders, which can be viewed
as the digital TV analogy to Unix or Windows for Personal Computers. 121,
123–126, 129, 131, 182, 184
co-modalism It has the objective of maximizing the efficiency of each mode of
transport – including road transport – in its own right. The underlying logic
of co-modality is that once each mode is allowed to achieve its full potential,
fright traffic would automatically shift to the most efficient option. Instead
of pushing freight traffic to what is perceived to be the most efficient mode
of transport, the new policy objective is to rely on the market pull of the
mode that turns out to be the most efficient in practice. 157, 159, 162, 163,
186
Common Interface is a socket in the TV decoder that is designed to allow con-
sumer to access any pay TV operators’ programs by inserting the given
operators credit card sized standardized decoder card containing the infor-
mation relevant for conditional access. 116
Conditional Access allows broadcasters to encrypted/scramble their television
programs and to restrict access to (paying) subscribers owning the broad-
caster’s set-top box to descramble/decrypt the signal.. 113–121, 123–126,
129, 131, 174, 183
Convention for Safe Containers A United Nations Convention from December
2, 1972, which provides for the approval of ISO Series 1 containers and
their periodic inspection. Non-stackable swap bodies are exempted. Most
Member States have ratified this Convention, in accordance with Council
Recommendation 79/487/EEC (OJ L 125, 22.5.1979, p. 18). 146, 154
de facto This thesis distinguishes between de facto and de jure standards. This
distinction describes the two main processes through which standards are
developed: cooperation and competition. De facto standards emerge from
the market, often with the help of network effects and increasing returns to
scale. 12, 60, 64, 66, 74, 91, 102, 116, 123, 132, 135, 136, 151, 168, 180, 188
de jure Standards are developed through cooperation within the formal standards-
writing organizations. 12, 16, 25, 91, 135
E!95 A EUREKA funded R&D project aimed at the development of HD-MAC
under the, launched in 1988. 84–88, 92, 102, 107, 176
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Gigaliner A 25 meter long and 60 ton heavy road vehicle, which breaches
Directive 96/53/ec. Currently, the maximum vehicle length is 16,650 mm
and the maximum weight is 40 tons for road transport and 44 tons for
combined transport.. 160, 162–164
intermodal transport Generally refers to the movement of fright in one and
the same loading unit or vehicle, successively using various modes of
transportation (road, rail, water, air, pipeline) without any handling of
the goods themselves during the transfer between modes. 142The goal
of making optimal use of all the various modes of transportation. This
notion assumes that the use of multiple modes for a single trip can be
advantageous from both an economic efficiency and environmental point of
view (OECD, 2001, p. 1). 142, 157, 159, 162.
iso Series 1 containers A loading unit standardized by the ISO. Although hardly
used in inter-European transport, they have become the de facto standard of
intercontinental maritime transport. The dimensions of Series 1 containers
vary but all of them are based on a steel frame, which allows them to be
lifted from the top corners and to be stacked on top of each other. 135, 136,
147, 149, 153, 154
New Approach The ‘New Approach to Harmonisation and Standardisation’, rep-
resents a legislative innovation from 1985 (Council Resolution of 7 May
1985 on a new approach to technical harmonisation and standards. OJ
136, 4.6.1985, p. 1-9). It limits the responsibility of the legislators to the
definition of “essential requirements” that goods must meet to be placed
on the European market. The official European standards bodies are then
to translate these essential requirements into technical specifications, re-
ferred to as ‘harmonised standards’. Goods and services that comply with
harmonised documents are presumed to conform with the essential require-
ments. Therefore, they cannot easily be refused market access.. 14, 17, 25,
42, 133, 134, 148, 152, 153, 155, 156, 164, 165, 182
pallets Raised platforms, normally made of wood, facilitating the handling of
goods. In 1947, two different dimensions were standardized by the ISO
(ISO 6780). The first, also known as the Europallet is 0.8 meters wide
and 1.2 meters long. The second, which is also known as the UK pallet,
is 1 meter wide and 1.2 meters long (This study will generally refer to
the former rather than the letter). These dimensions resulted from the
adoption of the basic packaging module (400 mm x 600 mm), which had
repercussions on the dimensions of furniture and, in particular, household
appliances. Although they were also standardized by the ISO, the ISO
Series 1 containers were deliberately left incompatible with these pallet
sizes. At the time of standardization, containers and pallets were considered
competing technologies. 136
swap body A loading unit that owes its name to four up-folding legs under its
frame that make it possible to ‘swap’ it from one carrier to another, or to
leave it at a location, without the help of a crane. In contrast to ISO Series
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1 Containers, they can generally only be lifted by forklift from the bottom
rather than the top. They are also generally not stackable. 137, 138, 143, 148,
149, 151, 153, 154
Technical Specification A form of draft technical standard with an initial validity
of three years, which can be extended to a maximum of six years. During
this period the members of CEN are requested to submit their comments,
particularly on the question whether the technical specification at question
can be converted into a European Norm. Unlike European Norms, technical
standards do not require the withdrawal of conflicting national standards
until the final decision about the possible conversion into European Norms
is reached. 148
technical standard A codification of technology, intended for voluntary but wide-
scale and repeated use. In the context of this thesis, the term ‘technical’
standards is used to refer to compatibility and interface standards, rather
than reference and minimum/maximum quality standards.. 12, 13, 15, 16,
172, 173, 184
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Acronyms
ASA American Standards Association. 135
BIC International Container Bureau. 145, 146, 148
BSKYB British Sky Broadcasting. 97, 114, 115, 117, 121, 128
CEO chief executive officer. 62, 71
DG TREN Directorate-General for Energy and Transport. 142, 145, 154, 162, 163
DG Directorate-General. 46, 62, 99, 100, 120, 162
DTI Department of Trade and Industry. 98
DVB Digital Video Broadcasting. 105, 107–112, 115–117, 119, 125, 126, 131, 132,
151, 167, 168, 173, 190, 191
EBU European Broadcasting Union. 80, 82, 105, 122
ECB European Central Bank. 178
EILU European Intermodal Loading Unit. 151, 153–159, 161–164, 183, 184, 186
EN European Norm. 12
EP European Parliament. 23, 24, 41, 61, 73, 74, 84, 87, 92–94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 113,
119, 123, 127, 128, 134, 145, 153, 155, 156, 161–163, 165, 183–186, 190
EU European Union. 14, 21, 23, 36, 73, 82, 83, 86, 95, 110, 119, 120, 133, 140,
152–154, 159, 193
FCC Federal Communications Commission. 73
FRAND fair reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions. 117, 119, 120, 126
GDP growth domestic product. 14, 69
GNP gross national product. 140
GSM Global System of Mobile Telecommunication. 55–63, 65–72, 74, 75, 86, 88,
90, 99, 100, 102, 103, 108, 131, 135, 136, 151, 170, 172–176, 190
ICT information and communication technologies. 13, 37, 57, 63, 171
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission. 109
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IPR intellectual property rights. 59, 63, 64
IRU International Road Transport Union. 158
ISO International Standardization Organization. 109, 135, 136, 138, 143, 147–149,
151, 157, 158, 160
ITTF Information Technologies Task Force. 46–48, 51, 62, 78, 79, 81–83, 85
ITU International Telecommunications Union. 59, 65, 73
IT information technologies. 45, 46, 49, 51, 53, 55, 63, 66, 78, 126
MHP Multimedia Home Platform. 125–129, 131, 182, 184
MOU memorandum of understanding. 49, 59, 72, 90, 99, 107, 174
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 142
R&D research and development. 47, 51–59, 62, 65, 68, 70, 71, 75, 79, 82, 85, 86,
88, 95, 103, 129, 146, 171, 173, 174, 188
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area. 178
SMG Special Mobile Group. 68, 71
TC119 Technical Committee for “Swap bodies for combined goods transport”.
143, 144, 146–149, 151–153, 155, 156, 161
TC Technical Committee. 143
TS Technical Specification. 125, 148
UIC International Union of Railways. 159
UIRR Union internationale des sociétés de transport combiné Rail-Route. 143,
144, 146
UK United Kingdom. 36, 58, 97, 110, 114, 118, 122, 128, 136, 159
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. 66, 68–70, 72–76, 99, 100,
102, 103, 121, 170, 173–175
US United States. 17, 23, 47, 48, 51, 61, 66, 69, 72, 73, 79, 83, 84, 96, 99, 101, 135,
136, 140, 167, 171, 188, 189, 192
HDTV high-definition television. 39–41, 44, 55, 61, 77, 79–83, 86, 87, 90, 93, 95–98,
100–102, 106, 108, 110, 119, 128, 141, 142, 145, 157, 160–162, 170–172, 176,
182–184, 186, 189–191
ACTS Advanced Communications Technologies and Services. 68, 70
CCIR Consultative Committee for International Radio. 80–82, 87, 90, 171
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access. 70, 71
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CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization. 14, 18, 21,
110, 133, 192
CEN European Committee for Standardization. 14, 18, 21, 22, 133, 143, 144, 148,
152, 154, 156, 164, 183, 192
CEPT European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations.
48, 49, 51, 56, 57, 176
DIN German Standardization Institute. 18, 144, 192
ESPRIT European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Infor-
mation Technologies. 51–53
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute. 14, 18, 21, 57, 69, 71,
102, 110, 125, 133, 177, 192
EUREKA European Research Co-ordinating Agency. 84–86, 90, 99, 102, 103, 107,
176, 184
FRAMES Future Radio Wideband Multiple Access System. 71
HD-MAC High Definition Multiplexed Analogue Components. 61, 82–88, 90–
104, 106–109, 118, 119, 123, 157, 160, 162, 182–184, 186
MAC High Definition Multiplexed Analogue Components. 80, 82, 90–93, 95, 97,
98, 100, 109, 123
PACT Pilot Actions for Combined Transport. 145
PAL Phase Alternative by Line. 78, 80, 82, 90–94, 97, 98, 102, 182, 183
PTT Postal, Telegraph and Telephone administration. 45, 48, 49, 51–55, 57–59,
176
RACE Research and technology development in Advanced Communications in
Europe. 53, 54, 57, 68, 70, 85, 103
SECAM Sequential Color with Memory. 78, 80, 82, 91–93
SGKV Study Group for Combined Transport. 143
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access. 55
WTO Worldwide Trade Organization. 73, 191
WTVML Worldwide TV Mark-up Language. 128
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